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INTRODUCTION
Changes in the technology used to create, disseminate, and store
information are likely to present some of the most complex challenges
to lawyers, policymakers, and citizens throughout the world in the next
century. Some of these challenges present broad choices; others present
the more constrained, and perhaps more difficult, problem of adopting
legal rules to reflect new and not always welcome technological reali-
ties. It is important to establish what choices exist, if only to navigate
intelligently in the coming policy turbulence. The set of legal and pol-
icy options is shaped not just by culture, history, and politics but by the
constraints of technology. This article seeks to explore the limits that
technology imposes on the legal and policy options available to those
concerned about anonymous communication, digital cash, and distrib-
uted databases, and the ways in which proposed limits on anonymous
communication might reduce personal privacy in unexpected ways.
Anonymity lies at the heart of three interrelated problems arising
from computer-aided communications over distributed networks (which
I will call "the Internet" for short1). First, communicative anonymity is
an issue in itself: the Internet makes anonymous communication easy,
and this has both good and bad consequences. Legislation to restrict
anonymous electronic speech has been introduced in state legislatures
and in Congress.2 Second, the availability of anonymous electronic
communication directly affects the ability of governments to regulate
electronic transactions over the Internet (both licit and illicit). Third,
anonymity may be the primary tool available to citizens to combat the
compilation and analysis of personal profile data, although data protec-
tion laws also may have some effect also. The existence of profiling
databases, whether in corporate or public hands, may severely constrict
1. Actually, "the Internet" is not one thing, but a set of tools. I. Trotter Hardy, Government
Control and Regulations of Networks, paper presented at Symposium on The Emerging Law of
Computer Networks, Austin, TX, May 19, 1995 (on file with author). The Internet provides the best
example because it exists today. The analysis will, I hope, scale up to any successor network al-
though there is good reason to believe that it does not scale down to discussions that occur entirely
within a forum owned and operated by a single Internet Service Provider such as America OnLine or
Compuserve, at least absent common carrier status. Cf. Pacific Gas And Elec. Co. v. Public Utils.
Comm'n of Calif., 475 U.S. 1 (1986); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
2. See 1995 Pa. S.B. 655, 179th Gen. Assem., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (enacted June 13, 1995)
(amending 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 910(a)(1)). Proposed federal legislation sought to prohibit all
anonymous electronic messages intended to "annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person ...who
receives the communication." S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(B) (1995). A similar proposal
was introduced in Connecticut, see Larry Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1750
n.20 (1995).
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the economic and possibly even the political freedoms of the persons
profiled; although profiling may not necessarily change the amount of
actual data in existence about a person, organizing the data into easily
searchable form reduces her effective privacy8 by permitting "data
mining" and correlations that were previously impossible. As U.S. law-
yers we are most accustomed to thinking about the problems of data
creation, dissemination, and access in certain delimited categories such
as the First Amendment, intellectual property rules, the torts of inva-
sion of privacy and defamation, and perhaps in the ambit of a few nar-
rowly defined statutes such as the Privacy Act' or the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act.5 These categories are valuable, but are collectively
inadequate to the regulatory and social challenges posed by the infor-
mation production, collection, and processing booms now under way.
The policy choices left open in each of these three areas-anony-
mous electronic speech, anonymous electronic commerce, and the con-
flict between data profilers and privacy-seekers -varies, and depends
critically on the nature and number of the potential targets of regula-
tion. In the course of a description of these new technologies and their
possible effects, this Article will make the following arguments and
assertions:
Anonymous Electronic Speech. Once Internet access becomes
widely deployed it is not realistically possible for any government to
monitor the content of every citizen's Internet communications, espe-
cially if cryptographic tools are easily obtained.' Part II suggests that
3. I use "privacy" in this article to mean "the control of information about oneself." See, e.g.,
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1970). By using "privacy" in this sense I do not mean to
suggest that there is necessarily a "privacy right" to control information about oneself. That is, for
the purposes of this article, a question of policy that needs debate. For arguments that if there is a
"right" to privacy it means something other than the right to control information about oneself, see,
e.g., Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Right To Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 295 (1975).
William A. Parent, Privacy: A Brief Survey of the Conceptual Landscape, 11 SANTA CLARA
COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 21 (1995), gives a useful survey of the various ways in which the term
privacy can be deployed, including: "the right to be let alone," Samuel D. Warren & Louis B.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890), "control of personal information
about oneself," Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968), "limitation of access to one-
self," Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980), "having
control of [one's] entire realm of intimate decisions," JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND
ISOLATION 7 (1992), and Dean Prosser's four privacy torts, William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REV. 383 (1960).
4. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1977).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1995). Several other nations have data protection laws. See infra text
accompanying note 347.
6. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key. Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and
the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995).
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the same is true of monitoring the sending of anonymous communica-
tions: So long as the tools to communicate anonymously remain widely
available in other countries, there is not much that any single country
can do about it. Nations could, however, make it difficult for their own
citizens to provide those tools to others, and if essentially all nations
connected to the Internet did this independently or as the result of a
concerted effort, the result would be to make anonymous electronic
communication more difficult and more risky. Whether this would be
constitutional in the U.S. is, however, debatable. It is even less likely
that all other major industrialized nations would agree to such a policy.
If even one nation with extensive Internet connections chooses not regu-
late the provision of anonymizing technology, the effect is to make
anonymous communication possible by all persons connected to the
Internet.
Anonymous Digital Cash. Part III describes a number of compet-
ing digital cash products. It is too soon to tell which if any of these
products will become widely used. Whatever products persist, national
governments are likely to be concerned about digital cash because they
will fear that it facilitates illicit transactions, and makes money laun-
dering easy. While digital cash enables rapid, electronic, and even in-
ternational transactions, only anonymous digital cash is likely to raise
regulatory hackles since the non-anonymous variety leaves easily
audited records. Furthermore, as Part III explains, different types of
digital cash have significantly different implications for law and policy
regarding anonymous digital commerce. Many types of digital cash do
not allow anonymous transactions at all. Others allow the payor, but
not the payee, to be anonymous, although digital money laundries
might be able to provide two-way anonymity. Only one of the schemes
discussed in Part III is designed to allow direct peer-to-peer fund trans-
fers without the intermediation of an entity functioning as a bank, and
even that system could be configured to keep records of every
transaction.
Until very large amounts of untraceable anonymous currency are
in wide circulation, and these funds are widely accepted for physical
purchases as well as electronic commerce, the owners of electronic cash
will need a means of transferring funds from electronic cash to ordi-
nary cash. In most cases, the owners of significant sums of electronic
cash will also want to invest their funds. In either case they will require
the services of a financial service provider, such as a bank. Thus, at
least in the medium term, governments may be able to control anony-
[Vol. 15:2:395
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mous commerce by concentrating on financial service providers. Finan-
cial service providers are already highly regulated, and present a rela-
tively easy target for governments seeking to prevent fully anonymous
fund transfers. Regulators may also benefit from the reluctance of con-
sumers to bank abroad, even when offered accounts denominated in
their home currency. If, however, consumers become more willing to
bank abroad, the ability of governments to control anonymous transac-
tions will be reduced further, unless all or almost all governments are
able to agree on common rules.
Anonymity as a Privacy-Enhancing Response to Profiling. Part IV
suggests that the policy decision to limit anonymous commerce could
itself have large costs. Diverse data become more valuable when aggre-
gated. If, as tends to be the case today, the aggregations are carried out
by small numbers of parties who hold the aggregated data in proprie-
tary databases, e.g., credit bureaus and credit card companies, then it
may be possible to regulate them to protect the informational privacy
of citizens. The existence of these regulatory chokepoints is unlikely to
last, however, because modern search techniques make it increasingly
attractive to keep data disaggregated, and continuously updated, while
making it searchable over distributed networks akin to the Internet. If
every data supplier to the network can also become a user of the net-
work's data, the number of parties who would have to be regulated
would grow considerably. When one considers that computerized data
are highly mobile, and that data can be stored or searched overseas in
"data havens," the regulatory possibilities begin to seem more limited.
If indeed regulation is unavailing, or unavailable for other reasons,
anonymous communications and anonymous commerce may be the pri-
mary tool available to most citizens to prevent their personal data from
becoming part of profiles over which they have no control, and which
may limit at least their economic options. Thus, it is conceivable that
an otherwise legitimate regulation on anonymous digital cash may have
such extreme effects on the ability of citizens to use the Internet to
receive information without having their reading habits recorded as to
call into question the regulation's constitutional propriety, not to men-
tion the wisdom, of such regulation.
Given the importance of anonymity to free speech, electronic com-
merce, and privacy, it is only a small exaggeration to suggest that the
debate about anonymity on the Internet is in effect a debate about the
degree of political and economic freedom that will be fostered, or toler-
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ated, in a modern society.7 Part I therefore seeks to frame the issue by
quickly sketching a few of the moral and social aspects of the debate
over anonymity.
I. THE MORAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
There is no consensus, nor is there likely to be, as to whether, on
balance, anonymity is a good. Anonymity has both valuable and harm-
ful consequences, and different persons weigh these differently. Some,
perhaps focussing on anonymity's contribution to many freedoms, ar-
gue that anonymity's benefits outweigh any likely harms it may cause,
or that the harms (e.g., censorship) associated with trying to ban ano-
nymity are not worth any benefits that could ensue. Others, perhaps
focussing on the victims of harmful actions that can be accomplished
anonymously, look at anonymity and often see dangerous license. Their
conclusion is that at least some forms of anonymity should be banned.
A. Costs of Anonymity
Anonymous communication is a great tool for evading detection of
illegal and immoral activity. Conspiracy, electronic hate-mail and hate-
speech in general, electronic stalking, libel, general nastiness, disclosure
of trade secrets and other valuable intellectual property, all become
lower-risk activities if conducted via anonymous communications.
These activities are merely low-risk rather than no-risk because it al-
ways remains possible to infer the identity of the author of some
messages from clues intrinsic to the message itself. For example, by
analyzing the manifesto issued by the "unabomber," the FBI concluded
that he went to class or "hovered around" a major university in the late
1970's to mid-1980's, most probably Northwestern University, the Chi-
cago Circle campus of the University of Illinois, the University of
Utah, Brigham Young University or University of California at Berke-
ley.' Similarly, the leaker of proprietary or classified data can some-
times be identified if the circle of people who had access to the infor-
mation was small.
An anonymous author suggests that the most serious argument
against anonymous speech is that "disclosure advances the search for
7. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Pri-
vate Sector, 80 IOWA L. Rav. 497, 500-01 (1995) ("In democratic society, information standards
reflect specific conceptions of governance. . . .For private interactions and the relationship between
citizens, both law and practice set the balance between dignity and free flows of information.").
8. Martin Gottlieb, Pattern Emerges in Bomber's Tract, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1995, at Al.
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truth," because when propaganda is anonymous it "makes it more dif-
ficult to identify the self interest or bias underlying an argument." 10
The author notes, however, that this argument assumes the validity of
the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, and that whether the benefit
of increased information from the ban on anonymous speech outweighs
the loss of the ideas whose expression the anonymity ban discourages is
an empirical question that is unanswerable.11 Justice Black, the First
Amendment absolutist, thought identity disclosure requirements might
enhance the freedom of speech, and suggested Congress could require
the disclosure of foreign agents "so that hearers and readers may not
be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinter-
ested source. Such legislation implements rather than detracts from the
prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment."
' 2
To an economist who treats markets in ideas as more concrete
than a metaphor, the desire to control information about oneself can be
either a final or an intermediate good. Treating privacy as a final good,
however, limits the power of economic analysis, since privacy is no
more than one of many elements of consumer preferences that deter-
mine her purchases when faced with the purchases that the market has
to offer." Judge Posner has suggested that privacy can usefully be ana-
lyzed as an intermediate good." Using this simplifying assumption,
Posner concluded that personal privacy is generally inefficient, since it
allows persons to conceal disreputable facts about themselves. 8 This
failure to disclose disreputable facts shifts costs of information acquisi-
tion (or the cost of failing to acquire information) on to those who are
not the least-cost avoiders. On the other hand, Posner argues that con-
cealment by businesses is generally efficient, since allowing businesses
to conceal trade secrets and other forms of intellectual property will
tend to spur innovation.16 Posner's formulation, however, has been criti-
9. Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70
YALE L.J. 1084, 1109 (1961) (collecting cases) [hereinafter Anonymous Note].
10. Id. at 1111.
11. Id. at 1112-13.
12. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
13. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978).
14. Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1979); Posner,
supra note 13.
15. See Posner, supra note 13, at 294-97.
16. Posner, supra note 13.
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cized for neglecting the strategic aspects of the individual's desire to
control the release of personal information that is not disreputable.17
Anonymous communication also poses particularly stark enforce-
ment problems for libel law and intellectual property law. While it may
be true that a signed defamatory message carries more credibility and
thus is more damaging than an anonymous one, it does not necessarily
follow that an unsigned message is harmless. Most people would proba-
bly be upset to discover a series of unsigned posters accusing them of
pedophilia tacked to trees or lampposts in their neighborhood. Perhaps
aware that some people believe that where there is smoke there must
be fire, the victim of such a libel is unlikely to be soothed by the sug-
gestion that anonymous attacks lack credibility. 8 An Internet libel can
be spread world-wide, and may be effectively indelible since it may be
reproduced, and stored, in countless and untraceable numbers of com-
puters.19 Anonymity can also be used to reveal a trade secret. For ex-
ample, on September 9, 1994 an anonymous poster sent source code
purporting to be RC4, a proprietary cryptographic algorithm of RSA
Data Security, Inc., to the cypherpunks Internet mailing list.20 In most
cases, a public posting will tend to reduce the value of a trade secret.2
Sissela Bok has argued that a society in which "everyone can keep
secrets impenetrable at will" be they "innocuous . . . [or] lethal
plans," noble acts or hateful conspiracies, would be undesirable because
"[i]t would force us to disregard the legitimate claims of those persons
who might be injured, betrayed, or ignored as the result of secrets inap-
17. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 43-53, 111-26 (1988); see also James Boyle,
A Theory of Law and Information Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 1413 (1992) (arguing that most law and economic analysis of markets for information are
based on fundamentally contradictory assumptions).
18. See, e.g., New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974) (arguing that people tend
to apply an appropriate discount to anonymous writing).
19. See Francis Auburn, Usenet News and the Law, [1995] 1 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES,
available online URL http://www.ncl.ac.uk/-nlawwww/articles1/auburnI.html (discussing the
failure of the Western Australia Supreme Court in Rindos v. Hardwick (No. 1994 of 1993, judg-
ment delivered 31 March 1994) to understand USENET and measure damages accordingly).
20. See RC4 Source Code, available online URL http://www.hks.net/cpunks/cpunks-7/
1369.html (entry in cypherpunks list archives). A spokesman for RSA Data Security stated that it
has been informed by third parties that the code produces output identical to RC4, but has not
confirmed this for itself. Telephone interview with Kurt Stammberger, Director of Technologies
Marketing, RSA Data Security, Inc. (Nov. 22, 1995) [hereinafter Stammberger Interview].
21. Interestingly, RSA itself suggested that the public posting of the purported RC4 source
code did not affect sales of licensed products because clients who want cryptographic products want
to purchase them from vendors they can trust to provide a genuine and reliable product.
Stammberger Interview, supra note 20.
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propriately kept."22 Justice Scalia believes anonymity is generally dis-
honorable because it eliminates accountability." This damage to soci-
ety's ability to redress legitimate claims is, I believe, the strongest
moral objection to the increase in anonymous interaction. It is also
clearly an objection with popular resonance, as a recent Wall Street
Journal column critiquing the growth of anonymous communication on
the Internet illustrates. 4 Even a more moderate writer, while admitting
that anonymity has its place, suggests that "[p]ermitting anonymity for
the purpose of removing any vestige of accountability for abusive be-
havior . . . is not likely to be tolerated in the Networld. ' 5
Anonymity has another serious consequence. Digital anonymity
exacerbates the trends that are producing a society of strangers. Stran-
gers are people who lack the mutual and continuous monitoring associ-
ated with life in a small town.26 Another way of putting the same point
is that strangers are people about whom one has little or no informa-
tion; in effect strangers engage each other as if they had complete in-
formational privacy. A society of strangers may be one in which trust
may be more difficult. "He who stands by what he has allowed to be
known about himself, whether consciously or unconsciously, is worthy
of trust. ' 27 People about whom one knows little or nothing are harder
to trust; they can be feared.
Anonymous communication can thus be viewed as one part of a
more general debate over the extent to which individuals should control
the dissemination of information about themselves. The problem is
more complex than the loss of some imagined rural idyll. Urbanization
itself does not necessarily breed mistrust. Georg Simmel suggested that
in many cases "external facts" about people and goods suffice to create
interpersonal confidence which therefore "no longer needs any properly
22. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 16, 28
(1982).
23. See infra text at note 46.
24. WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at BI, available online URL http://www.clas.ufl.edu/-avi/
NII/wsjno-anon.html.
25. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to The
First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1675 (1995); cf. George P. Long, III, Com-
ment, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1205 (1994) ("if
law enforcement authorities are precluded from obtaining the identities of anonymous users, illegal
activities will proliferate").
26. On traditional rural ideas of the personal relationships required as a prerequisite to a com-
mercial relationship, see Anne-Mari Sellerberg, On Modern Confidence, 25 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 39
(1982).
27. NIKLAs LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER 39 (Howard Davis et al. trans., 1979).
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personal knowledge." 8 Certainly, the prevalence of trust is valuable:2 9
"Trust is not the sole foundation of the world; but a . . . fairly complex
society . . . could not be established without trust."30 Anonymity, like
other forms of personal control over information, threatens to make ac-
cess to those "external facts" on which people rely more difficult. Un-
willingness to trust strangers leads to the growth of social institutions
designed to compensate for, or eliminate, anonymity-walled and
monitored communities, credit checks, lie detectors, drug tests and on-
the-job monitoring.31 "Surveillance is the cost of [] privacy. ''3 2 The re-
interpretation of Fourth Amendment privacy rights via so-called regu-
latory searches in recent decisions such as National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab,"3 and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 4
may be in part a response to perceived social consequences of privacy.35
28. GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 319 (Kurt H. Wolff trans. & ed.,
1964); see also Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies, 11 Am. J. Soc.
441 (1906).
29. See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531 (1995), for
delightful examples.
30. LUHMANN, supra note 27, at 94; see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIR-
TUES & THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995). Jon Elster defines trustworthiness as the ability to
make credible promises. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 274-75 (1989).
31. See STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY (1993).
32. Id. at 1.
33. 489 U.S. 656 (1989); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
634 (1989) (finding drug and alcohol tests mandated by Federal Railroad Administration regula-
tions reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347, 1347
(1977) (granting stay of injunction against further warrantless searches of workplaces permitted
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (1988
& Supp. V 1993))). But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (finding that the
defendant had a constitutional right to deny a housing inspector entry into a leasehold without a
warrant in a non-emergency situation).
34. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995) (upholding suspicionless mandatory drug testing of all student
athletes in high school). The case is shocking not for the authoritarian principle of law it reiterates,
that in the absence of a "clear" 18th century "practice" to guide Fourth Amendment analysis of the
reasonableness of a warrantless "administrative" search, the reasonableness "is judged by balancing
its intrusion . . . against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 2390 (quoting
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)), but for how the test was
applied: Justice Scalia concluded that because student athletes have a lower expectation of privacy
given the nature of the high school locker room, and because by volunteering for sports they "subject
themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally," id. at
2392-93, their privacy interest could be overbalanced by a school district's "perhaps compelling," id.,
desire to deter drug use in school by making examples of what it perceived to be student leaders,
despite an absence of any particularized suspicion that those students used drugs.
35. The result in Vernonia seems at least partly influenced by the District Court's finding that
the school was "in a state of rebellion" that "was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as
by the student's misperceptions about the drug culture." Id. at 2395. Justice Scalia described this as
[Vol. 15:2:395
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A similar impulse may motivate legislative initiatives such as Megan's
Law."
The objection to communicative anonymity with the most popular
resonance may blend all these concerns. The combination of communi-
cative anonymity with a powerful, global, poorly understood new me-
dium seems to threaten people because the Internet allows strangers to
reach into the same homes that are being turned into fortresses against
strangers, and to allow those strangers to interact with its inhabitants
(especially its children) without any risk of being held accountable for
their communications. It may be that the idea of the home as a secure
fortress is an illusion, 87 but it is a powerful hope.
B. Advantages of Anonymity
Ironically, the same anonymity that is blamed for undermining the
accountability necessary for the security of the home/fortress may turn
"an immediate crisis of greater proportions than existed in Skinner" id. where th showing of drug
use by railroad employees was based on national data, rather than data particularized to a single
railroad. Id. Nevertheless, while it may not have been particularized, the danger in Skinner affected
railway safety, a field in which accidents can kill hundreds; it is difficult to see a "crisis of greater
proportions" in a rebellious classroom.
36. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 (1996).
37. There is no doubt, for example, that the home is permeable to sense-enhanced searches by
the police and possibly others. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding valid a warrantless aerial surveillance of a greenhouse from four hundred feet);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding valid a warrantless aerial surveillance of a
yard enclosed by a 10-foot fence). Cf. Jeff Cole, Eyes in the Skies: New Satellite Imaging Could
Soon Transform The Face of the Earth, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1995, at Al (describing new genera-
tion of ultra-high-quality satellite images offered for sale).
The government can use satellites to spy in the home's windows. Lisa -J. Steele, Comment, The
View from on High: Satellite Remote Sensing Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 6 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 317, 327-33 (1991) (discussing warrantless searches by satellite and the applicable consti-
tutional implications). It may use heat-detection gear to monitor heat emanations from the home.
See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.) (holding that a warrantless use of infra-
red sensing devices did not violate the Fourth Amendment because any defendant's subjective expec-
tation of privacy in heat emanating from her house is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
objectively reasonable), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); but see State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593
(Wash 1994) (holding that warrantless use of infrared thermal detection device violates state consti-
tution); United States v. Cusamano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that warrantless use of
thermal imager upon home violates Fourth Amendment).
Given the wide range sense-enhanced searches outside the reasonable expectation of privacy for
Fourth Amendment purposes, see Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758-63 (1994) (ex-
plaining how the Supreme Court has used increasing permeability of home to enhanced intrusion as
a reason to find no reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment analysis), one can
reasonably ask what sort of intrusions other than a simple Peeping Tom is actionable as common law
trespass or invasion of privacy. Of course, unofficial invasions of privacy can be statutory offenses.
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out to be the tool that the inhabitants of that home need to level the
playing field against corporations and governments that might seek to
use new data processing and data collection tools in ways that constrain
the citizen's transactional or political freedom. Larger and faster
database processing techniques combined with the ever-increasing
quantity of personal data available on individuals makes it possible for
both governments and private organizations to construct personal
profiles based on transactions, demographics, and even reading habits
of most citizens. Since most people lack the ability to contract for pri-
vacy on affordable terms, their main line of defense against being pro-
filed is likely to be anonymous communication and anonymous
transactions."8
Anonymous communication may be particularly deserving of pro-
tection for its own sake. Not everyone is so courageous as to wish to be
known for everything they say,89 and some timorous speech deserves
encouragement. Corporate whistle-blowers, even junior professors, may
fear losing their jobs. People criticizing a religious cult or other move-
ment from which they might fear retaliation may fear losing their lives.
In some countries, even this one in some times and places, it is unsafe
to be heard to criticize the government. Persons who wish to criticize a
repressive government " or foment a revolution against it may find ano-
nymity invaluable. Indeed, given the ability to broadcast messages
widely using the Internet, anonymous e-mail may become the modern
replacement of the anonymous handbill.
Communicative anonymity encourages people to post requests for
information to public bulletin boards about matters they may find too
personal to discuss if there were any chance that the message might be
traced back to its origin. In addition to the obvious psychological bene-
fits to people who thus find themselves enabled to communicate, there
may be external benefits to the entire community. To pick just one ex-
ample, public health is enhanced by the provision of information re-
garding communicable diseases, but many people would feel uncom-
fortable asking signed questions about sexually transmitted diseases,
and might be especially cautious about being identified as a potential
sufferer of AIDS. This caution may be particularly reasonable as data-
38. See infra Part IV.
39. "[A]ctual instances of the deterrent impact of disclosure laws are legion." Anonymous
Note, supra note 9, at 1107.
40. Cf. Dirk Johnson, Chinese in U.S. Lament Bush Victory, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 27, 1990, § 1,
at 10 (describing fears of Chinese students in U.S. that protests against the Beijing government
would lead to persecution if they returned home and retaliation against their families).
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collection technology improves: any post to a public newsgroup or bul-
letin board is liable to be archived and searchable, perhaps for all
eternity.
Anonymous communication, whether traceable or not, fosters the
development of digital personae, which may be experienced as liberat-
ing by some.41 The option of creating such personae is likely to increase
and enhance the quantity, if not inevitably the quality, of speech. In
addition to increasing the quantity of speech, anonymous communica-
tion may also enhance the quality of speech and debate. "2 Communica-
tions that give no hint of the age, sex, race, or national origin of the
writer must be judged solely on their content as there is literally noth-
ing else to go by. This makes bigotry and stereotyping very difficult,
and also should tend to encourage discussions that concentrate on the
merits of the speech rather than the presumed qualities of the
speakers.43
In the U.S., anonymous speech may be guaranteed by the First
Amendment or whatever right to privacy exists in the Constitution. In
the U.S., anonymous speech also benefits from its association with well-
remembered incidents in which political actors holding unpopular views
that many now accept benefitted from the ability to hide their identity.
The Federalist Papers, the nation's most influential political tracts,
were published pseudonymously under the name "Publius." More re-
cently, the Supreme Court held the guarantee of free speech in the
Constitution protects a right of anonymous association and that a state
therefore lacked the power to compel a local chapter of the NAACP to
disclose the names of its members.4 In so doing, the Court protected
the NAACP members from danger at the hands of bigots who would
have had access to their identities if the state had prevailed. Anonymity
basks in the glow of association with good causes.
41. For a celebration of such "digital personalities," see Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Encrypted
Self: Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic Personalities, 13 J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1 (1994).
42. Or, it may not. See supra text at note 10.
43. There is probably a great deal more to be said on this subject. One need only to consider
the enormous weight that our "identity-conscious society and legal world," Clark Freshman, Were
Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated at Birth?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1568, 1576 (1995)
(book review), places on factors such as race, see Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The
Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994), to imagine the
effects.
44. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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C. Legislating Accountability
Dissenting in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,"" Justice
Scalia summed up the case against anonymity. Anonymity, he wrote, is
generally dishonorable: "It facilitates wrong by eliminating accounta-
bility, which is ordinarily the very purpose of the anonymity."' 6 To cre-
ate legal protection for anonymous communication absent a reason to
expect "threats, harassment, or reprisals," he argued, is "a distortion of
the past that will lead to a coarsening of the future.'
' 7
The specter of a cheap and potentially ubiquitous means of avoid-
ing accountability for one's speech or one's possibly illicit purchases is
worrying to many, and seems to be leading to increasing attempts to
regulate anonymous communication, and anonymous digital cash.
Pennsylvania, for example, has just passed a statute making it a crime
to possess, program, or use a device which can be used to "conceal or to
assist another to conceal . . . the origin or destination of any telecom-
munication.' 48 In other cultures with a more authoritarian tradition,
anonymous speech may seem even more threatening to the established
order; in some places the idea of anonymous communication may also
conjure up unhappy images of secret informers and malicious
denunciations.
In a legal culture that tends to glorify the First Amendment as the
bedrock of our freedoms, it may seem odd to suggest the possibility of
controls on information creation, dissemination, or storage. And in an
age where the political rhetoric, if not always the policy, is increasingly
that of laissez-fair capitalism it may seem strange to suggest that gov-
ernments might impose curbs on technologies that increase transac-
tional freedom. The instinct that says all such controls are bad may
indeed be a healthy one, although it is not the instinct that animates all
current U.S., much less foreign, law,' 9 and definitely not the instinct
45. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
46. Id. at 1537 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On the link between identity and accountability see,
e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Manipulating Anonymity: Streetwalkers' Strategies for Safety in the City,
45 ETHNOS 157, 158 (1980) (stating that prostitutes seek to reduce their risks by "finding out as
much as possible about the identities of those they encounter while hiding clues to their own
identity").
47. 115 S. Ct. at 1537. There is some irony in Justice Scalia being so concerned that every
private harm have a private remedy, when he so firmly rejects the idea that public harms necessitate
a remedy. See. e.g., Webster v. Doe , 486 U.S. 592, 661-71 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. Pa. S.B. 655, supra note 2.
49. U.S. examples include the copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 102 et seq. and the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (XIII)(b)(l) (1994).
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that animates some notorious current policy proposals."0 The instinct is
complicated, although by no means invalidated, by the global reach of
the information ocean now lapping at our doorstep. 51 Our ability to
police ourselves is eroded by pools and rivers of foreign data outside our
shores, and by our interconnection with networks in other countries
that may operate by different rules. Similarly, foreign governments
with repressive tendencies may find their restrictive information policies
undercut by the extraterritorial consequences of our practices.
II. FREE SPEECH Now: THE ANONYMOUS MESSAGE IN THE
IMPREGNABLE BOTTLE
The Internet we have today is a tool for communication, one un-
dergoing rapid growth.52 At present the Internet is primarily an elite
tool, but it seems reasonable to suppose that access to the Internet will
become almost as ubiquitous as access to the telephone network within
a few years. 5a Some of the transformative effects of this explosion in
50. See supra note 2 (proposals to censor the Internet).
51. I owe the metaphor of an information ocean to Rishab A. Ghosh. See E-mail to Michael
Froomkin (Jan. 11, 1995) (on file with author) (quoting from his article in Asian Age magazine of
Jan. 2, 1995).
52. See gopher://ncic.merti.edu:7043/11 /statistics/nsfnet/history/hosts for a recent count of
computers connected to the Internet. Today's Internet is an amalgam of many government and aca-
demic networks. An increasing number of commercial and nonprofit information service providers
have joined these networks, including Dow Jones, Telebase, Dialog, CARL, the National Library of
Medicine, and RLIN. Benard Aboba, How the Internet Came to Be, in THE ONLINE USER'S ENCY-
CLOPEDIA (1993), available online URL gopher://gopher.isoc.org:70/00/Internet/history/
how.Internet.came.to.be. The relationship between the Internet and commercial consumer informa-
tion providers such as America OnLine (AOL), CompuServe and Prodigy continues to evolve. At
their inception these services provided no Internet connectivity. They then began to offer limited
gateways for the exchange of electronic mail. Now they are expanding their gateways to allow their
users to gain access to the World Wide Web, and sometimes to other Internet services as well. The
number of subscribers is also growing rapidly. Subscriber growth is estimated at 25% or more per
year. During the first three months of 1995, U.S.-based PC online services added more than 1 mil-
lion subscribers. Testimony of William. W. Burrington, Assistant General Counsel and Director of
Government Affairs, America OnLine, Inc before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technol-
ogy, and Government Information 6 (May 11, 1995), available online LEXIS library Nexis, Curnws
File [hereinafter Burrington Testimony]. However, the commercial access provided by large national
ISPs is primarily one-way, and it is unclear to what extent commercial ISPs desire to allow persons
outside their service to have Web or FTP access to information generated by subscribers. Market
pressures, notably the desire of users to have their Web pages widely read, appear to be promoting
this development.
53. More than 93% of U.S. households had telephones in 1990. Warren G. Lavey, Universal
Telecommunications Infrastructure for Information Services, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 151 (1990) (citing
FCC News No. 723: Preliminary Domestic Information from Statistics of Communications Common
Carriers Released by FCC, at Table 9 (1989)). Thirty percent of U.S. households have a computer.
DAVID BENDER, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST WARS, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPY-
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Internet connectivity, particularly within the United States, are already
becoming visible.
Internet communication is capable of becoming a radically democ-
ratizing tool. The Internet offers rapid and (relatively) cheap one-to-
one communication both nationally and internationally. It also provides
means for citizens who have a common interest to find other like-
minded persons to communicate with. 4 The autobiographical bildung-
sroman featuring an adolescent who believes he is the only sane, intelli-
gent, or gay person (as the case may be) in a small town, and has no
one to talk with, soon may be a thing of the past.
Perhaps more importantly, the Internet promises to democratize
one-to-many communication. On the World Wide Web, to take the
currently most popular example, everyone is a potential publisher, and
the potential readership (and listenership and viewership, since the In-
ternet increasingly transports audio and video) grows every day. The
elite nature of the contemporary Internet makes it too soon to call it a
truly democratic medium. Nevertheless, as Owen Fiss himself has
noted, one can reasonably hope that his warning that radical critics of
the status quo find it difficult to obtain access to mass media will soon
seem pass6. 5 The Internet is already becoming a significant tool of po-
litical debate and political organization, 6 and has the potential to en-
RIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (No. G4-3942) June
22-23, 1995 (available online WESTLAW tp-all database).
Currently the Internet reaches more than 90 countries; at least 160 have e-mail connectivity.
Burrington Testimony, supra note 52, at 7.
The Clinton Administration has stated that it intends to make widespread access a cornerstone
of its National Information Infrastructure policy. "Because information means empowerment, the
government has a duty to ensure that all Americans have access to the resources of the Information
age . . . [the NII will attempt to] Extend the 'universal service' concept to ensure that information
resources are available to all at affordable prices." The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda
for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,027-28 (1993).
54. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
Consider too Karl Marx's remark that, "A relatively thinly populated country, with well-developed
means of communication, has a denser population than a more numerously populated country, with a
badly-developed means of communication." KARL MARX, CAPITAL (quoted in MARK POSTER, THE
MODE OF INFORMATION 1 (1990)).
55. Compare Owen Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992)
(cautioning that radical dissent is becoming relegated to the "last desperate forum"-the street cor-
ner) with Owen Fiss, In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613 (1995); see also Jerry
Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of
the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1623 (1995); Volokh,
supra note 54, at 1833-36.
56. See, e.g., available online URL http://dgsys.com/-cgriffin/net gde.html (detailing how
to use the net for political organizing and opposition research); MIT's Political Participation Project,
available online URL http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/ppp/home.html; Mark S. Bonchek, Grass-
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hance representative democracy.57 Indeed, as group formation on a na-
tional scale becomes easier and less costly, some positive critiques of
pluralism may lose some (but not all) of their force. 8
It is yet not evident whether the Internet will be a communicative
tool that will be a net benefit to democratic government or society, or
even one that is truly democratic. 59 The democratization of publishing
means that much more will be published, which may lead to the ulti-
mate in narrowcasting as readers try to keep their virtual heads above
a rising tide of data.60 Talking only to the like-minded has an anti-
democratic, or at least anti-communitarian, component. If the Internet
becomes the town square, or the shopping mall of the future, it may be
one in which millions are shouting on the same street corner while
passers-by are able to tune in or out at will. Many speakers may find
themselves drowned out in the cacophony, although this will be due to
a decision by the listener and not, as today, a function of the limited
number of speakers with access to mass media.61 It should be noted,
however, that tools exist which tend to mitigate the drowning-out ef-
fect. For example, search tools on the World Wide Web may lead read-
ers to materials they would otherwise never find. Similarly, Bob's deci-
sion to include a hypertext link to Alice's web page functions as free
roots in Cyberspace: Using Computer Networks to Facilitate Political Participation (Working Pa-
per 95-2.2: Presented at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in
Chicago, IL on April 6, 1995), available online URL http://www.ai.mit.du/projects/ppp/pubs/95-
2-2.html.
57. See Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1783
(1995).
58. E.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). For a quick summary
of some positive critiques of pluralism, see A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous
Branch: Legisprudence and the New Legal Process, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1071 (1988) (book review).
59. Statistics on Internet usage vary. A recent study found that 34% of users are female, but
that females account for only 23% of measurable usage. Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak,
Measuring the Internet: Preliminary Results of the Commerce/Nielsen Internet Demographics Sur-
vey, http://www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/novak/CN.prelim.results.oct3O.html. The most com-
monly quoted statistic before this study suggested that fewer than 20% of the users of the Internet
in 1994 were female. See, e.g., Cabinet Office (OPSS) Press Office, Cyberspace is for Women Too,
available online URL http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GCO/coi8119a.ok (quoting UK Science
Minister John Horam) (OPSS 185/95, June 21, 1995); Males Predominate on Internet, But Women
are Making Headway, available online URL http://www.dgsys.com/-editors/woman.html (citing
Georgia Institute of Technology Survey showing 82 % of Internet users are male). Presumably, most
users of the Internet are at least wealthy enough to have use of a computer, not to mention some
basic literacy, which also makes the user community less representative of the population as a whole.
60. See Vartan Gregorian, A Place Elsewhere: Reading the Age of the Computer, BULL. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 56 (Jan. 1996); Sunstein, supra note 57, at 1787; Volokh, supra note 54, at
1835.
61. See Volokh, supra note 54, at 1834.
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advertising for Alice, which may garner her readers she would not oth-
erwise have. Such links may function as a primitive set of reputation
credentials which would bring some speakers more listeners. Interest-
ingly, both of these examples require some action on the part of the
reader; the author/publisher need do nothing more than announce the
existence of the resource to the appropriate indexing services."2
Any proposal to regulate Internet anonymity in the United States
faces two large hurdles: the Constitution and the technological con-
straints imposed by the international nature of the Internet. At present,
however, Internet anonymity relies on a small number of unpaid volun-
teers who operate the anonymous remailers that make Internet ano-
nymity possible. If many governments impose regulations banning or
restricting their activities, access to Internet anonymity could become
much more difficult.
A. How the Internet Enables Anonymous Communication
Thanks in large part to the easy availability of powerful crypto-
graphic tools, the Internet provides the ability to send anonymous elec-
tronic messages at will. As described in more detail-below, the anony-
mously remailed e-mail cannot, if properly implemented, be traced to
its sender. In addition, two or more persons can communicate without
knowing each other's identity, while preserving the 'untraceable' nature
of their communications. As detailed below, the availability of strong
cryptography vastly enhances communicative privacy and anonymity.
Currently the Internet makes it easy to send an anonymous mes-
sage. Although no tangible goods can be exchanged, this communica-
tive anonymity allows users to engage in political speech without fear
of retribution, to engage in whistle-blowing while greatly reducing the
risk of detection, and to seek advice about embarrassing personal
problems without fear of discovery -things that are hard to do by tele-
phone in this age of caller ID. s
62. For an example of a service that helps web author/publishers list their works on multiple
indices, see Submit It!, available online URL http://www.submit-it.com/.
63. On Caller ID, see Robert Asa Crook, Sorry, Wrong Number: The Effect of Telephone
Technology on Privacy Rights, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (1991); Consuelo Lauda Kertz &
Lisa Boardman Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Balancing Telephone Information Technol-
ogy and the First Amendment with Consumer Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029
(1992); Glenn C. Smith, We've Got Your Numberl (Is it Constitutional to Give it Out?): Caller
Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA L. REV. 145 (1989);
Steven P. Oates, Caller ID: Privacy Protector or Privacy Invader?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 219; cf.
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The traditional anonymous leaflet required a printing and distribu-
tion strategy that avoided linking the leaflet with the author. If the
leaflet risked attracting the attention of someone armed with modern
forensic techniques, great pains were required to avoid identifying
marks such as distinctive paper or fingerprints. In contrast, on the In-
ternet communications are all digital; the only identifying marks they
carry are information inserted by the sender, the sender's software, or
by any intermediaries who may have relayed the message while it was
in transit. Ordinarily, an e-mail message, for example, arrives with the
sender's return address and routing information describing the path it
took to get from sender to receiver; were it not for that information, or
perhaps for internal clues in the message itself ("hi mom!"), there
would be nothing about the message to disclose the sender's identity.
Enter the anonymous remailer. Remailers vary, but all serious "
remailing programs share the common feature that they delete all the
identifying information about incoming e-mails, substitute a predefined
header identifying the remailer as the sender or using a cute tag such
as nobody@nowhere.65 By employing easily automated cryptographic
precautions widely available on the Internet,6" and routing a message
through a series of remailers, a user can ensure three things conducive
to high-security anonymity: (1) none of the remailer operators will be
able to read the text of the message because it has been multiply en-
crypted in a fashion that requires the participation of each operator in
turn before the message can be read;6" (2) neither the recipient nor any
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (no expectation of privacy in telephone numbers
dialed because this information is available to the telephone company).
64. Some intentionally insecure remailers are intended to let the sender have a little fun.
These typically insert clues in the detailed headers (which are rarely displayed by commercial e-mail
packages unless the user specifically instructs the software to show them) that reveal the origin of
the message. A particularly cheerful example of this was a World Wide Web page called, "Why
Send E-Mail when You Can Send FakeMail?," available online URL http://
www.netcreations.com/fakemail, which, among other things, sent my mother birthday greetings
from various real and fictitious dignitaries. The system ran until the owner shut it down because of
"a few really nasty, harmful, hateful messages" sent via the service. Id.
65. A list of remailers and their features, as well as current information about their recent
performance statistics, can be found at the University of California at Berkeley available online
URL http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/-ralph/remailer-list.html.
66. Public-key encryption technology is widely available on the Internet. Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) is available online by FTP from many sites including available online URL ftp://net-
dist.mit.edu/pub/, available online URL ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp, or a German server:
available online URL ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/crypt/pgp. For a good
description of the technical and political workings of PGP, see SIMSON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY
GOOD PRIVACY (1995).
67. See infra text following note 75.
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remailer operators in the chain (other than the first in line) can identify
the sender of the text without the cooperation of every prior remailer's
operator; (3) therefore it is impossible for the recipient of the message
to connect the sender to the text unless every single remailer in the
chain both keeps a log of its message traffic and is willing to share this
information with the recipient (or is compelled to do so by a court or
other authority). Since some remailer operators refuse to keep logs as a
matter of principle, there is a good chance that the necessary informa-
tion does not exist. Even if logs exist, it could be prohibitively expensive
to compel all the operators to divulge their logs when remailers are
located in different countries.6 s
Any electronic communication, even live two-way 'chat' communi-
cation, can theoretically be made anonymous. 69 In current practice,
anonymous remailer technology applies to e-mail, and hence is used for
communication to individuals, mailing lists, and 'newsgroup' discus-
sions. E-mail offers the simplest case, and although e-mail remailer
technology may not yet be as user-friendly as it could be, it is available
to anyone who knows where to look-and can even be found on an
easy-to-use World Wide Web page.
70
It is useful to distinguish between four types of communication in
which the sender's physical (or "real") identity is at least partly hid-
den: (1) traceable anonymity, (2) untraceable anonymity, (3) untrace-
able pseudonymity, and (4) traceable pseudonymity. These categories
allow one to disentangle concepts that are otherwise conflated: whether
and how an author identifies herself as opposed to whether and how the
real identity of the author can be determined by others.71
To make the examples that follow clearer, in each case Alice will
be the person sending an e-mail message to Bob. Ted, Ursula, and
68. The expense of hiring foreign legal counsel, and possible language difficulties are only
some of the problems. Many legal systems require that an act be an offense in both jurisdictions
before allowing a prosecution, or in some cases even discovery, to proceed. The recent successful
effort by the Church of Scientology to get information from a remailer operator succeeded because
the remailer was a "traceable pseudonymous" remailer, see infra text at note 80, not a true anony-
mous remailer.
69. For a description of a prototype anonymizing WWW browser, see Annonymizer FAQ,
available online URL http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/faq.html.
70. The URL is http://www.c2.org.
71. For an example of the dangers of conflatation, see Long, supra note 25. The author states
that "[ilnevitably, each user [of a remailer] is subject to the integrity and trustworthiness of the
server's administrator." Id. at 1184. In fact, as described in the text below, this is true only of
traceable anonymity and pseudonymity; untraceable anonymity, for example, does not require that
the author trust any individual, only that the message be routed through a large enough number of
remailers to ensure that there is one trustworthy person somewhere in the chain.
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Victor will be remailer operators, and Carol a judge with subpoena
power.
1. Electronic Anonymity
Electronic anonymity can be "traceable" or "untraceable." Only
the latter offers real security to the speaker.
a. Traceable anonymity
A remailer that gives the recipient no clues as to the sender's iden-
tity, but leaves this information in the hands of a single intermediary, is
a system of traceable anonymity. In the simplest example, Alice sends
an unencrypted e-mail to a remailer operated by Ted, with instructions
to forward the e-mail to Bob. Ted's remailer deletes Alice's identifying
return address and sends the message on to Bob purporting to be from
"nobody@remailer.com."
Alice has no way of knowing whether Ted has logged the message,
keeping a record of Alice and Bob's e-mail addresses, or indeed the
entire text of the message. If Ted has done this, then Bob can find out
who sent him the message by persuading Ted to tell him-or, in some
cases, if the message appears to violate a law, by enlisting the aid of
Carol, a judge with subpoena power. Of course, if Ted lives in another
country, outside Carol's jurisdiction, there may be little that Carol can
do to assist Bob in his quest to persuade Ted to reveal Alice's identity.
Many countries do have agreements for judicial assistance, but these
can be costly, difficult, and in many cases require that the act com-
plained of be illegal in both nations.7 2
Although traceable anonymity offers the lowest security, it suffices
for many purposes. Some messages do not require any more security
than a new header. There have been occasions when I have posted
messages to newsgroups and received a great deal of unwanted e-mail
in reply because my e-mail signature identifies me as a law professor.
One way to avoid getting requests for free legal advice, or long and
vicious notes attempting to re-educate me about gun control, is to de-
lete the signature and route comments through a remailer. That simple
expedient suffices because the consequences of my being discovered as
the author of my posts on legal topics are not terribly severe.
72. But see the discussion of the anonymous remailer "anon.penet.fi," infra text accompanying
note 78.
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In general, however, sending a message with sensitive information
directly to a remailer for immediate forwarding to the intended recipi-
ent requires an inordinate amount of trust that the remailer operator
will not read or copy the message or report the sender to the appropri-
ate authorities. I have often thought that a nice novel could be written
using a crooked remailer operator as its central character: imagine that
Ted opens up for business, runs a fine remailer for a few years, collects
many guilty secrets, and then retires on his blackmail profits.
Much greater security, and nearly iron-clad anonymity, can be
achieved at the price of somewhat greater complexity through the use
of "untraceable anonymity."
b. Untraceable anonymity
By "untraceable anonymity" I mean a communication for which
the author is simply not identifiable at all. For example, if Alice drops
an unsigned leaflet with no fingerprints on Bob's doorstep in the dead
of night when no one is looking, her leaflet is "untraceably
anonymous."
Current Internet technology allows this form of anonymity by the
routing of messages through a series of anonymous remailers. This
technique is called "chained remailing" and is about as anonymous as
directed communication gets these days. Nothing is foolproof, however:
as explained below, if Alice has the bad luck to use only compromised
remailers whose operators are willing to club together to reveal her
identity, she is just out of luck. If one member of the chain performs,
however, Alice can ensure that no one can connect her to the message
Bob receives so long as she uses both encryption and chaining. Even
these two techniques together may not be enough to foil a determined
eavesdropper who is able to track messages going in and out of multiple
remailers over a period of time. To foil this level of surveillance, which
has nothing to do with the bad faith of the remailer operators, requires
even more exotic techniques including having the remailers alter the
size of messages and ensuring that they are not remailed in the order
they are received.
7 3
At the simplest level, encryption ensures that the first remailer op-
erator cannot read the message and effortlessly connect Alice to Bob
73. See Lance Cottrell's home page on Mixmaster: available online URL http://obscura.com/
-loki/Mixmaster.FAQ.html; Remailer-Essay, available online URL http://nately.ucsd.du/-loki/
remailer-essay.html (explaining that some remailers intentionally introduce delays ("latency") to
make it more difficult for any eavesdropper to link outgoing traffic with incoming messages).
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and/or the contents of the message. But encryption also has a far more
important and subtle role to play. Suppose that Alice decides to route
her anonymous message via Ted, Ursula, and Victor, each of whom
operates a remailer and each of whom has published a public key in a
public-key encryption system"4 such as PGP. Alice wants to ensure
that no member of the chain knows the full path of the other remailers
handling the message; anyone who knew the full path would be able to
identify Alice from the message Bob will receive. On the other hand,
each member of the chain will necessarily know the identity of the im-
mediately previous remailer from which the message came, and of
course the identity of the next remailer to which the message will be
sent.
Alice thus wants Ted, the first member of the chain, to remove all
the information linking her to the message; she is particularly anxious
that Ted not be able to read her message since he is the one party in
the chain who will know that Alice sent it. Alice also wants Ted to
know only that the message should go to Ursula, and to remain igno-
rant of the message's route thereafter. Alice wants Ursula, the second
member of the chain, to know only that the message came from Ted
74. In a public-key system, each user creates a public key, which is published, and a private
key, which is secret. Messages encrypted with one key can be decrypted only with the other key, and
vice-versa. For a fuller description, see Whitfield Diffie & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in
Cryptography, IT-22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS INFO. THEORY 644 (1976), and Ralph C. Merkle, Secure
Communication over Insecure Channels, COMM. ACM, Apr. 1978, at 294; BRUCE SCHNEIER, AP-
PLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 29 (1994); Whitfield Diffie, The First Ten Years of Public-Key Cryptogra-
phy, 76 PRoc. IEEE 560 (1988) (discussing the history of public key cryptography).
A strong public-key system is one in which possession of both the algorithm and one key pro-
vides no useful information about the other key. The system gets its name from the idea that the
user will publish one key, but keep the other one secret. The world can use the public key to send
messages that only the private key owner can read; the private key can be used to send messages
that could only have been sent by the key owner.
Thus, if Alice wants to send a secure e-mail message to Bob, and they both use compatible
public-key cryptographic software, Alice and Bob can exchange public keys on an insecure line. If
Alice has Bob's public key and knows that it is really Bob's, then Alice can use it to ensure that
only Bob, and no one pretending to be Bob, can decode the message. A strong public key system
makes it possible to establish a secure line of communication with anyone who is capable of imple-
menting the algorithm. (In practice, this is anyone with a compatible decryption program or other
device.) Sender and receiver no longer need a secure way to agree on a shared key. If Alice wishes to
communicate with Bob, a stranger with whom she has never communicated before, Alice and Bob
can exchange the plaintext of their public keys. Then, Alice and Bob can each encrypt their outgoing
messages with the other's public key and decrypt their received messages with their own secret,
private key. The security of the system evaporates if either party's private key is compromised, that
is, transmitted to anyone else.
75. "PGP" stands for "Pretty Good Privacy." See supra note 66. It is a type of robust encryp-
tion, which when used with a long key is unbreakable in any reasonable period of time by currently
known techniques.
1996]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE
and should go to Victor; Victor should know only that it came from
Ursula and should go to Bob, although by the time the message reaches
Victor, Alice may not care as much whether Victor can read the mes-
sage since her identity has been well camouflaged.
Alice achieves these objectives by multiply encrypting her mes-
sage, in layers, using Ted, Ursula and Victor's public keys. As each
remailer receives the message, it discards the headers identifying the e-
mail's origins and then decrypts the message with its private key, re-
vealing the next address, but no more. If one thinks of each layer of
encryption as an envelope, with an unencrypted address on it, one can
visualize the process as the successive opening of envelopes, as follows:
To: Ted
Message encrypted with Ted's private key.
Please forward to: Ursula
Message encrypted with Ursula's public key.
Please forward to: Victor
Message encrypted with Victor's public key.
Please forward to: Bob
Text of anonymous message.
Ideally this is encrypted with Bob's public key,
but even if it is in plaintext, Victor should be
unable to connect it to Alice so long as Alice
remembers not to sign her name.
Chaining the message through Ted, Ursula, and Victor means that no
remailer operator alone can connect Alice to either the text of the mes-
sage or Bob. Of course, if Ted, Ursula and Victor are in a cabal, or all
in Carol's jurisdiction and keep logs that could be the subject of a sub-
poena, Alice may find that Bob is able to learn her identity. All it takes
to preserve Alice's anonymity, however, is a single remailer in the chain
that is both honest and either erases her logs or is outside Carol's juris-
diction. In theory, there is no limit to the number of remailers in the
chain, and Alice can, if she wishes, loop the message through some
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remailers more than once to throw off anyone attempting traffic
analysis."
2. Electronic Pseudonymity
Suppose Alice is a repeat participant in a broadcast medium such
as USENET or a mailing list. She may not wish to sign her name to
her messages, but she desires to engage in discussion and debate with
other list members and she wishes to do so under a continuous identity.
Alice decides to sign her messages as "Andrea." Alice could, however,
have chosen to sign her messages as "Frank," on the theory that this
might allow her to avoid anti-female discrimination. Indeed, either sex
can masquerade as the other; children as adults (and vice-versa). If
nothing else, this creates some potential for embarrassment, and con-
cerns some parents.
77
Like fully anonymous messages, pseudonymous messages come in
two varieties: traceable and untraceable. The advantage of traceable
pseudonymity is that it gives the sender a consistent name that allows
other parties to send replies far more easily than is possible with any
untraceable system.
a. Traceable pseudonymity
Traceable pseudonymity is communication with a nom de plume
attached which can be traced back to the author (by someone), al-
though not necessarily by the recipient. While a traceable pseudony-
mous system makes it much easier for someone to discover Alice's iden-
tity, it usually offers one large compensating advantage: the recipients
of Alice's message can usually reply to it by sending e-mail directly to
the pseudonymous e-mail address in the "From:" field of the message.
The message will then either go to Ted, the remailer operator, who
keeps an index of the addresses that link Andrea to Alice, or in the
case of commercial service providers who allow subscribers to use pseu-
donymous IDs, directly to Alice's account.
Anon.penet.fi, probably the best-known "anonymous" remailer, is
in fact merely a very user-friendly traceable pseudonymous remailer:
76. Not being a political dissident, I confess that I have never used more than a single
rcmailer myself (primarily in order to post to public newsgroups without fear of getting requests for
free legal advice), and have never bothered to encrypt any of my e-mail messages; I created my own
PGP key, available online URL http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/mykey.htm, purely for
demonstration purposes.
77. See supra note 43 (discussing the importance of identity in contemporary society).
19961
JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE
[Anon.penet.fi] provides a front for sending mail messages and post-
ing news items anonymously. As you send your very first message to the
server, it automatically allocates you an id of the form anNNN, and
sends you a message containing the allocated id. This id is used in all
your subsequent anon posts/mails. Any mail messages sent to
your-id@anon.penet.fi gets redirected to your original, real address. Any
reply is of course anonymized in the same way, so the server provides a
double-blind. You will not know the true identity of any user, unless she
chooses to reveal her identity explicitly.
78
The anon.penet.fi system keeps a record of each user's e-mail ad-
dress. The security of the approximately 8,000 messages that pass
through anon.penet.fi daily79 thus depends critically on the willingness
of the operator, Johan Helsingius, a Finnish computer scientist, to re-
fuse to disclose the contents of his index which maps each pseudony-
mous ID to an e-mail address. In February 1995, the Church of
Scientology successfully enlisted the aid of the Finnish police, via In-
terpol, to demand the identity of a person who had, the Church of
Scientology claimed, used anon.penet.fi to post the contents of a file
allegedly stolen from a Scientology computer to a USENET group
called "alt.religion.scientology." In compliance with Finnish law,
Helsingius surrendered the information, believing that the only alterna-
tive would have been to have the entire database seized by the police.8"
The social institution of traceable pseudonymity, which is permit-
ted by a number of commercial Internet providers, is likely to generate
some interesting lawsuits. Many commercial ISPs and on-line service
providers, such as America OnLine for example, allow users to use any
unique name they like as their "user ID," their on-line identifier. When
my brother opened an account with an ISP, he used our family name
for his account. As a result, when my parents set up an Internet ac-
count with the same service provider they were forced to select some-
thing different. Their ID is an amalgam of their first names. They
could, however, have chosen any combination of letters and numbers
78. The anon.penet.fi help file is available online URL http://chaos.taylored.com:1000/OZ/
Anonymous-Mail/Remailers/Instructions/Help-file-from-anon.pent.fi.gz.
79. Douglas Lavin, Finnish Internet Fan Runs Service Allowing Anonymous Transmissions,
WALL ST. J., July 17, 1995, at A7 (reporting 8,000/day figure).
80. See available online URL http://www.cybercom.net/-rnewman/scientology/
home.html#PENET (describing incident). Differing descriptions of the Scientologists' legal efforts
can be found at The Church of Scientology vs. the Net, available online URL http://
www.cybercom.net/-rnewman/scientology/home.html (critical view); UK Scientology Critics,
available online URL http://mail.bris.ac.uk/-plmlp/scum.html (even more hostile); Church of
Scientology International, available online URL http://www.theta.com/goodman/csi.htm
(Scientologists' view).
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they wanted so long as their ISP had not already assigned that name to
someone else. Whether the ISP will release my parents' actual name to
anyone who asks is primarily a question of contract law until a sub-
poena is involved. When people think they have been defamed or other-
wise injured by the actions of a user who employs a pseudonym, the
party claiming injury is likely to ask courts to require the ISPs to dis-
close the identity of the subscriber, at least when the ISP is in an ac-
cessible jurisdiction.
b. Untraceable pseudonymity
Untraceable pseudonymity works just like untraceable anonymity,
except that Alice chooses to sign her message as Andrea, a pseudonym.
If Alice is worried that someone else may try to masquerade as
Andrea, she can sign her message with a digital signature81 generated
specially for "Andrea," which will uniquely and unforgeably distin-
guish an authentic signed message from any counterfeit. By participat-
ing in discussions under a consistent pseudonym (often abbreviated to
"nym" on the Internet) Alice can establish Andrea as a digital persona:
[N]yms allow for continuity of identity to be maintained over a period of
time. A person posting under a nym can develop an image and a reputa-
tion just like any other online personality. Most people we interact with
online are just a name and an e-mail address, plus whatever impression
we have formed of them by what they say. The same thing can be true of
nyms. Cryptography can also help maintain the continuity of the nym,
by allowing the user to digitally sign messages under the name of the
nym. The digital signature cannot be forged, nor can it be linked to the
True Name of the user. But it makes sure that nobody can send a mes-
sage pretending to be another person's nym. 81
Strictly speaking, a digital persona does not require untraceable ano-
nymity: it is sufficient to have a system that allows one to communicate
under a "nym" and to digitally sign one's messages in order to prevent
81. Public-key systems allow users to append a digital signature to an unencrypted message. A
digital signature uniquely identifies the sender and connects the sender to the message. Because the
signature uses the plaintext as an input to the encryption algorithm, if the message is altered in even
the slightest way, the signature will not decrypt properly, showing that the message was altered in
transit or that the signature was forged by copying it from a different message. A properly imple-
mented digital signature copied from one message has only an infinitesimal chance of successfully
authenticating any other message. See SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 35.
82. Comments of computer security consultant Hal Finney, available online URL http://
chaos.taylored.com: lO00/OZ/Anonymous-Mail/Issues/Background-Information.gz.
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anyone else from masquerading as the nym. 83 "Publius," the author of
the Federalist Papers, was known to "his" publisher, and a digital per-
sona can exist even if the persona's ISP knows the persona's real iden-
tity. Nevertheless, a nym may have more value, or at least may be
experienced as more liberating, if the identity of the person(s) behind
the persona is untraceable.8"
3. The Human Element: Remailer Operators
While the technological alternatives described above have their
own interest, the most important point for present purposes is that very
effective Internet anonymity requires only two things: cryptographic
tools, and willing remailer operators. The cryptographic tools are in
ready supply.85 If the user deploys the cryptographic tools properly, the
remailer operators need not be known to be trustworthy; since the mes-
sage is untraceably anonymous if any single operator in a chain is hon-
est, it will ordinarily suffice to route the message through several
remailers. The more remailers in the chain, however, the longer it may
take the message to get to its destination," and the greater the chance
that an operator in the chain will fail to pass the message on down the
line.8
7
The supply of remailer operators is the major potential constraint
on Internet anonymity."8 Remailer programs are currently operated by
a relatively small number of volunteers located in a few countries; at
present they receive no compensation for this service, and in the ab-
sence of anonymous electronic cash or the equivalent8 it is difficult to
see how an electronic payment system could be constructed that would
83. So long as the private key in a key pair is not shared with anyone, a digital signature
uniquely identifies the author of a document. For a short description of digital signatures, see Froom-
kin, supra note 6, at 895.
84. "The citizen who is truly free in forming her identity should have the opportunity to exper-
iment with roles she does not wish to adopt in public." Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 69 (1991) (citing Foucault and Goffman). For a suggestion that nyms be granted the legal
right to own and borrow money, to transact, and to communicate, see Karnow, supra note 41, at 12-
13.
85. See supra note 66.
86. See supra note 73 (discussing concept of "latency").
87. This risk is reduced by the provision of a "remailer pinging service" that regularly checks
to see if remailers are forwarding their mail. See supra note 65.
88. In addition, remailers do not defend against traditional methods of acquiring information.
Encryption may foil a wiretap on the sender's telephone line, but the use of a remailer to send
plaintext will not do so, since the message is captured at the source.
89. See infra Part II.
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not risk undermining the very anonymity the remailers are designed to
protect.
The remailer operator's problem is a simple one. No remailer op-
erator can control the content of the messages that flow through the
remailer. Furthermore, the last remailer operator in a chain has no reli-
able way of concealing the identity of the sending machine from the
message's ultimate recipient. Suppose, to return to the example
above, 90 Alice wants to send an anonymous death threat to Bob via
remailers operated by Ted, Ursula, and Victor. If Victor does nothing
to mask his e-mail address, Bob will know he was the last to remail the
message. Victor can make any attempt to identify him more difficult by
forging his e-mail address in the message to Bob, but Victor cannot be
certain that this will work. Indeed, he can be almost certain that over
time it will fail. 1
The last remailer in a chain thus risks being identified by an un-
happy recipient. An identifiable person is a potential target for regula-
tion. If the remailer operators were made strictly liable for the content
of messages that passed through their hands, even though they were
unable to learn the content of those encrypted messages, most reasona-
ble people probably would find running a remailer to be an unaccept-
able risk if they resided in a jurisdiction capable of enforcing such a
rule.
Remailer operators already have come under various forms of at-
tack, most recently lawsuits or subpoenas instigated by officials of the
Church of Scientology who sought to identify the person they allege
90. See supra text following note 75.
91. To understand why this is so requires some background in how an ordinary e-mail message
is transmitted from Alice's machine to Bob's via the Internet. Ordinarily the two computers do not
communicate directly. Instead Alice's machine sends the message to a machine that it hopes is in
Bob's general direction, and the message passes from machine to machine until it finds one that is in
regular communication with Bob's. Each machine that handles the message appends "path" infor-
mation to the e-mail that identifies it as having taken part in the communication. The final recipient
receives the entire path data along with the text of the message, but most commercial e-mail pack-
ages are designed to avoid displaying this path information to the reader unless she asks for it.
Victor can instruct his computer to lie about its identity, and indeed can forge information
suggesting that the message originated elsewhere far away, but he has no way to persuade the ma-
chine to which he sends the message to cooperate. As a result, it is possible for a sufficiently moti-
vated Internet detective to identify the first machine to which Victor sent the message, especially if
she has several messages to work with. See Spain FAQ or "Figuring out Fake E-Mail and Posts,"
available online URL http://digital.net/-gandalf/spamfaq.html. If the machine that communi-
cated with Victor keeps records of its e-mail handling, or if its operator can be persuaded to do start
doing so, the Internet detective can identify Victor's machine, and perhaps even Victor, as the source
of the remailed message.
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used remailers to disseminate copyrighted and secret Church teach-
ings.9. As a result, operating a remailer is not a risk-free activity today.
Indeed, one can imagine a number of creative lawsuits that might rea-
sonably be launched at the operator of a remailer. Examples include a
new tort of concealment of identity, a claim of conspiracy with the
wrong-doer, and a RICO claim. A remailer operator whose remailer
was used to harass someone might face a common law tort claim of
harassment. A conspiracy charge would be difficult since it would diffi-
cult the prove the element of agreement that is a necessary part of a
conspiracy. It is difficult to say that Bob conspires with a stranger, even
if he leaves a tool lying in plain sight, knowing that criminals are likely
but not certain to come by and use it. If Bob is really ignorant of the
identity, content, and purposes of the messages he retransmits, he can
plausibly say that there is no agreement between him and the conspira-
tor, and that he should no more be liable for the misuse of his remailer
than the rental car company that leases a car to a terrorist. A RICO
claim against a remailer could also founder on the lack of agreement.9 8
Although it is far from obvious that any of these legal theories would
or should succeed, some raise non-frivolous issues and thus would be
expensive to defend.
At some point, if the number of remailers becomes small, it be-
comes technically (if not necessarily politically or legally) feasible for
92. See supra note 80.
93. The circuits conflict as to whether a defendant must agree to "personally commit" the
predicate acts in a RICO conspiracy but none of the circuits have done away with the need for some
sort of agreement between the parties to the conspiracy. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits hold that the defendant's agreement to personally commit RICO predicate acts is
not required. See United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1529 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Morris v. United States, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971 (1985); United States v. Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 760 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 924 (1990); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir), cert. denied, sub
nom. Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549, 554
(6th Cir. 1986), appeal after remand, 835 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Neapolitan,
791 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940 (1986); United States v. Kragness, 830
F.2d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 848 (1984). According to these circuits, the government need only prove that the defendant
directly or indirectly conspired to conduct RICO activity. The First, Second, and Tenth Circuits
require the government to prove that the defendant agreed to "personally commit" two or more
predicate acts in a RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Rabito v. United States, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Killip, 819
F.2d 1542, 1548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987 (1987).
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the authorities to conduct traffic analysis94 on all the remailers and
make deductions about who sent what to whom. In the absence of a
compensation mechanism, or a jurisdiction capable of offering a safe
haven for remailers, the cornerstone of Internet anonymity currently
relies entirely on the kindness of strangers.
B. Constitutional Constraints on Regulation of Anonymous
Electronic Communication
The ease with which anonymous electronic communication lends
itself to unaccountable libel, conspiracy, and other harms has led to
some calls for regulation;9 5 as use of the Internet grows and more users
learn about cryptography and remailers, one can reasonably expect
calls for regulation to increase. It seems reasonable to ask if such regu-
lations would be constitutional.
The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to be
anonymous in so many words. The First Amendment's guarantees of
free speech and freedom of assembly have, however, been understood
for many years to provide protections for at least some, and possibly a
great deal of, anonymous speech and secret association. As already
noted, the Federalist Papers were written pseudonymously.96 In 1958,
the Supreme Court upheld the right of members of the NAACP to
refuse to disclose their membership lists to a racist and surely vengeful
state government,97 a decision that I imagine almost every lawyer in
the US would endorse today-at least on its facts. Simultaneously,
however, the United States has nurtured a deep-seated fear of conspir-
ators and conspiracy, 98 with the McCarthyite witch-hunts of the 1950's
being only one of the more lurid examples.
Doctrinal discussions of permissible restrictions on the freedom of
speech commonly divide the discussion into "political" and "non-politi-
cal" speech, and the sketch which follows adopts this convention. The
94. Traffic analysis is the study of the sources and recipients of messages, including messages
that the eavesdropper cannot understand. See Froomkin, supra note 6, at 747.
95. See supra note 2.
96. Pseudonymity differs from anonymity in a number of ways. Perhaps the most important
difference is that pseudonymity allows for the creation and continuity of a "nym"-an alternate
identity. See supra text accompanying note 82. In the case of the Federalist Papers, "Publius" was
in fact three collaborators. On the Internet, "John" may be Jane, or little Johnny.
97. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); for a forceful assertion of a
moral right to associational or group privacy, see Edward J. Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to
Huddle, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 219 (1977).
98. I discuss the U.S. hypersensitivity to conspiracy in Froomkin, supra note 6, at 850-62.
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division into two categories tends, however, to obscure alternate and
perhaps more valid ways of describing the extent of the government's
power to impose restrictions on speech. In particular, the standard doc-
trinal approach tends to reify a debatable distinction between purport-
edly high value and lower value speech. The categories "political" and
"non-political" themselves may be overlapping and ultimately un-
helpful. For example, outrageous, even obscene, speech can be politi-
cal.99 And if the personal is indeed the political all categories collapse
into one.
1. Anonymous Political Speech
Political speech receives the highest constitutional protection be-
cause it "occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First
Amendment;"1 ' other types of speech, notably "commercial speech,"
sometimes receive a reduced level of First Amendment protection. Core
political speech need not center on a candidate for office, but can affect
any matter of public interest -especially if it is an issue in an
election.101
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the existence of a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,110 2 which would
presumably include protections for anonymous speech. Indeed, McIn-
tyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court's most recent
opinion on the right to anonymous speech, states that "an author's de-
cision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions
or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom
of speech protected by the First Amendment" and "the anonymity of
an author is not ordinarily a sufficient reason to exclude her work prod-
uct from the protections of the First Amendment."1 '' Despite these
ringing words, whether there is a right to be anonymous in the US
remains unclear as a general matter, since difficult cases are precisely
those in which exceptions are made to fit facts that sit uncomfortably
within the rules that apply "ordinarily."'10 "
99. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 486 U.S. 46 (1988).
100. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (1995).
101. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978).
102. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
103. McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1516.
104. For a contrary view that "McIntyre will prove to be dispositive" in providing First
Amendment protections to anonymous political speech, see Richard K. Norton, Note, McIntyre v.
[Vol. 15:2:395
FLOOD CONTROL ON THE INFORMATION OCEAN
Broad prohibitions of anonymous political speech, such as ordi-
nances prohibiting all anonymous leafletting, are an unconstitutional
abridgment of free speech.10 5 The Supreme Court has also tended to be
highly solicitous of the need of dissidents and others to speak anony-
mously when they have a credible fear of retaliation for what they say.
Thus, the Supreme Court has struck down several statutes requiring
public disclosure of the names of members of dissident groups. 10 6 Nev-
ertheless, the right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs
can be overcome by a compelling state interest. The state interest in
forbidding discrimination in places of public accommodation has been
held to be sufficiently compelling to meet this test, at least when the
objectives and remedies were sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve
the result when examined with strict scrutiny. 10 7 In contrast, the recent
McIntyre decision found that the state's "interest in preventing fraudu-
lent and libelous statements and its interest in providing the electorate
with relevant information" was insufficiently compelling to justify a
ban on anonymous speech that was not narrowly tailored.108
Ohio Elections Comm'n: Defining the Right to Engage in Anonymous Political Speech, 74 N. CAL.
L. REV. 553 (1996).
105. Mclntyre,115 S. Ct. at 1521-24; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
106. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers' 74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982)
(holding that the "Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations");
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 623-28 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (assert-
ing that a disclosure requirement puts an impermissible burden on political expression); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) (holding invalid a statute that compelled teachers to disclose
associational ties because it deprived them of their right of free association); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (voiding an ordinance that compelled the public identification of group
members engaged in the dissemination of ideas); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-24
(1960) (holding, on freedom of assembly grounds, that the NAACP did not have to disclose its
membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("It is hardly a
novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may consti-
tute . . . restraint on freedom of association .... "); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 145 (1951) (Black, J., concurring) (expressing the fear that dominant groups
might suppress unorthodox minorities if allowed to compel disclosure of associational ties). But see
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 85 (1961)
(declining to decide whether forced disclosure of the identities of Communist Party members was an
unconstitutional restraint on free association); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S.
63, 77 (1928) (holding that a required filing of group members' names with the state constituted a
legitimate exercise of police power).
107. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544
(1987); see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (stating
that freedom of expression is a powerful tool used in the exercise of First Amendment rights); Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-19 (1984) (recognizing that an individual's First
Amendment rights are not secure unless those rights may be exercised in the group context as well).
108. 115 S. Ct. at 1519.
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Not even political speech is immune from regulation. Despite its
privileged position, political speech can be regulated given sufficient
cause, especially if the regulation is content-neutral, as a regulation on
anonymous speech would likely be. An example of sufficient cause is
the state interest in ensuring compliance with campaign finance contri-
bution limits. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo,109 the Supreme Court
upheld a statute forbidding donations of more than $1,000 to a candi-
date for federal office, and compelling disclosure to the Federal Elec-
tion Commission of the names of those making virtually all cash dona-
tions.110 Since the Court in the same decision essentially equated the
expenditure of money in campaigns with the ability to amplify political
speech,"' the decision appears to say that given a sufficiently weighty
objective, and a statute carefully written to minimize the chilling or
otherwise harmful effects on speech, even political speech can be
regulated."'
Similarly, in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,118 the Supreme
Court struck down a state requirement forbidding corporations from
making political contributions except for ballot measures directly af-
fecting its business, but it contrasted the unconstitutional state law
with others that it suggested would surely be acceptable: "Identification
of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure,
so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they
are being subjected.""1 ' Indeed, the Communications Act requires li-
censed television and radio stations to identify the sponsors of paid po-
litical advertisements at the time the ad is broadcast. "' Indeed, the
licensee has a duty to "exercise reasonable diligence" in identifying the
true sponsor of political advertisements."'
109. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
110. Id. at 23-29, 60-84.
111. Id. at 19.
112. Cf Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding ban on post-
ing any signs, including political ones, on utility poles). Justice Stevens held, however, that the utility
poles were not public fora, id. suggesting that the court might not extend this idea to public fora and
that Vincent may come to be seen as simply a decision upholding a particular time, place, and
manner restriction.
113. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
114. Id. at 792 n.32. The Supreme Court again noted the communicative importance of the
identity of a speaker, albeit in a different context, in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046
(1994) (noting that a poster in front of a house associates speech with the identity of the speaker).
115. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1995). See also 47 C.F. R. § 73.1212 (1995).
116. 47 U.S.C. § 317(c) (1995). The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC did not abuse its discre-
tion by ruling that a licensee could satisfy this obligation in the face of undocumented accusations
that the apparent sponsor was a front group for tobacco lobbyists by accepting an undocumented
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The implications for the regulation of anonymity -even in the con-
text of political speech -are obvious, and were not lost on the Supreme
Court of California, which in Griset v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n recently upheld a state statute forbidding anonymous mass
political mailings by political candidates. 117 The facts involved a politi-
cal dirty trick: Griset had sent a mass mailing attacking his opponent
and pseudonymously purporting to be from a neighborhood association.
The court concluded that prospective voters could have been deceived
into thinking that Griset had "grass roots" support. 118 The California
court reasoned that this sort of deception was the evil that the statute
was designed to cure, and that the ban was necessary to further the
state's interest in "well-informed electorate" at election time and was
"narrowly drawn to meet that goal."' The Court therefore distin-
guished Griset from federal Supreme Court decisions, such as Talley,
supra, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 20 and NAACP v. Alabama,2"
which held that the First Amendment freedom of association limited
the state's ability to pierce an organization's anonymity. One could per-
haps read Griset as concerning the mis-use of pseudonymity rather
than anonymity. The argument would be that there is a greater harm
to the political process from a false statement of support by a non-
existent "citizen's group" than from an anonymous source, since the
latter's secrecy puts readers on notice that the author could be anyone.
While this approach is attractive, and probably constitutional, neither
the opinion nor the statute makes a distinction between a false state-
ment and one that fails to identify the author.
Quite possibly the Supreme Court would uphold a narrowly tai-
lored statute prohibiting anonymity even in the context of political
speech if the statute had clear and palatable objectives. This possibility
seems all the more real when one considers the contexts in which the
Supreme Court has already sustained limitations on the privacy of indi-
viduals engaged in the political process, particularly the Buckley deci-
assertion from the apparent sponsor that he was the real sponsor in the absence of documentary
evidence to the contrary. Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1442 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
117. Griset v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 884 P.2d 116, 126 (Cal. 1994) (upholding
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 84305 (West 1994)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995)).
118. Id. at 125.
119. Id. at 123.
120. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
121. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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sion. 1 22 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
Communications Act requirement that paid political radio and televi-
sion broadcasts include the name of the sponsor, and the Court denied
certiorari."a
Once down this slippery slope of regulation it is notoriously diffi-
cult to find a logical place to stop.1 24 A particularly difficult case might
be a statute that sought to ban all anonymity in political campaigns on
the theory that if the message is not signed with the actual name of the
author, it is impossible to know whether it originated in a political cam-
paign, and thus constitutes actionable lies about an opponent, or poten-
tially violates campaign finance expenditure limits. This would juxta-
pose the Talley-Mclntyre line of cases with the Buckley-Griset line of
cases. Without forcing everyone to sign their messages there may, it
could be argued, be no way to monitor what campaigns spend, and thus
no way to ensure they do not seek to get an edge by spending beyond
the legal limits.
In the glow of McIntyre's rhetoric about the importance of ano-
nymity to the political and literary tradition, it is all too easy to think
that anonymity in cyberspace would surely triumph. Yet there is reason
to doubt, especially because in McIntyre Justice Stevens himself care-
fully distinguished earlier cases upholding statutes that sought to pre-
serve the integrity of the voting process, e.g., Burson v. Takushi.12 '
Additionally, statutes designed to attack the enforcement problems
caused by anonymous libelous or electronic violations of intellectual
property rights might be in a particularly good position to survive judi-
cial review. As a constitutional matter, the issue is far from resolved.1 2 6
122. See supra note 109; see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
298 (1991); id. at 299-303 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 308-09 (White, J., dissenting). All
Justices agreed that identification requirements in political campaigns could be appropriate.
123. Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443 (1983) (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(2) (1995)
against constitutional challenge), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983). Loveday might be explained as
relying on a special feature of radio and television such as shortage of spectrum, cf. Turner Broad-
casting, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), but the rule has been extended to cable television also. See 47
C.F.R. § 68.318(c)(3) (1995). For arguments in favor of such regulation, see generally Peter F.
May, Note, State Regulation of Political Broadcast Advertising: Stemming the Tide of Deceptive
Negative Attacks, 72 B.U. L. REv. 179 (1992).
124. My first year Torts teacher derided slippery slope arguments as "fear of doing the right
thing today for fear of being forced to do the right thing tomorrow."
125. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding law forbidding campaign-related
speech within 100 feet of the entrance to polling place).
126. Cf WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER ON COPY-
RIGHT (proposing a new chapter of the Copyright Act that would prohibit "tampering" with "copy-
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2. Anonymous Non-political Speech
As ringing a defense of the First Amendment as the Talley and
McIntyre decisions may be, they involved political speech. At most,
therefore, they merely suggest the outcome for cases involving anony-
mous speech that is not "political speech" and also not one of the areas
of general public concern such as religion, art, or literature, that com-
mentators usually include within the rubric of so-called "core" First
Amendment speech.12 7 It is also important to understand that the ano-
nymity cases decided by the Supreme Court involved very broadly
drafted statutes aimed at political speech, and that the Supreme Court
has carefully left open the question whether a statute regulating (or
prohibiting) anonymous speech would survive review if the statute were
narrowly tailored, e.g., to "provid[e] a way to identify those responsible
for fraud, false advertising and libel."1 '
Restrictions on anonymity are more likely to be sustained if they
focus on types of non-political speech that have tended to receive the
lowest protection. Although in McIntyre the Court found that the
state's "interest in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements and
its interest in providing the electorate with relevant information" was
insufficiently compelling to justify a ban on anonymous speech, the
weighing might produce a different result if there were some way to
tailor it to types of speech that ordinarily receive less protection, such
as commercial speech.129
Despite some scholarly suggestions that the First Amendment
should apply with undiluted force,180 "commercial speech" tends to be
right management information"). This proposal could include information relating to attribution as
well as, e.g., devices that charge for access to the work.
127. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (1995) (describing
political speech as core speech for First Amendment purposes).
128. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64; see also McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1517.
129. If the government seeks to regulate commercial speech that is not false or misleading and
concerns a lawful activity a reviewing court must determine whether the regulation promotes a sub-
stantial governmental interest, directly advances that interest, and is not more extensive than neces-
sary. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a
discussion of the limits to the Central Hudson test see generally Commercial Speech, 107 HARv. L.
RaV. 224 (1992); for criticism of the case, see David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv. 359 (1990).
130. See, e.g., Ronald Coase, The Economics of the First Amendment: The Market for Goods
and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 384 (1974); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment
and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROoK. L. REV. 5 (1989); Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid Of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990).
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subject to greater regulation. 81 Restrictions are more likely to be up-
held if they appear plausibly tailored to strike at illegal non-political
non-speech "conduct"' 82 particularly when the speech "incidentally"
burdened is non-political. And restrictions are most likely to be upheld
when the speech burdened falls into the ill-defined, and predominately
salacious, category of speech that is for all practical purposes
disfavored.
An example of the latter is the stringent anti-anonymity provisions
that appear in the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of
1988,133 as amended by the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 1990184 (collectively, "the Act"). The workings of
the Act are worth examining in some detail because the Act has been
upheld by the D.C. Circuit, 8 5 and risks setting a precedent for future
legislative attempts to restrict anonymous non-political speech. The Act
attacks anonymity by requiring that producers of certain kinds of
speech ascertain and record information about performers' identities
(the "ascertainment requirement"), and that producers affix a notice
disclosing their own identity and address (the "disclosure
requirement").
The Act's ascertainment requirement is far-reaching. All produc-
ers of visual depictions of certain types of "actual sexually explicit con-
duct""" have a duty to "ascertain"'' 87 the legal name and age of every
131. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). The Court has also stated that the overbreadth doctrine is inapplicable in
various commercial speech contexts. See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 638-39 (1980).
132. The lines between speech, expressive conduct, mere conduct, and hybrid forms of these
things have generated much litigation and commentary. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789, 930 (2d ed. 1988); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(rejecting First Amendment challenge to law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (calling demonstration a form of "speech plus" entitled to less pro-
tection than pure speech).
133. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4485-4503 (1988).
134. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4816-17 (1990), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2257(b)(1) (1995).
135. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc denied, 47
F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
136. "Actual sexually explicit conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 2557(a)(1) (1995), is defined by refer-
ence to 18 U.S.C. § 2256, which defines "sexually explicit conduct" as any visual depiction of sexual
intercourse, bestiality, masturbation or sadistic or masochistic abuse. Id. at § 2256(2)(A)-(D)
(1995).
137. The implementing regulations provide that "secondary" producers, (e.g., a magazine edi-
tor and publisher) may discharge this duty by accepting copies of a "primary" producer's records. 28
C.F.R. § 75.2(l)(b) (1995). The regulations define primary producers as "any person who actually
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performer so depicted by examining the performer's photographic1 88
"identification document." 189 The Act defines "producer" broadly to in-
clude everyone "from photographers to printers to page layout art-
ists."1 " It includes all those involved in the production process of "any
book, magazine, periodical, film, video tape or other similar matter"
and all those involved in their creation, duplication, reproduction, or
reissuance after November 1, 1990.1,1 However, the definition of "pro-
ducer" excludes "mere distribution or any other activity which does not
involve hiring, contracting for managing, or otherwise arranging for the
participation of the performers depicted. 14 2 (Whether, given this limi-
tation, the Act applies to a person who posts "visual depictions" made
after November 1, 1990 of "actual sexually explicit conduct" to a
World Wide Web site is an interesting question, one that may turn on
whether the act of posting a picture or movie on the Web is exempt
"distributing" or covered "duplication, reproduction, or reissuance.")
In addition to ascertaining the performer's real name and age, the
producer must also ascertain all aliases "ever used" by the performer
including "maiden name, alias, nickname, stage, or professional name,"
and maintain records of all affected performers cross-indexed by their
aliases." 8 A producer who knowingly fails to maintain these records, or
knowingly includes inaccurate information, can be punished by a fine
and up to two years imprisonment; second and subsequent offenses can
result in up to five years imprisonment. 144
Although the Act does not create penalties for performers who
mislead an unwitting producer, 14 one practical effect of the ascertain-
ment requirement is to make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for ef-
films, videotapes, or photographs a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit conduct." 28 C.F.R.
§ 75.1(c)(2) (1995).
138. The requirement of a photo ID appears only in the Attorney General's implementing
regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(1) (1995), issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2257(g) (1995).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(1) (1995).
140. American Library Assoc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J., dis-
senting from denial of suggestion for rehearing in banc).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h)(3) (1995).
142. Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b)(2)-(3) (1995).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(i) (1995). Cf. WHITE PAPER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 126, at 235-
36 (relating to regulation of "copyright management information").
145. "This requirement is satisfied if the producer asks the performer for the information."
H.R. Doc. No. 100-129, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1987) (President's message transmitting 1988
act to Congress); 33 F.3d at 92 (relying on this limiting construction). Presumably, however, a per-
former who showed obviously phony ID that was accepted as genuine by a producer who knew it was
false would face some risk of a conspiracy charge.
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fected performers to perform anonymously. The District Court ac-
cepted that the Act "is overly burdensome because it will invade the
privacy of adult models and discourage them from engaging in pro-
tected expression. . . . Many of the artists and adult models engaged
in sexually explicit visual imagery have an interest in maintaining their
anonymity. Exposure of their true names, aliases, and addresses could
subject them to stigmatization, harassment and ridicule from
others."' 4 On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit dismissed this argu-
ment on the grounds that producer's records are disclosed only to the
Attorney General or her delegate, and to producers and publishers fur-
ther along the chain of production. Judge Buckley asserted, without
apparent support in the record, that "we may safely assume that the
performers are not concerned over the prospect of being stigmatized,
harassed, or ridiculed by the producers they help enrich."' 1
Another practical effect of the Act's ascertainment requirement is
to make it impossible for (re)producers to use affected images unless
the (re)producer is in direct contact with a producer earlier in the
chain of production who had direct contact with the performer, because
producers later in the chain of production can discharge their record-
keeping obligation only by contact with the performer or with a "pri-
mary" producer who was in direct contact with the performer.' 4 8 As a
result, it is now potentially a criminal violation to use affected images
146. See American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 419 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
147. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 94. Given that there have been suggestions that some
actors are forced to perform at gunpoint, it seems fair to wonder if Judge Buckley's assertion is as
self-evident as he thought it was. See, e.g., LINDA LOVELACE & MICHAEL MCGRADY, ORDEAL
(1980); see also Laura Lederer, Then and Now: An Interview with a Former Pornography Model, in
TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 57 (Laura Lederer ed., 1980) (describing rape
and other threats from producers); Robin L. West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography
Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 AM. B.
FouND. RES. J. 681, 686-88 (summarizing testimony to Meese Commission on Pornography chal-
lenging assertion that pornography is "consensually produced by voluntary participants in a volun-
tary market").
Performers acting for hire who fear their employers may be able to work under a pseudonym;
nothing in the social security regulations, for example, appears to prohibit this. Cf 60 Fed. Reg.
42,431 (1995) (amending 20 C.F.R. § 422.120 to state that agency will attempt to contact worker
before contacting employer in cases where employees name in wage report differs from name in
Social Security records, but that IRS will assess penalty only if social security number is absent or
invalid). In such cases the requirement that they give their real name may add to their risks. The
effect on a hypothetical unpaid performer engaged in social commentary is, perhaps, even greater.
148. 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(b) (1995).
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when the model is unknown or anonymous, regardless of the model's
age.
149
The Act's second attack on anonymity is its disclosure require-
ment. Affected producers must affix to "every copy" of the covered
materials a statement identifying the producer's business premises or
other location where the producer can be found, and must maintain the
ascertained records at that location. 5 ' It is a felony for the producer to
fail to affix this information, and a felony for any person, whether or
not they are a producer, to sell, give, or offer to sell or give 51 any
visual depictions of the relevant "actual sexually explicit conduct"
which does not have an affixed statement describing where the required
records may be located.1
52
Under the Act, therefore, neither performers nor primary produc-
ers of affected materials can be anonymous. The D.C. Circuit held that
the Act is nonetheless consistent with the First Amendment because it
imposes content-neutral burdens on speech, and those burdens are
designed to achieve a significant legislative goal. 53 Writing for the
panel majority, Judge Buckley suggested that the record-keeping re-
149. This result as applied to obviously adult performers is particularly anomalous given that
the purpose of the Act is to combat child pornography. See American Library Ass'n, 794 F. Supp. at
417-18 (noting anomaly). The D.C. Circuit alluded to this issue in a discussion of the problems the
Act creates for "appropriationist artists," that is, "photographers who create distinct works that
incorporate photographs taken by others-typically without permission." American Library Ass'n,
33 F.3d at 93. Although the court suggested that "application of the Act to [appropriationist artists]
would raise a serious First Amendment problem because of the difficulty they may encounter in
securing the information" that the Act requires them to keep on file, it concluded that the record
was inadequate to present the issue in "clean-cut and concrete form." Id. In contrast, the D.C.
Circuit gave short shrift to the District Court's suggestion that the Act "will effectively ban foreign
produced images of sexually explicit conduct," even when the performers are adults. 794 F. Supp. at
418. "Foreign producers who wish to peddle their products in the United States should be expected
to abide by our laws," the court stated, warning that to rule otherwise would create "a loophole" for
domestic child pornographers to send their wares abroad for re-export to the United States. 33 F.3d
at 93. By defining the problem as one of "foreign producers trying to peddle their products" rather
than one of domestic parties seeking to purchase and re-use, re-package or re-distribute products
that can plausibly be defined as speech, the court evaded a constitutional problem posed by the Act.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(c) (1995); 28 C.F.R. § 75.5 (1995).
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(0(4) (1995) (making it an offence "knowingly to sell or otherwise
transfer, or offer for sale or transfer" any "book, magazine, periodical, film, video, or other matter,
produce[d] in whole or in part with materials which have been mailed or shipped in interstate or
foreign commerce or which is intended for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce" but lacking
the affixed information about the location of the records).
152. A person selling or giving covered materials has a duty to ensure that the statement has
been affixed to the materials, but no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of the statement
or the records required to be kept. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(f)(4) (1995).
153. American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 81, 84-85. The District Court had found
the Act unconstitutional, see American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 418 (D.D.C. 1992).
19961
JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE
quirement was no more a content-based burden on speech than were
the zoning ordinances restricting the location of "adult" theaters that
the Supreme Court upheld in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters.
154
In Renton the Supreme Court stated that intermediate scrutiny sufficed
when a statute burdens speech because of its subject matter rather than
its viewpoint. As a result of Renton, "an otherwise content-based re-
striction on speech can be recast as 'content neutral' if the restriction
'aims' at 'secondary effects' of the speech."15 5 The distinction between
viewpoint and content neutrality is extremely significant, because the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "viewpoint neutrality" (in
which all speakers on a given subject are discriminated against equally)
does not equal content-neutrality,156 and only content-neutrality is enti-
tled to be judged by the more lenient standard of "intermediate scru-
tiny" rather than the most exacting standard, strict scrutiny.
Judge Buckley used Renton in ALA v. Reno to suggest that the
Child Protection Act was content-neutral because it aimed at one of
the secondary effects of visual depictions of actual sexually explicit con-
duct (i.e., child pornography) rather than the speech itself. 15 7 Buckley
argued that the Act was no less content-neutral than the zoning restric-
tions on adult theaters upheld in Renton. If subjecting theaters to more
stringent zoning because they show blue movies was not a case of view-
point neutrality deserving strict scrutiny but only a case of content-
neutrality deserving intermediate scrutiny,156 why, Buckley essentially
asked, should the Act be any different? The panel majority further re-
lied on the Supreme Court's earlier statement that when speech and
non-speech elements are combined in a single course of conduct, "a
sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. 15
9
154. 33 F.3d at 85 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
155. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
156. Burson v. Freemen, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850 (1992); Boos, 485 U.S. at 319; Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Con-
sciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (regulation "may not be based upon either the content or subject
matter of speech"); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980).
157. 33 F.3d at 85 (citing Renton and Boos).
158. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48.
159. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting First Amendment chal-
lenge to law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards).
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Having found that the Act was a content-neutral regulation that
had only an incidental effect on First Amendment rights, Judge Buck-
ley applied intermediate scrutiny and concluded that the Act was con-
stitutional because it furthered the compelling governmental interest of
combating child pornography. 160 The dissent countered that the statute
was overbroad and would in any case have at most a negligible effect
on child pornography because underage actors would get phoney IDs,
and because the Act in its own terms' 6' precludes the use of the pro-
ducers' records directly or indirectly in a child pornography prosecu-
tion, '1 2 a limitation presumably designed to address Fifth Amendment
concerns. 6 ' The Supreme Court denied certiorari.16
The D.C. Circuit's ruling in American Library Ass'n is significant
because it permits an anonymity ban to extend to non-commercial,
non-political speech on the grounds that the regulation seeks to combat
a social harm and only incidentally burdens speech. 65 In theory, if the
160. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 84-85. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)
(noting compelling governmental interest in eradicating evils associated with child pornography).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(d) (1993).
162. American Library Ass'n, 33 F.3d at 94-95 (Reynolds, J., dissenting). In his later dissent
from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Tatel, who was not a member of the original panel,
argued that,
The only class of producers whose behavior this statute is likely to influence-those who ig-
nore the age of their models but would nonetheless refuse to employ individuals they knew
were minors-could be equally deterred, with no corresponding regulatory burden on pro-
tected speech, by rewriting the child pornography statutes to impose criminal liability upon
those who recklessly or negligently violate them. .. . While such an approach might allow a
few individuals to escape liability by establishing that they had made a reasonable mistake
about the age of the model, "even as compelling a societal interest as the protection of minors
must occasionally yield to specific constitutional guarantees." United States v. U.S. District
Court, 858 F.2d 534, 543 (9th Cir. 1988).
American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 47 F.3d 1215, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J., dissenting from
denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc).
163. See American Library Ass'n, 713 F. Supp. at 475. An earlier version of the record-keep-
ing requirements of the Act was held to be unconstitutional in American Library Ass'n v. Thorn-
burg, 713 F. Supp 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot sub nom. American Library Ass'n v. Barr,
956 F.2d 1178, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
164. 115 S. Ct. 2610 (1995).
165. Bans on anonymous publication are not unprecedented. England banned anonymous pam-
phlets between 1637 and 1694, when licensing laws required that all books bear the name of the
author and printer. W.S. Holdsworth, Press Control and Copyright in the 16th and 17th Centuries,
29 YALE L.J. 841, 848-49 (1920).
As detailed in Anonymous Note, supra note 9, at 1084-93 (giving examples from English,
French and U.S. practice), a number of state and federal statutes have sought to restrict anonymous
speech or the freedom of anonymous association. The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on
anonymous speech and association on several occasions. In Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229
U.S. 288 (1913), the Court upheld a requirement that mailers wishing second class mailing status
publish a list of editors and proprietors twice annually, but relied on a "now-outdated view of the
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government's interest in combatting the effects of child pornography is
sufficient to justify the Act's effects on adult performers and those who
produce materials containing their visual images, it might be equally
constitutional to require that at least non-political messages on the In-
ternet include information sufficient to allow a libel victim to trace the
source of the defamation.1 66 Nor is it difficult to imagine how one
might make similar arguments to defend the prohibition on anonymous
faxes that Congress passed in 1991 in order to protect consumers from
junk faxes.167
The Supreme Court has yet to go so far. The District Court in
ALA v. Reno found it easy to distinguish the Act from the facts of
Renton; Judge Buckley held that Renton controlled. If Judge Buckley
was right, which is itself debatable, 68 the problem is Renton: as many
first amendment," Anonymous Note, supra note 9, at 1089. In Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S.
236 (1943), the Supreme Court upheld a pre-WW I statute requiring foreign agents to register with
the Secretary of States, but several subsequent decisions, culminating in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), suggested that the Supreme Court had turned away from the analy-
sis in Viereck, see Anonymous Note, supra note 9, at 1093-1102.
In United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954), the Supreme Court upheld the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1994), which requires those engaged in lobbying to
divulge their identities. More recently, lower courts have sustained similar private identification re-
quirements in other regulatory settings involving the workplace, see, e.g., Big Bear Super Market
No. 3 v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding worker identification provisions of Immi-
gration Control Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324 against a void for vagueness challenge).
166. See 713 F. Supp. at 477 (giving similar examples as one reason to hold that Act was
unconstitutional). See supra text accompanying note 115 (describing FCC requirement that broad-
cast paid political advertisements identify sponsor).
167. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105
Stat. 2394, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(d)(2) (1995), requires the FCC to make rules requiring that
fax machines mark the name and telephone number of a business or individual sending the fax on
the first page of every transmission. 47 C.F.R. § 68.318 (1995) makes it unlawful
for any person within the United States to use a computer or other electronic device to send
any message via a telephone facsimile unless such message clearly contains, in a margin at
the top or bottom of each transmitted page or on the first page of the transmission, the date
and time it is sent and an identification of the business, other entity, or individual sending the
message and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such business, other entity,
or individual. The telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or any other number
for which charges exceed local or long distance transmission charges. Telephone facsimile
machines manufactured on and after December 20, 1992 must clearly mark such identifying
information on each transmitted message. Facsimile modem boards manufactured on and
after December 13, 1995 must comply with the requirements of this section.
For arguments supporting such regulation, see Michael M. Parker, Fax Pas: Stopping the Junk Fax
Mail Bandwagon, 71 ORE. L. REV. 457 (1992).
168. The primary reason why Judge Buckley's analysis is questionable is the one pointed to in
the dissents: that as the Act itself barred the government from using the information in the records
against anyone, there was little grounds to believe that the statute was capable of accomplishing its
purported objective.
FLOOD CONTROL ON THE INFORMATION OCEAN
commentators have noted, Renton's conclusion that distinctions aimed
at controlling the "secondary effects" of speech are content-neutral and
thus require only intermediate scrutiny is at best manipulable and at
worst ridiculous. 169 Nevertheless, unless eroticized speech is a very spe-
cial form of "low-value speech"170 an attempt to control anonymous
non-political speech might fall within the Renton rule, and thus with-
stand intermediate scrutiny if the measure were backed by a suffi-
ciently weighty governmental purpose. In this context, Professor Tribe's
suggestion that the Supreme Court "is beginning to construct a multi-
level edifice with .. .categories of less-than-complete constitutional
protection" for expression characterizable as "commercial speech...
offensive speech . . . defamation and possibly the speech of public em-
ployees" seems particularly accurate-and ominous.
1 71
Despite suggestions to the contrary, the Internet carries a high vol-
ume of non-eroticized, and indeed political, speech.1 72 As a practical
matter, therefore, it would be exceedingly difficult, and probably im-
possible, to craft a ban on anonymous speech on the Internet that dis-
169. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); TRIBE,
supra note 132, at § 12-3 n.17 (Renton "ill-advised .... Carried to its logical conclusion, the
doctrine could gravely erode first amendment protections."); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 46, 115 (1987) (calling decision a "disturbing, incoherent, and
unsettling precedent"). Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative
Court, 80 IowA L. REv. 51, 68 (1994) ("A content-neutral reading of the Renton ordinance is hard
to justify. Literally, the ordinance was content-based."). The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1, 195 (1986) ("The Renton ordinance was content-based regulation of the first
order."). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
612-17 (1986) (defending use of Renton analysis in First Amendment/pornography cases).
170. See Sunstein, supra note 169, at 602-08 (arguing that pornography is low-value speech
and hence entitled to diminished First Amendment protection); see also TRIBE, supra note 132, at
930 (listing near-obscene speech as one of five special types of speech receiving a lower level of First
Amendment protection). For a suggestion that the problem with eroticized speech is that judges and
legislators dislike it, see Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation of Nonobscene Eroticism as a Form
of Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1231 (1993); see also David
Cole, Playing By Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REv.
111 (1994).
171. TRIBE, supra note 132, at 930.
172. Compare Martin Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway, 83
GEo. L.J. 1849 (1995) with Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed Analysis of the
Conceptual, Logical, and Methodological Flaws in the Article: "Marketing Pornography on the
Information Superhighway" July 2, 1995 (version 1.01), available online URL http://
www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/rimm.cgi; Jim Thomas, Some Thoughts on Carnegie Mellon's Com-
mittee of Investigation, available online URL http://sun.soci.niu.edu/-cudigest/rimm/rimm2 (dis-
cussion of ethical lapses in Rimm study); Jim Thomas, The Ethics of Carnegie Mellon's Cyber-porn
Study, available online URL http://sun.soci.niu.edu/-cudigest/rimm/ethics.cmu; The Cyberporn
Report, available online URL http://www.cybernothing.org/cno/reports/cyberporn.html (collecting
URLs criticizing Rimm study); see also supra note 56.
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tinguished between political and non-political speech and yet was en-
forceable. Since remailer operators will ordinarily be unable to decrypt
the messages that they are forwarding, the operators themselves will be
unable to tell whether the message is core First Amendment speech or
unprotected obscenities. 7 ' A ban on anonymous speech cannot there-
fore meaningfully distinguish by subject matter, nor can it necessarily
even distinguish between visual depictions and mere words.
Any meaningful attempt to ban anonymous Internet speech must
therefore either attempt to ban it all, or craft some more limited rule
that has the same result.17' A straightforward banning of all anony-
mous speech is so far from being narrowly tailored to achieve the pub-
lic purposes (preventing harmful messages from being forwarded or
frustrating legitimate law enforcement attempts to trace threatening
messages or the plans of conspiracies) that it does not seem likely to
survive even cursory review. On the other hand, Renton might provide
a model for achieving the same end in a different way. If, for example,
remailer operators were made strictly liable for carrying messages that
are used to conduct terrorist operations, perhaps on a Renton theory
that some categories of speech have harmful secondary effects, the re-
sult would be to force all remailers in the jurisdiction to close since the
operators would have no other way to protect themselves from the lia-
bility. This hypothetical strict liability statute would be vulnerable to
the accusation that it discriminated against points of view that dare not
speak openly, and its constitutionality is far from certain, but it is cer-
tainly more likely to be found constitutional than a straight ban on
anonymous messages.
7 5
Given the international nature of the Internet, however, even a
clever attempt to ban anonymous remailers one jurisdiction at a time
may be ineffectual. Even if every remailer in the U.S. stops operating,
there is nothing to stop U.S. citizens from sending and receiving
messages via foreign-based remailers - at least not yet. The continuous
and conspicuous use of remailers and the equivalent might even be seen
173. See supra text following note 75.
174. For a suggestion that the Renton approach might be extended to political speech, see
Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 633
(1991) ("Although this question has not yet definitively been answered, the recent case of Boos v.
Barry [485 U.S. 312] indicates that an affirmative response by a majority of the Court may not be
far off.").
175. "[T]he widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945) (upholding application of Sherman Act to newsgathering agency), quoted with approval in
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567 (1990).
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to create a reasonable expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment
purposes, thus reinvigorating a part of the Constitution which otherwise
appears to be heading towards desuetude.
C. Practical Constraints: The International Tide
The Internet is an increasingly multi-national phenomenon. Other
countries that lack a First Amendment may desire solutions to the per-
ceived dangers of anonymous communication that are more or less re-
strictive than those suggested by U.S. law, which itself remains unclear
in important respects. Remarkably, however, the reality of the Internet
is that the technology for sending e-mail messages anonymously is al-
ready in use both here and abroad: the whole world can now enjoy (or
suffer) the fruits of anonymous remailers located anywhere. The Con-
stitutional status of anonymous electronic speech remains important: if
the U.S. will not or constitutionally cannot ban anonymous remailers,
then they will be available for the entire Internet to use. Even if the
U.S. attempts to ban anonymous remailers, and even if the Constitu-
tion allows this, U.S. law may not be determinative because, as it now
stands, the Internet as a whole is not easily amenable to any nation's
control. While it is probably within the physical power of the U.S. gov-
ernment to prosecute Internet remailers based in U.S. territory, the
government appears to lack the power to deny U.S. residents the bene-
fit of remailers located abroad, although it can certainly raise the costs
of getting caught.
17 6
The Internet is an international packet switching network and its
messages are carried over telephone lines. 17 Short of cutting off one's
own international telephone service or concluding an international
agreement with all industrialized countries to discontinue telephone
service to foreign countries that harbor remailers there is little that one
176. This is by no means a unique example of the Internet making a legal rule obsolete. See,
e.g., Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104
YALE L.J. 1681, 1695 n.43 (1995) (describing irrelevance of prior restraint doctrine in age of mass
near-instantaneous communication).
177. A packet switching network is method by which data can be broken up into standardized
packets which are then routed to their destination via an indeterminate number of intermediaries.
See Bruce Sterling, Short History of the Internet (Feb. 1993), available online URL gopher://
gopher.isoc.org:70/0O/Internet/history/short.history.of.Internet.
Multiple packets originating from a single long data stream may use more than one route to
reach a far destination where they will be reassembled. This decentralized, anarchic, method of
sending information appealed to the Internet's early sponsor, the Defense Department, which was
intrigued by a communications network that could continue to function even if a major catastrophe
(such as a nuclear war) destroyed a large fraction of the system. Id.
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can do to keep out messages from any other country, or indeed to keep
citizens from sending messages wherever they like.17 8 If the government
of Ruritania is intent on preventing communication with Great Britain,
Ruritania might attempt to require that Ruritanian ISPs refuse to ac-
cept messages from computers whose domain name identified them as
British. British domain names frequently end with the characters ".uk"
and Ruritanian routers might be required to return all messages from
those domains. Even if this is technically feasible, such a strategy is
unlikely to succeed. First, there are generic domain names such as
".com," ".org," and ".net" that do not identify the country of origin.
Second, unless Ruritania has currency and other controls, there is noth-
ing to stop Ruritanian users establishing an account in the U.S. and
telnetting to it to access British data.1"9 Third, short of a robust inter-
national convention, there is no way that Ruritania can prevent people
outside Britain from running remailers that "launder" messages from
Britain and present Ruritanian computers with acceptable domain
names. In short, any effort to censor the Internet organized at the na-
tional level (or below) is likely to fail.180 As John Gilmore put it, "the
Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it."'
8 '
U.S. law currently imposes few if any legal restrictions on anony-
mous remailing."'8 U.S. rules can thus be viewed as a baseline; any
country with a more restrictive approach to anonymity can expect to
178. Penthouse Magazine's World Wide Web site announces that the web site is "not availa-
ble" in Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji Island, Formosa, India, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico,
Nigeria, Okinawa, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, St. Lucia,
Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, United Kingdom and Venezuela because these nations "prohibit adult
material." Penthouse Magazine, Not Available in These Countries, available online URL http://
www.penthousemag.com/resource/nothere.html. Nevertheless, I am reliably informed that the
materials on this web site are accessible from a domain in the United Kingdom whose address ends
in ".uk".
179. Even currency controls may not prevent users from establishing foreign Internet accounts
since some accounts, on "freenets," are free to the public.
180. Thus, Eugene Volokh's radical predictions about the demise of private speech regulation
in the U.S., see Volokh, supra note 54, at 1836, actually may be too mild because they do not take
account of the international nature of the Internet.
181. Redefining Community, INFO. WK., Nov. 29, 1993, at 28 (quoting Gilmore). Of course,
nothing prevents individual users or system operators from blocking the direct receipt of messages
from unwanted sources. See Branscomb, supra note 25, at 1676. Users, however, will not find it
difficult to circumvent these restrictions. See, e.g., Katsch, supra note 176, at 1695 n.43.
The discussion in the text applies to Internet functions such as e-mail or World Wide Web
requests. In contrast, so long as the number of remailers remains small, it might be technically
feasible to eliminate anonymous postings from the USENET (a distributed bulletin board system).
See Long, supra note 25, at 1186-87 (describing operation of "Automatic Retroactive Minimal
Moderation").
182. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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see it undermined by the U.S. rules unless it is willing and able to cut
itself off from the Internet entirely. 183 Similarly, should the United
States's rules change to restrict anonymity, as they might some day,
these new rules will themselves be undermined by persons in any an-
other country with adequate connectivity and a legal regime more con-
genial to anonymous communication. " The proponents of measures to
eliminate Internet anonymity are thus likely to find themselves in the
position of the counselors to King Canute.185 Indeed, to the extent that
foreign countries with good Internet connectivity such as the Nether-
lands and Finland already have more permissive rules, those rules ef-
fectively undercut the United States' ability to enforce what rules it
has.
The difficulty that governments have in reigning in free speech on
the Internet or in living with its consequences is particularly visible in
the uneasy relationship that several Asian governments have with the
Internet. Only North Korea and Myanmar have chosen to remain com-
pletely aloof from it. 86 The Vietnamese government overcame its con-
cerns about free movement of information and allowed a small aca-
demic and scientific network, "NetNam," to operate, because the
government saw the Internet as the "fastest, cheapest way" to improve
communications with the rest of the world.187 The Vietnamese govern-
ment then apparently had second thoughts about unregulated commu-
nications, and decided to set up its own system, using hardware pur-
chased from a US telecommunications company, Sprint. The new
system, which is likely to displace NetNam, will have a greater capac-
ity but the government hopes that it will also be controlled more tightly
"for technical and security reasons [and] from the cultural aspect."188
The government intends to keep out foreign pornography and other
harmful information sent by foreign organizations. 189 A government
183. For a suggestion that the People's Republic of China may attempt to achieve information
autarchy, see Joseph Kahn & Kathy Chen, Chinese Firewall, WALL ST. J., Jan 31, 1996, at 1.
184. The Canadian Copyright Act guarantees the right of an author to write under a pseudo-
nym. See Canadian Copyright Act § 14.1.
185. See supra text accompanying note 2.
186. Philip Shenon, 2-Edged Sword: Asian Regimes On the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1995, § 1, at 1.
187. Id. (quoting Tran Ba Thai, sysop of NetNam).
188. Jeremy Grant, Vietnamese Move to Bring the Internet Under Control May Backfire, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at 6 (quoting Nghiem Xuan Tinh, deputy director of Vietnam Data Commu-
nications Company, a subsidiary of Vietnam Post and Telecommunications).
189. Id. This may be a reference to the campaign by anti-Communist emigres based in Cali-
fornia who sought to overwhelm the Vietnamese Prime Minister's e-mail mailbox. See Shenon, supra
note 186 (describing attempt).
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spokesman admitted, however, that the government was uncertain as to
how it would achieve these goals, but he promised that the government
intended to "think about it."' 90
Meanwhile, in Singapore, the government has promised penalties
for anyone caught transmitting pornographic or seditious matter.191 It
has also ensured that its point of view will be represented in a Usenet
discussion group, soc.culture.singapore, frequented by its critics. Gov-
ernment spokespersons routinely post messages giving the government's
side of issues.19" Overall, however, the government has chosen to con-
trol Internet access since, despite its best efforts, it cannot figure out
how to control content:
The Singapore government knows that it cannot do much to censor
the Internet. But it refuses to give up without a fight.
The main control is to limit access-the rationale being that only
the determined would get at the materials and not the casual users.
Singapore's case is instructive in that it is trying to both control
information and yet benefit from the Information Age. Current thinking
suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve both aims. Nev-
ertheless, Singapore is trying. 198
As part of its campaign against Internet pornography, the Singaporean
government searched the files of users of Technet, one of Singapore's
major Internet providers. A scan of 80,000 files with a ".GIF" exten-
sion found five pornographic files, resulting in warnings to their own-
ers.' " Foreign companies with offices in Singapore worried that the
Singaporean government would search their data too in the hopes of
190. Grant, supra note 188.
191. Shenon, supra note 186.
192. See, e.g., Philip Taubman, Cyberspace in Singapore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at A24.
193. Peng Hwa Ang & Berlinda Nadarajan, Censorship and the Internet: A Singapore Per-
spective, available online URL http://info.isoc.org/HMP/PAPER/132/txt/paper.txt (The lead au-
thor is a professor at the School of Communication Studies, Nanyang Technological University.)
[hereinafter Singapore Perspective].
The Chinese government is also seeking to limit Internet access by keeping costs of local service
artificially high, although Internet usage is growing quickly through both campus and commercial
servers. Shenon, supra note 186. China's post and telecommunications minister, Wu Juchuan, an-
nounced that China will exercise control of the information it allows in. "By linking with the in-
ternet, we do not mean the absolute freedom of information." Johanna Son, Asia-communication:
Bumps Lie Ahead In Information Superhighway, Inter Press Service, available on line LEXIS,
library News, file Curnws.
China has also announced plans to build a state-owned Internet network called Chinanet. China
Plans own Internet, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1995, at 7; see also Kahn & Chen, supra note 183.
194. Singapore Perspective, supra note 193.
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finding confidential corporate e-mails, and the government had to
promise them that it would not do it again.
195
Just as nations are unable to control the content of Internet
speech, so too will they be unable to prevent anonymous communica-
tion. This inability to enforce a ban on anonymous Internet communi-
cation is not an unmitigated disaster, Justice Scalia's warnings notwith-
standing.19 Although it will impose real costs in untraceable libel, hate
speech, and (perhaps) theft of intellectual property,1 97 easily available
anonymous communication also spells the end of restrictive national
policies regarding information. Any government that allows its citizens
to become a part of the global electronic network will be forced to live
with a freedom of speech even greater than that contemplated by the
authors of the First Amendment. The Singaporean example suggests
that the ability of even a very authoritarian government to restrict ac-
cess to the global information network is limited because businesses be-
lieve that the value of unrestricted access to these communications is
very high.
Even so, governments are not yet powerless. Governments have it
within their power to impose some costs, at least in ease of use, on
those who wish to communicate anonymously. If banned in one coun-
try, anonymous remailers can be found abroad. A country that wishes
to ban mail to or from foreign anonymous remailers will find it hard to
detect unless it expends great resources monitoring all national traffic.
The expenditure will need to be great because it is difficult to distin-
guish between ordinary mail and mail to anonymous remailers unless
the government either bans encryption or maintains a very up-to-date
list of foreign remailers. Even an encryption ban is difficult to enforce
since some forms of encrypted text are hard to distinguish from other
common file formats.198 Governments have demonstrated that they are
capable of acting in concert to seek to control activities such as money
195. Shenon, supra note 186. As this article was going to press, the government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China announced new limits on the exchange of market information regarding the
Chinese economy. News reports suggested that the spread of the Internet was one of the govern-
ment's major concerns. See Kahn & Chen, supra note 183.
196. See supra text accompanying note 46.
197. Technical counter-measures, akin to salting each telephone book with unique false entries
to pinpoint the source of any copies, promise to reduce this danger considerably. In addition, custom-
ers may prefer to buy products from vendors they know and trust. See supra note 21 (statement by
RSA spokesman that posting of RC4 source code to the Internet has not slowed sales of RSA li-
censed products using RC4).
198. A ban on cryptography can be circumvented, at some cost to ease of use, by employing
steganography:
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laundering which they perceive as a common threat, although the effec-
tiveness of these measures is debated. 19 9 International actions in this
domain include the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances0 " regional agreements,201 a
number of mutual legal assistance treaties between the U.S. and other
nations,202 and the creation of a Financial Action Task Force including
most of the world's major economies.20 As yet, there appears to be no
equivalent movement to control anonymous remailers, but it is not
inconceivable.
The prime effect of a single government's attempt to ban anony-
mous messages will be to make anonymous communication far less easy
to use if one is concerned about getting caught. Loss of ease of use is a
significant factor, because the harder a computer technique is to use,
the fewer people will use it. Furthermore, the more difficult a computer
technique, the more users will make sloppy mistakes that could lead to
their being detected.2" Criminalization drives use at least partly under-
ground, much like the attempt to control drugs has no doubt reduced,
Steganography is the art and science of communicating in a way which hides the existence of
the communication. In contrast to cryptography, where the "enemy" is allowed to detect,
intercept and modify messages without being able to violate certain security premises guaran-
teed by a cryptosystem, the goal of steganography is to hide messages inside other "harmless"
messages in a way that does not allow any "enemy" to even detect that there is a second
secret message present.
Markus Kuhn, Steganography Mailing List, available online URL http://www.thur.de/ulf/ste-
gano/announce.html.
199. See, e.g., Lisa A. Barbot, Comment, Money Laundering an International Challenge, 3
TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 161, 164 (1994) (suggesting money laundering continues to grow despite
international efforts).
200. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 19, 1988 (E/Conf./82/15), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
201. See, e.g., Scott E. Mortman, Note, Putting Starch In European Efforts To Combat
Money Laundering, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S429 (1992) (discussing EC directive on money launder-
ing); Phyllis Solomon, Note, Are Money Launderers All Washed Up in the Western Hemisphere?
The OAS Model Regulations, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 433 (1994) (discussing money
laundering provisions of Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission's Model Regulations Con-
cerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug Trafficking and Related Offenses).
202. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE CON-
TROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 113 (1995) (OTA-ITC-630) [hereinafter MONEY LAUNDERING].
203. See id. at 115-17.
204. The leading study of "how cryptographic systems fail in practice" concluded that "many
products are so complex and tricky to use that they are rarely used properly. As a result, most
security failures are due to implementation and management errors." Ross Anderson, Why
Cryptosystems Fail, 37 COMM. ACM 32-41 (Nov. 1994), available online URL ftp://
ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk:/users/rial4/wcf.ps.Z.
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but in no way eliminated, the use of marijuana and narcotics in the
U.S. and other countries."'
Widespread access to anonymous communication, even if the com-
munication carries some risk, means that citizens armed with com-
puters will be able to criticize their government-and their neigh-
bors-with less fear of retribution, and will have increased access to
messages from around the world giving alternative points of view.
Meanwhile, at this writing there is little or no risk involved in using a
chain of anonymous remailers, and only a little technical skill is re-
quired. As a result, rules seeking to control the export of information
such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) will be-
come even more difficult to enforce.200 So long as anonymous remailers
exist, rules seeking to limit the importation of "subversive" or "ob-
scene" speech become impossible to enforce consistently while the re-
cipient country remains connected to the Internet. Like it or not, we
live now in an age of completely free speech, of one limited and anony-
mous type, for everyone with access to a computer.2 0 7
III. NEW CHANNELS OF COMMERCE
A great number and variety of businesses have announced plans
for or prototypes of Internet-based commercial activities. As many as
fifteen percent of consumer purchases may be electronic by the turn of
the century.208 Internet commerce seems poised to evolve in two com-
205. On the fate of the War on Drugs in the U.S., See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS,
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993).
206. See ITAR page, available online URL ftp://ftp.cygnus.com/pub/export/export.html.
Anonymous communication will be less effective in undermining the ITAR to the extent that its true
goal is to restrict the emergence of a standard mass-market encryption product. Until anonymous
digital cash is wide-spread, no commercial software publisher in the U.S. will risk violating the
ITAR since there is no effective means for them to charge for their products and yet maintain the
anonymity they would require to avoid any risk of prosecution.
207. Note that one does not need to own a computer; one simply needs access to a machine
one can trust not to log one's communications. In the United States, for example, such a computer
might be located in a public library.
208. Where E-Cash Will Take Off, Bus. WK., June 12, 1995, at 70. Another estimate suggests
more than $200 billion in Internet commerce within five years. John Kavanagh, Purchases on the
Internet 'Could Potentially Exceed $200bn by Year 2000,' FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at 12 FT-IT
(quoting wide variety of estimates). Internet purchases in 1994 were estimated at $240 million. Id.
See also Edward Mozley Roche, Business Value of Electronic Commerce Over Interoperable Net-
works, Paper Presented at Freedom, Forum, July 6-7, 1995 (Rosalyn, Va.), available online URL
http://www.commerce.net/information/reference/roche.txt (projecting huge increases in Internet
commerce).
1996]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE
plementary directions, which one might call ordinary commerce in tan-
gible things and information commerce.
In the case of ordinary commerce in tangible things, many trans-
actions that are currently carried out by telephone, ordinary mail (e.g.,
catalog sales), and even in person, may shift to the net. The shopping
mall of the future may be on line, and offer everything from video
product demonstrations and recorded customer testimonials to techni-
cal specifications for the product. Interactive sales may allow
merchants to question customers as to their needs and budgets and
then guide them to particular products; 09 the products could be manu-
factured to the customer's size, color, and other specifications based on
the customer's specifications. It may even be possible to haggle with the
merchant's computer about the price. 10
From the most practical standpoint, the challenge of Internet com-
merce is of conducting business via a medium that excels at moving
information, but provides a very insecure means of communication. It
is not always possible to be certain that persons are who they claim to
be, nor is it certain that no one is eavesdropping. Digital cash promises
to solve the problem of moving value, but it is too early to say which if
any type of digital cash is likely to find wide acceptance in the market-
place. In the mean time, consumer transactions are being conducted by
credit/debit card.
A. Internet Credit Card Transactions
In the short run, credit and debit cards provide the simplest, if not
necessarily the ideal, means of transferring value over the Internet.
These Internet credit card 211 transactions can usefully be divided into
three categories:
(1) The customer e-mails the merchant her credit card details (or
fills out a form on a World Wide Web page), much as a person cur-
209. See, e.g., Walter R. Baranger, Taking In The Sites; Car Parking Areas Grow Around
the Web, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 11, 1995, at D8 (describing home pages of auto manufacturers who offer
prototype interactive sales information, querying customer on color, cost and other preferences).
210. The implications of Internet-based price discrimination are substantial, but they are be-
yond the scope of this article. Professor Gandy argues that profiling will enable new forms of invidi-
ous discrimination. See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest. No End In Sight?, 1996
U. Cm. LEGAL F. (forthcoming). One might, however, argue that the Internet empowers consumers
more than it empowers those who would take advantage of them since it will put information of how
firms treat similarly situated consumers at their fingertips.
211. This discussion uses "credit card" loosely to include debit cards. Although the differences
between credit and debit cards are significant in other contexts, the Internet aspects of the transac-
tions are not materially different.
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rently sends such information through the ordinary mail. Although
there is some risk that this information might be copied en route, par-
ticularly if the message originates on Ethernet systems that are vulner-
able to in-house packet sniffing, to date such theft of credit card details
seems rare at most. The customer's liability for fraudulent use in such
cases is subject to the same $50 limit as with any other credit card
transaction.2 112
(2) The customer encrypts the credit card data before sending it,
e.g., with PGP or with Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) proto-
col. Subject to the constraint that a determined attacker armed with
enough computers and time can always break some of the shorter codes
in use, this reduces the risk that the credit card details will be copied
by a third party. (Other risks include the danger that the cryptographic
system is flawed, badly implemented, or used on an insecure platform,
e.g., one which stores the data in an insecure manner.)
(3) The customer enters into an agreement with a third party such
as First Virtual Holdings, in which the credit card data is transmitted
to the third party by some other means. In the case of First Virtual, an
early entrant to this market, each transaction is also confirmed by
e-mail;213 in other cases, the customer may be issued some identifying
data, such as a PIN or a public-private key pair2" with which to digi-
tally sign messages. In both cases participating merchants clear trans-
actions through the third party before the charge is posted to the cus-
tomer's credit card.
In all three categories, the customer needs to have a valid debit/
credit card, e.g., Visa, or MasterCard, to make the transaction work.
The charges are sent to the bank, or appear on the credit card, and are
settled between the buyer, the seller (or the third party) and the card
issuer as if the customer had used the card to buy something in an
ordinary transaction.
Despite the variety of options, however, the transfer of ordinary
commerce in tangible things from existing retail channels to distributed
network sales is likely to raise relatively few new legal problems, al-
though there is no reason to expect any of the existing problems associ-
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1995) (limiting consumer
liability to $50 for most unauthorized electronic funds transfers).
213. See First Virtual, Welcome to First Virtual, available online URL http://
www.fv.com:80/info/intro.html.
214. See supra note 74.
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ated with retail sales to disappear. 15 Indeed, ordinary Internet com-
merce in tangible things may remain well suited to credit card sales,
particularly if the customer's potential liability for fraud remains fixed
at $50.116
In contrast to ordinary commerce in tangible things that simply
moves to the Internet, the sale of information is likely to be trans-
formed. This transformation will bring new legal and social problems in
its wake, or at the very least amplify old ones.1 17 Although today access
to most World Wide Web pages is free and open to anyone with a
browser, this may change once the pioneers on the information ocean
begin creating exclusive economic zones in their virtual real estate and
limiting access to users who have either purchased a password for ac-
cess or have browsers that are pre-configured to pay charges, perhaps
up to a pre-defined limit, for access to World Wide Web pages. Web
pages are ideally suited to micro-transactions, in which the reader is
charged a trifling fee-a penny or less-for each access,' 18 so long as
the process of payment can be seamlessly integrated into browsing
tools. At present, minute charges such as a tenth of a cent cannot eco-
nomically be processed through existing credit card systems' 1 and this
seems unlikely to change in the near future. Thus, a digital means to
transfer value, preferably one that does not require the participation of
a third party such as a credit bureau or credit card issuer, will be re-
quired before micro-charges can become part of the new information
economy." 0 It is clear that the potential for growth of Internet infor-
215. For a survey of many of these problems, see Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Credit
Cards-Authorized And Unauthorized Use, 13 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 233 (1994). Claims of fraud
that hinge on forgery or on factual determinations of identity may change if commerce begins to rely
on digital signatures. Unless a user loses control of the digital signature (or, more commonly, the
passphrase used to get access to the encrypted digital signature), a message signed with a digital
signature is undeniably the user's and not a forgery.
One additional issue of importance to the merchant is whether the credit card clearer will re-
gard the transaction as one in which the card is "present" or "not present." Merchants typically
have to pay a higher commission, and in some countries may bear more risk, in a transaction where
they cannot physically examine the card.
216. Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1995).
217. Cf. John Mason, Bank's Security Chains Failed, FIN. TiMas, Sept. 20, 1995, at 12
(describing banks' fears that hackers will use electronic means to rob banks).
218. See Arnold Kling, Banking on the Internet, available online URL http://www-
el c.gnn.com/gnn/meta/finance/feat/archives.focus/bank.body.html.
219. See, e.g., Report § 1.1, available online URL http://www.nri.reston.va.us:3000/XIWT/
documents/dig__cash___doc/Partl.html. The average U.S. credit card purchase today is $60. Id.
220. Steve Glassman et al., The Millicent Protocol for Inexpensive Electronic Commerce,
available online URL http://HTTP.CS.Berkely.EDU/-gauthier/millicent/millicent.html, argues
that even digital coins are too expensive for micro-transactions, and that a new form of "scrip" needs
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mation commerce is enormous, and that the high fixed costs of credit
cards transactions makes them particularly unsuited for high-volume
low-value transactions.
B. Digital Cash: A Technical Menu
Cryptologists have worked out methods for creating and transmit-
ting tokens of value-the digital equivalent of cash and checks-over a
network like the Internet. This "digital cash," also known as "elec-
tronic cash," "E$," or "e-cash," will allow buying and selling goods or
services over the Internet. Any digital cash system vastly expands the
commercial possibilities of the Internet, particularly if the system has
low transaction costs. With low transaction costs, pay-per-view/pay-
per-byte systems in which pennies or less are charged to view an article
or picture on the World Wide Web become a real possibility.
Depending on which protocol is adopted, the transaction may or
may not result in a record of the buyer's participation in the transac-
tion being maintained by either the seller or the bank. Digital cash can
leave the audit trail of a credit card purchase, or can provide greater
anonymity than paper currency. Without some form of anonymity built
into digital cash, however, each payment creates the possibility of a
record which, when combined with other similar records, becomes a
detailed consumer profile. If digital cash replaces credit cards for ordi-
nary commerce in tangible things, the consequences of this profiling
may be no more severe than those caused by the use of credit cards
today. If, however, the availability and ease of use of Internet com-
merce causes consumers to shift cash sales to Internet credit card sales
or traceable digital cash, the effect will be to increase the amount of
information available on the consumer's buying habits.
If consumers use a traceable payments mechanism for the
purchase of information as well as goods, the potential for consumer
profiles grows larger still. If Internet tools such as the World Wide
Web become a major national and international communications me-
dium with an embedded micro-charging mechanism, every newspaper
article accessed, every online catalog perused, every political debate
sampled, will leave an information residue. These data can be collected
to form a highly detailed profile of the consumer-citizen. The existence
to be deployed for micro-transactions. Proposals for two schemes that may meet the exacting re-
quirements of efficient micro-transactions can be found in Ronald L. Rivest & Adi Shamir, Payword
& MicroMint: Two simple Micropayment Schemes (Nov. 8, 1995), available online URL http://
theory.Ics.mit.edu/-rivest/RivestShamir-mpay.ps.
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of such detailed dossiers on spending and intellectual preferences would
be unprecedented.
2 1
We are at a very early stage in the development of Internet com-
merce. Most payment products and protocols are somewhere between
the drawing board and the street; few are beyond their field tests. No
standards have emerged, but many large financial corporations and
banks are preparing to provide consumer electronic financial exchange
products.222 Each of these implementations requires that decisions be
made about inevitable tradeoffs between security, anonymity, cost, and
ease of use.
Let us assume that the digital cash is to be provided by a bank,2 23
and used in a real-time transaction between Alice, a customer, and
Bob, a merchant.2 24 In a real-time transaction Alice buys information
(software, news, art, the right to view a Web page) on-line. There may
be only seconds between Alice's proffer of payment and her expectation
that Bob will deliver the goods; Bob must confirm the validity of Alice's
payment immediately, or run the risk that there will be little he can do
if Alice has cheated him. An Internet transaction might of course take
many other forms, and these too receive occasional mention in what
follows. The transaction could, for example, be a catalog sale transac-
tion in which Alice places an order, makes a payment, and Bob waits
until payment clears before shipping the goods. In this model, Bob's
risk that the payment will be bad is relatively low since he need only
fail to ship the goods.
Because the digital cash is represented by a series of bits, and
there are few things in this life easier to copy than bits, the bank is
going to be very anxious to ensure that any copies of the digital cash
created by Alice or by Mallet, a hostile third party,215 will be unspend-
able, or at least very easy to detect. The bank wishes to prevent, or at
221. See generally Gandy, supra note 210.
222. See the long list of companies at the E-cash Index, available online URL http://gan-
ges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/proposed.html.
223. Whether a corporation that provides electronic cash services is necessarily required to be
licensed as a bank is a question beyond the scope of this article. The provision of digital cash creates
obvious issues regarding the backing of currency by electronic banks, control of the money supply,
and wonderful new forms of bank fraud.
224. For a far more detailed discussion of the possible participants and their requirements, see
generally Mihir Bellare et al., ikp-A Family of Secure Electronic Payment Protocols (July 12,
1995), available online URL http://www.zurich.ibm.ch/Technology/Security/publications/1995/
ikp.ps [hereinafter IBM Research].
225. "Mallet" is the name cryptographers give to a malicious active attacker. See, e.g.,
SCHNEIER, supra note 74, at 31.
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very least detect, attempted double-spending of digital cash in order to
avoid having to pay twice, and ideally it also wants to be able to figure
out who the double-spenders are in order to have them prosecuted for
fraud. For example, if the bank's communication with Alice is not en-
crypted, Mallet might eavesdrop on Alice's telephone line and record
the digital cash as it is transmitted and then try to spend it before
Alice does. And even if the communication with Alice is secure, the
bank wishes to make sure that Alice herself cannot spend a coin more
than once.
Bob, the merchant, wishes to be able prove that Alice authorized
the transaction, in order to ensure that Alice will not attempt to deny it
later ("non-repudiation"). Bob also wants an assurance that Alice has
the funds to pay for the transaction, and that the bank will transfer
them to him."' In some circumstances Bob may also wish to avoid
revealing the fact of the transaction. Meanwhile, Alice wishes to ensure
that unauthorized payments are impossible, that Bob cannot deny hav-
ing received her payment, that the fact of transaction is private, and
that there is some redress available if Bob defaults or delivers shoddy
goods. In some cases, Alice wants the transaction to be fully anony-
mous-not even Bob should know Alice's identity; in such cases, how-
ever, Bob will want to ensure that Alice remains unable to disavow the
obligation to pay.
2 27
If the transaction is entirely electronic, each of the parties will
need a mechanism to ensure the other parties will pay what is required.
In a world where fraud is possible, or the transaction has any non-
instantaneous aspects (e.g., a warranty, the possibility of product liabil-
ity suits, the possibility that a party might attempt to repudiate the
payment) the parties will want some assurance that the other parties
are who they claim to be: bank, Bob, and Alice (the owner of the digi-
tal currency). Identity authentication, however, is by far the easiest as-
pect of the electronic transaction, as it can easily be achieved with digi-
tal signatures.22 8
226. See IBM Research, supra note 224, at 4. Unlike the case where Alice offers paper
money, Alice's proffer of digital cash does not provide the necessary assurances, because Bob needs
to confirm that the digital cash has not been spent previously.
227. See IBM Research, supra note 224, at 4-6.
228. If the parties have no prior contact, then the digital signatures need to be backed by some
evidence of authenticity. This can be provided by either a "web of trust" model, in which the party
proffering a signature produces attestations of identity or reliability signed by one or more persons
known to the other party or, failing any common acquaintances, by some chain of authenticators
culminating in a person known to the other party. Alternately, the digital signature can be backed by
a "certificate" by some trusted third party, e.g., the Post Office, attesting to identity. See OFFICE OF
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Digital cash can be stored in any one of a number of places: in the
financial institution's computer, in Alice's and Bob's computers, or on
smart cards carried by the customer and the merchant.2 9 The digital
cash may be backed by actual funds, or it may not. Depending on the
system used, if Alice and Bob hold the digital cash, the bank may issue
it in the form of digital "coins" which must be aggregated to reach the
total amount of the purchase, or Alice and Bob may hold it in a digital
account on a smart card which is debited and credited as needed. The
system may require that all transactions are cleared by the issuer, or it
may allow funds to circulate freely between customers and merchants.
What follows attempts to be a representative sample of the types
of digital cash currently being developed. Few of the digital payment
systems discussed below allow unlimited direct transferability between
holders of electronic funds: with the single exception of the Mondex
digital purse model, in all of the digital coin models the recipient of an
electronic payment must always return to the bank for a new coin
before being able to spend it, although it is theoretically possible for
users to modify at least one digital coin payment scheme to allow the
coins to be transferred among third party without returning to the
bank."' 0
1. The Debit Card Model
One simple, albeit costly, electronic payment strategy that meets
the bank's security needs, but not necessarily all of Alice and Bob's, is
to require that every transaction between them be cleared through the
bank at the time of the transaction. The highest-security version of this
model is not really digital cash at all, and is modeled on debit cards:
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRI-
VACY IN NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 55-56 (1994) (OTA-TCT-606) [hereinafter OTA INFORMATION
SECURITY] (describing Post Office's proposed certification service); MICHAEL BAUM, NATIONAL IN-
STITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY LIABILITY AND
POLICY: LAW AND POLICY OF CERTIFICATE-BASED PUBLIC KEY AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES (1994)
(surveying legal and policy issues involved in setting up and running a certification authority); A.
Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L.
REv. 49 (1996).
229. For a taxonomy of smart card types, see David Chaum, Prepaid Smart Card Techniques:
A Brief Introduction and Comparison, available online URL http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie:80/mepeirce/
Project/Chaum/cardcom.html.
230. Note, however, that parties wishing to exchange digital coins without clearing them
through the bank must have much greater trust in each other than would otherwise be required. Id.
In contrast, electronic wallet systems, such as Mondex, which do not store "coins" but instead have a
meter that records the value held, lend themselves easily to third-party transferability. See infra text
accompanying note 256.
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the bank requires Bob, the merchant, to contact the bank on-line at the
time of payment in order to transfer the funds from Alice's account to
Bob's account. If Alice has insufficient funds, the bank refuses to allow
the transaction. If the client has the funds, they are transferred from
the client's account to the merchant's account at time of sale. An alter-
native form of this model has the "bank" replaced by a clearing service
that forwards the payment instructions to the ordinary banks previously
selected by members of the scheme.3 1
Alice's and Bob's identity can be verified using unforgeable digital
signatures, making the chances of a fraudulent or repudiable transac-
tion remote so long as both parties carefully protect the passphrases
(longer, alphanumeric, versions of bankcard PIN numbers) that access
their accounts. There is no danger of double-payment or duplication of
digital currency because no digital currency ever leaves the banking
system.
One disadvantage of this approach is that on-line verification in-
troduces both delay and expense into the transaction akin to that of
ordinary credit cards. The transaction costs associated with the debit-
card paradigm make it unsuited for low-value/very-high-volume trans-
actions.238 2 The basic debit card model would work for buying a car on-
line, or even perhaps a t-shirt, but not for charging a tenth of one cent
to read a Web page. The debit-card paradigm also does nothing to pro-
tect the privacy interests of either Alice or Bob: the bank has a full
record of every transaction. This facilitates auditing, and may be of
great value to law-enforcement, but it also means that privacy vis a vis
the bank is low, and that the bank will find consumer profiling easy.2 8
231. This, in essence, is the strategy behind CyberCash's Money Payments Service (TM), see
Moneypayments, available online URL http://www.cybercash.com/technical/moneympay-
ments.html, and also the "Checkfree Wallet," see http://www.checkfree.com, available online URL
http://www.mc2-csr.com/vmall/checkfree/v20/faq.html. Members of the Money Payments pro-
gram include Wells Fargo Bank, American Express and Mellon Bank. Id. A similar strategy, involv-
ing the use of a prepaid VISA ATM/debit card (and a five percent commission charge!) is employed
by the (unchartered) "First Bank of Internet." See Announcement, available online URL http://
ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/Press/foi.html.
232. See, e.g., Stefan A. Brands, Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatic (CWI), Off-line Elec-
tronic Cash Based on Secret-Key Certificates 1-2 (1995) (Report CS-R9506) [hereinafter Brands
19951, available online URL http://www.cwi.nl/ftp/brands/CS-R9506.ps.Z.
233. As discussed in more detail below, see infra, it may be easier for regulators to control the
transaction data in the bank's possession than the information kept by Alice and Bob.
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2. The Basic Digital Coin
The basic digital coin model is fairly simple: the Bank issues the
user a very large, probabilistically unique, random number (the "serial
number" of the coin) signed with the Bank's private key. When Alice
wants to spend the coin, she sends it to Bob, who turns it in to the bank
either on line, or after the fact. The bank checks the serial number
against its list of spent coins and, if the coin has not previously been
spent, either credits Bob's account or issues him a new coin with a new
serial number."' So long as the bank is honest, Alice and Bob both
have the proof they need that the transaction, and the payment, oc-
curred. The coin model is also computationally simple to implement.
Each coin requires a long, unique, random number, but the bank can
re-use the same private-public key pair to sign every coin of a given
denomination s.23  The basic coin model does not allow coins to circulate
freely: every time Alice spends a coin at Bob's shop, Bob must redeem
the coin at the issuing bank, either for traditional funds or a new coin,
before he can spend the money. 36
The basic coin model has two problems. First, if the transaction is
on-line in real time, but verification is off-line (that is, at some time
after the completion of the transaction), Bob may be unable to ensure
that the coin Alice is offering him has not previously been spent until it
is too late.137 Bob can check the coin's digital signature against the
public key associated with a coin of the purported denomination. This
test will distinguish a forged coin from a real one. But without on-line
verification Bob cannot tell if a coin already has been redeemed else-
where at the time Alice wants to buy from him. On-line verification
ensures that the coin being proffered is valid, but this verification likely
234. A simple example of this procedure in action is the Netcash "coupon." See What is
Virtual Cash?, available online URL http://www.teleport.com/-netcash/nvasch.html, NetCash
Quick Start Guide, available online URL http://www.teleport.com/-netcash/ncquick.html.
235. See David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992, at 96, 96-97 (dis-
cussing electronic cash), available online URL http.//ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/
Chaum/sciam.html.
236. As a general matter, it is possible to convert coin-based off-line electronic payment sys-
tems to allow transferability, but this has practical disadvantages that make that development un-
likely. See Sefan Brands, An Efficient Off-Line Electronic Cash System Based on the Representation
Problem 7-8, 52 (1993), available online ftp://ftp.cwi.nl:/pub/CWlreports/AA/CS-R9323.ps.Z
[hereinafter Brands 1993]; David Chaum & Torben Pryds Pedersen, Transferred Cash Grows In
Size, ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY: EUROCRYPT '92 390 (proving that it is impossible to construct a
transferrable digital coin system "without property that money grows when transferred").
237. Note that if the transaction is not consummated on-line, e.g., in a catalog sales model,
Bob can assess the validity of Alice's payment at his leisure.
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involves delay and expense. 88 Second, since the serial number of the
coin is unique and known to the bank, Bob's redemption of the coin
links Alice to the transaction, and the bank ends up with a database
containing information on all of its customers; as in the credit-card
model, the customers have no privacy.
2 89
Basic digital coins are likely to have at most a small effect on the
money supply. Whether they have any effect at all depends in large
part on how banks and customers manage the coins and whether they
use on-line or off-line clearing systems. At one extreme, transactions
are cleared on-line and the bank allows Alice to avoid purchasing the
digital coins until the moment she needs them. As a result, Alice keeps
her funds in an interest-bearing account until she needs a coin. When
she wants to transact with Bob she contacts the bank, it issues a coin,
and she offers it to Bob who redeems it as soon he receives it from
Alice. In this scenario, the digital coin's effect on the money supply is
negligible.
At the other extreme, transactions are cleared off-line and the
bank requires that Alice acquire digital coins in advance of need, much
as one buys travellers checks today. Because on-line clearing is not
available, or too expensive to be practical, Bob takes some risk of being
paid in previously spent coinage when he accepts a coin from Alice.
Bob's need to aggregate coins before redeeming them from the bank
introduces further delays between before settlement. In this version,
digital coins function much like traveller's checks. Since both travellers
checks and cash are part of Ml, the narrowest measure of money com-
monly used by macroeconomists, this alone is not significant. If, how-
ever, people choose to hold digital coins instead of ordinary cash, more
of the money in circulation will flow into the banking system, increas-
ing the money supply through fractional reserve lending.240 Digital
238. See supra text accompanying note 232.
239. Chaum, supra note 235.




H = high-powered money, i.e., the quantity of money held by banks as reserves;
e = the fraction of deposits that banks hold as reserves; and
c = the fraction of deposits held as pocket cash.
If the introduction of digital cash results in a substitution of digital cash for pocket cash, c will
decrease. So long as e < 1, i.e., so long as banks hold less than all their deposits as reserves, any
decrease in c increases the money supply. See ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 451, 452 n.4
(1978).
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coins also could have a small effect on the velocity of money if they
enable a greater number of transactions per year, or if the existence of
world-wide 24-hour cybermalls encourages people to transact more
often. 41
3. Blinded Coins
The basic coin model gives the bank confidence at the price of on-
line verification and the opportunity for banks to amass customer
spending profiles. It is possible, however, to retain the features of the
basic coin model that make it either impossible or at least very risky
for people to copy their digital cash and spend it twice without giving
the bank an opportunity to create a giant database of who spent what
where. In this model, payors, but not payees, can remain anonymous.
Using "blinded coins" Alice can acquire digital cash with a unique
serial number from a bank without allowing the bank to create a record
of the coin's serial number. Despite the bank's ignorance of the serial
number, the number's uniqueness helps ensure that Alice cannot spend
it twice. The techniques that achieve this, developed and patented by
David Chaum and being marketed by a company he founded called
DigiCash, are complex. Like a basic digital coin, a blinded coin begins
with a large random serial number, but this time the serial number is
generated by Alice, the customer who intends to acquire a coin from
the bank. Alice multiplies this serial number by another random factor
("the blinding factor" 42), and sends the product (the "blinded" num-
ber) to the bank. As in the basic case, the bank signs the number with
its secret key.
Unlike the basic case, however, a bank issuing a blinded coin does
not know the true serial number of the coin at the time the bank issues
it by affixing its digital signature to the "blinded" number. All that the
bank knows is that Alice has purchased a coin of a given denomina-
A central bank such as the Federal Reserve Board can offset this effect, however, by increasing
the reserve requirement (forcing banks to increase e) for banks that issue electronic cash.
241. According to the pre-Keynsian quantity theory of money, MV=PQ, where
M = money supply
V = velocity of money, i.e., the average number of times per year that the money stock is used in
making payments for final goods and services.
P = price level
Q = real output.
242. For a description of the blinding protocol, see BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRA-
PHY 112-15 (2d ed. 1996).
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tion,2 4 8 and the "blinded" number Alice submitted.244 In the absence of
anonymous bank accounts, the bank knows Alice's identity, and knows
how many coins of each denomination Alice is buying. Armed with this
information, the bank should be able to comply with rules designed to
control money laundering and tax evasion to the same extent as an
ordinary bank."15 Alice's privacy depends in part on there being a suffi-
ciently large volume of coins in circulation such that Alice's purchase
and use of the coins does not stand out.
There is yet another way to hide and retrieve Alice's identity. In
this variation, the bank does not know who spent the money so long as
it is spent only once, but this information is accessible to a designated
organization outside the bank.246 The inventors of this type of digital
cash suggest that the trusted third party which would hold the means
of de-annonymizing the digital cash should be "a consumer rights or-
ganization. 247 Nothing in their protocol, however, would prevent a
government from requiring that the organization be the police or the
courts. In effect, this protocol opens the door to Clipperized digital
cash, in which the government could have access to transactional data
subject to Fourth Amendment constraints.248 It is possible, however, to
modify the system of traceable anonymous cash so that the user's iden-
tity will only be disclosed if several parties ("trustees") agree.24'9 This
system of multiple trustees resembles the system of multiple escrow
agents envisioned for the keys to the Clipper chip.
All forms of blinded coins are generated as follows. When Alice
gets the signed blinded number back from the bank, she performs a
mathematical operation that removes the "blinding factor." The result
is a coin that looks like a basic digital coin, bears the "true" serial
number, and has a digital signature from the bank that authenticates
243. See Chaum, supra note 235; Hal Finney, Detecting Double-spending (long), available
online URL http://ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepeirce/Project/Double/dsarticles.html.
244. The odds of two customers choosing the same serial number are remote if the bank re-
quires that customers choose sufficiently large (e.g., 100 digit) random numbers. When it does
happen, it should produce an interesting lawsuit.
245. See DigiCash, Ecash and Crime, available online URL http://www.digicash.com/ecash/
aboutcrime.html.
246. Markus Jakobsson & Moti Yung, Revokable and Versatile Electronic Money, available
online URL http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/markus/revoke.ps.
247. Id.
248. Cf Froomkin, supra note 6 (discussing Clipper chip).
249. See Ernie Brickell et al., Trustee-based Tracing Extension to Anonymous Cash and the
Making of Anonymous Change (Sandia National Labs print, on file with author, copies available by
e-mail from psgemme@cs.sandia.gov).
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the true - not the blinded - serial number.2 50 Alice can now spend the
coin in Bob's shop as if it were a basic coin. In the absence of anony-
mous bank accounts, Bob must still disclose his identity to redeem the
coin. (If for some reason Alice later wants to "stop payment" on the
coin because Bob defaulted, she can always reveal the true serial num-
ber to the bank. 51)
Like a basic coin, however, the blinded coin is just digitized data.
Since the blinding process means that the bank cannot trace the coin's
serial number to Alice, some means is required to convince her not to
run off and duplicate coins. Preventing double-spending is relatively
simple for an on-line clearing system; preventing Alice from cheating a
system that relies on off-line clearing is more difficult.
a. Preventing Double-Spending of Blinded Coins With On-Line
Clearing (DigiCash)
When Alice spends a blinded coin and Bob presents the coin to the
bank for settlement, the bank cannot link the coin to Alice because it
has no record of the coin's serial number. Without some means of
preventing double-spending, the temptation might be more than Alice
could resist. On-line clearing removes all temptation. Since the bank
keeps a record of every serial number redeemed, it can check the coin
proffered by Bob against the master list. If the coin was previously
spent it denies payment. As the clearing is on-line, Bob then is able to
tell Alice that the bank has refused to honor her coin, much like a
merchant will tell a customer that a credit card company has refused to
authorize a purchase.
On October 23, 1995, Mark Twain Bank of St. Louis, Missouri
became the world's first financial institution to issue blinded digital
coins backed by value. The bank uses software licensed from Digi-
Cash. 52 The system relies on on-line clearing of blinded coins, but de-
250. "The blinding operation is a special kind of encryption that can only be removed by the
party who placed it there. It commutes with the public key digital signature process, and can thus be
removed without disturbing the signature." DigiCash, An Introduction To Ecash, available online
URL http://www.digicash.com/publish/ecash-intro/cash-intro.html#flow; see also Brands 1993,
supra note 236, at 4; Chaum, supra note 235; David Chaum, Security without Identification: Card
Computers to Make Big Brother Obsolete, available online URL http://www.digicash.com/publish/
bigro.html.
251. Chaum, supra note 235; David Chaum et al., Untraceable Electronic Cash, in ADVANCES
IN CRYPTOLOOY-PROCEEDINOS OF CRYPTO 88 at 319 (1990).
252. See Mark Twain Bank, First Bank to Launch Electronic Cash, available online URL
http://www.marktwain.com/pressl.html. Bank customers download software to hold their coins on
their PC. Id.
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tails of the technical specifications of the system were limited at the
time this article went to press.258 Other financial institutions are likely
to be providing similar electronic cash services in the near future. For
example, DigiCash has licensed its software to the Swedish Post Office,
which owns the retail bank that transacts with accounts held by sev-
enty-five percent of Swedish households.'"
b. Preventing Double-Spending of Blinded Coins With Off-Line
Clearing
On-line clearing is potentially expensive in both time and money.
Off-line clearing is usually much cheaper in both. Unfortunately, off-
line clearing creates an opportunity for an unscrupulous party to spend
the same coin many times since the party accepting the coin will not
know it has been spent until it is too late.25
Bob's risk that the coin offered by Alice will prove to be worthless
is greatest when neither Bob nor the bank knows who Alice is, since
Alice will reasonably believe that her anonymity protects her from the
consequences of her double-spending. Even if Bob knows Alice's iden-
tity but the bank does not, Bob bears considerable risk when the costs
of making Alice pay would be greater than the value of the debt. This
may include a large set of transactions if Internet commerce becomes
global. Nevertheless, if Alice is aware that Bob or the bank knows her
identity, she can reasonably fear that Bob might report her to the ap-
propriate authorities, perhaps for criminal prosecution, which should
reduce the temptation to double-spend.
The essence of a blinded coin is that the bank does not know the
coin's serial number, and hence cannot deduce the payor's identity
when the coin is presented for redemption by the payee. In both the
basic coin model and the standard blinded coin model, the coin carries
no information about Alice. It is possible, however, to encode informa-
tion about Alice's identity in such a way that if the coin is spent only
once the information remains encrypted on the coin. If someone tries to
spend a coin that has previously been redeemed, the second spending
will disclose the information encoded on the coin about its original
253. Digicash and Mark Twain Bank have promised to make a technical description of the
system public. Full details should be available online URL http://www.digicash.com/ecash/proto-
col.html by the time this article is published.
254. Mark Twain Bank, supra note 252.
255. See supra text following note 236. There is no danger that Alice will just make up a data
stream and claim it is a coin, since Bob can check the bank's digital signature.
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owner.25' This system works even if Alice spends the coin with two
different merchants.
The second spending can only reveal whatever identifying informa-
tion the bank encoded into the coin at the time it gave the coin to
Alice. The issuing bank is responsible for choosing to encode sufficient
information, e.g., a unique identification number, to allow it to trace
the coin back to the customer. The bank, however, has a problem: the
bank cannot read the information about Alice's identity encoded onto a
blinded coin unless Alice spends the coin twice. In other words, the
blinding prevents the bank from inspecting the coin at the time of issu-
ance to ensure that Alice has in fact supplied the required information.
The bank can, however, use probabilistic methods that make it very
likely that Alice will encode her identity on the coin at the time the
bank issues the coin. For example, the bank might require that Alice
generate a hundred blinded numbers and associated encrypted data
fields. The bank could then require that Alice reveal the contents of
ninety-nine coins of the bank's choice. If all of these coins turn out to
have the proper information about Alice, the odds are good that the
100th coin-the only one that will actually be signed by the bank, and
the only one for which Alice does not reveal the contents-does too. If
Alice tries to cheat by inserting missing or erroneous information into
even one of the 100 coins, the odds are good that the bank will detect
it. And if the bank detects attempted cheating, the bank will probably
refuse to issue digital coins to Alice ever again.
256. Chaum and his colleagues have developed a challenge-response protocol in which the
bank asks the person redeeming a coin a mathematical "question" that reveals no identifying data if
a coin is being spent for the first time. See Chaum, supra note 235; see also Chaum et al., supra
note 251; Ecash Homepage available online URL http://www.digicash.com/ecash/ecash-
home.html.
Brands has developed a complicated "cut and choose" protocol that protects Alice's identity if
Alice spends the coin once, but creates a very significant probability that multiple spending will
reveal her identity if the parties who have been given the same coin can compare notes. This protocol
is better suited to off-line clearing systems than the basic DigiCash model, but it still requires that
the victims of multiple spending be able to communicate with each other or the bank reasonably
frequently. See Brands 1993, supra note 236, at 4-5. If the coin is spent a second time, however, a
second reply to the question elicits an answer that, when combined with the answer given on first
spending, reveals sufficient data for the bank to identify the party to whom it originally gave the
coin. See Chaum, supra note 235. Hal Finney's excellent, brief, but somewhat mathematical expla-
nation of Stefan Brands' optimizations to this procedure can be found available online URL http://
ganges.c.td.ie/mepeirce/Project/Mlists/brans4.html.
Information about the payee can also be encoded on a coin when it is spent, although this is not
a necessary part of the protocol.
[Vol. 15:2:395
FLOOD CONTROL ON THE INFORMATION OCEAN
In an off-line clearing scheme, Bob's security against double
spending rests on a challenge-response protocol that discloses Alice's
identity if she tries to double-spend. Bob thus bears some risk of being
stuck with the digital equivalent of a slug in the vending machine be-
cause Alice may have spent the coin elsewhere before he gets it to the
bank. Unlike the slug in the vending machine, however, the coin can
contain information that identifies Alice to the bank. Whether this suf-
fices to find Alice and get civil or criminal remedies depends on
whether the information on the coin is accurate and on the jurisdictions
involved.
It may be that blinded coins cannot safely be issued in denomina-
tions of any significant size in the absence of an efficient on-line clear-
ing system; Alice could spend even a $1 coin many times in a few min-
utes and then attempt to vanish.25 7 However, if the denomination is
small enough, Bob can limit his risk if he checks every small-denomina-
tion coin Alice offers to make sure that it is not a duplicate of a coin he
has personally received in the past, and makes sure to contact the bank
for verification whenever he has received as many coins as he cares to
risk holding. 58
c. Preventing Double-Spending of Blinded Coins With Electronic
Wallets
In order to feel confident about issuing blinded coins, banks are
likely to require considerable assurance that the coins cannot be spent
more than once; banks may also want to minimize the chances of third-
party money laundering in order to avoid difficulties with national reg-
ulatory authorities. From the bank's point of view it may be cold com-
fort to be able to identify the person who spent a coin a million times if
that person cannot be found.
An electronic wallet is a smart card with a microprocessor on it.
The wallet interacts with specially designed card readers, somewhat
like bank cards are used in Automatic Teller Machines. Embedding the
coin, or at least part of the information needed to use the coin, in a
smart card with tamper-resistant features provides greatly added secur-
ity if the tamper-resistant part of the card is programmed to prevent
257. Brands 1993, supra note 236, at 4-5.
258. See, e.g., Shamir et al., supra note 220 (describing payword and micromint, two new
efficient off-line clearing systems).
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double spending.25 9 Banks, merchants, even personal computers, might
have the necessary smart card readers.
One extension of this model requires that the tamper-resistant part
of the card have an electronic "observer" whose participation is re-
quired to spend a coin. The combination protects Alice's privacy by
having all communications from the observer go via Alice's computer
which is programmed to ensure that no transaction details are dis-
closed. If anyone breaks the tamper-resistance and attempts to double-
spend, the blinded coins protocol still applies and the identity of the
coin's original owner is revealed. 2 0 Perhaps the best example of this is
the Conditional Access for Europe (CAFE) project, being sponsored by
the European Union's ESPRIT program. The CAFE protocol promises
to offer high security for the customer, a chance of getting unspent
money back if the purse is lost, and payer (but not payee) privacy; so
far, however, no actual CAFE products exist beyond prototypes.
2 1
4. The Traveler's Check Model
Coin-based digital cash systems have problems with exact change.
Digital coins are not divisible without sacrificing customer privacy and
also making the payment system much less efficient to operate.262 Indi-
visible coins ordinarily have to be aggregated to get the amount needed
for a purchase, just as dimes and pennies might be combined to make a
23-cent acquisition. If coins are in small denominations, a large num-
ber of coins may be required to buy anything even moderately expen-
sive. At some point, processing a large enough number of coins can
introduce transmission delays and information processing costs. If the
coins are to be carried on a smart card, large numbers of coins require
a card with a larger memory, which increases the investment required
to participate in the system.
259. Brands 1993, supra note 236, at 5-7. One way to look at this is that the electronic wallet
model places the blinded coin in a digital purse. Cf Brands 1993, supra note 236, at 2; infra text
accompanying note 264 (describing digital purse).
260. Brands 1993, supra note 236, at § 2.2.
261. See Jean-Paul Boly et al., The ESPRIT Project CAFE-High Security Digital Payment
Systems (1994), available online URL http://www.informatik.uni-hildesheim.de/FB4/Proekte/
sirene/publ/BBCMl_94CafeEsorics.ps; see also CAFE- Conditional Access For Europe, available
online URL http://www.informatik.uni-hildesheim.de/FB4/Projekte/sirene/projects/cafe/in-
dex.html; The CAFE Project, available online URL http://www.cwi.nl/cwi/projects/cafe.html;
Digicash, DigiCash products-the CAFE project, available online URL http://www.digicash.com/
products/projects/cafe.html.
262. See Brands 1995, supra note 232, at 8.
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Whatever the price of the good being purchased, Bob needs to pro-
vide change if Alice does not happen to have the exact coins required.
Thus, Bob needs to have a stock of coins on hand to pay Alice (recall
that all coins must be returned to the bank each time they are spent),
and Alice needs to be able to deposit coins in the bank as well as with-
draw them.
In contrast, an electronic traveller's check system allows Alice to
spend each check for any amount up to a predetermined maximum.
The bank debits Alice for the maximum value when the check is cre-
ated, and refunds Alice the difference between the maximum and the
amount actually expended. If the check system relies on "blinded"
checks, akin to blinded coins, it is possible to design the refund system
so that when Alice presents the unexpended portion of the check for a
refund, nothing in the refund request itself (other than the amount re-
quested) gives the bank any information that would allow it to link the
refund request to a particular payment."' Unlike traveller's checks,
competitive pressures might force banks to pay some interest on the
funds set aside to cover the check.
5. The Electronic Purse (Mondex Money)
The electronic purse is a smart card or a computer program that
holds and keeps track of the owner's electronic funds balance, much as
a copy card or a telephone card stores value. If the purse is on a smart
card, the card can be used either with ATMs or with specialized card
readers attached to computers or telephones. In the pure implementa-
tion, no backups exist: if the card is lost, or the computer disk crashes,
the consumer's money is as gone as if a dollar bill were burnt-but the
bank gets to keep it.2" An electronic purse can be designed with
whatever privacy, or lack of privacy, the manufacturer desires. If the
smart card functioning as the electronic purse has sufficient storage,
the card can keep track of every transaction that it touches; the purse
can be designed so that this information is accessible only to its owner,
or it can be designed so that the information is accessible to others,
such as the issuing bank or law enforcement. Similarly, the ATMs and
263. Brands 1993, supra note 236, at 50-52. The danger of "linking by complementary
amounts" is reduced if a customer groups refund requests together. Id. at 52.
264. See Mondex, If My Card is Lost or Stolen, Do I Lose the Money on It?, available online
URL http://www.mondex.com/mondex/lost.htm. If the smart card has some form of password pro-
tection, then a stolen card is of little value to a thief, id. unless the thief can somehow guess or extort
the passphrase.
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card readers that the smart cards need to communicate with each other
and with the bank can also be programmed to keep track of every
transaction, but do not have to.
One example of the electronic purse concept is the Mondex system
currently being field tested in Swindon, England by a joint venture of
NatWest and Midland Bank, in cooperation with British Telecom. 6 5
The Mondex card is unusual in two respects. First, it is designed to
hold up to five different currencies on a single card; second, and more
important, it allows direct peer-to-peer fund transfers, without the in-
tervention of a bank.
Little is publicly known about the mechanics of the Mondex sys-
tem. Mondex representatives have stated that the company intends to
restrict information about the workings of its cards, including its public
key and the algorithm used, in order to make life that much more diffi-
cult for anyone who would be tempted to try to hack the system. The
company has stated that it uses digital signatures to distinguish an au-
thentic Mondex transaction from a fraudulent one, 2  and that each
card will carry two security systems, one of which will be changed
every two years in series.2 7 Each card also carries a unique 16-digit
identifier that links it to the person who purchased it.218 The Mondex
system has, however, been criticized for relying too heavily on the tam-
per-resistance of the smart card. According to Mondex's competitors, if
an attacker were to manage to break the tamper-resistance of the de-
vice, he would be able to introduce new money on the card virtually at
265. On the English field test, see, e.g., Leslie Helm, Cashless Society Gets Closer With Plans
For Electronic Currency, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at D4, and Revenue to accept Mondex: Tax
payments, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at 4 (noting that British tax authorities plan to accept payment
via Mondex). On a far more modest U.S. trial, see Jeffrey Kutler & Valerie Block, Mondex Gains
U.S. Foothold With Smart Card Test at Wells, AM. BANKER, Aug. 3, 1995, at Credit/Debit/ATMs
1 (describing issuance of 90 cards to Wells Fargo Bank employees).
Although the Mondex system appears to be the closest to market in the English-speaking world,
"Portuguese banks launched a national electronic purse in February, and more than 500,000 cards
are expected to be issued this year." Richard Wolffe, Banks Unzip The First £20m 'Electronic
Purse', FIN. TIMES, July 3, 1995, at 5.
266. Mondex, How Secure is Mondex?, available online URL http://ww.mondex.com/
mondex/secure.htm.
267. Tim Jones, Mondex Chairman, Security and Security Policy in Internet Payment Sys-
tems, Remarks at Worldwide Electronic Conference, Bethesda, MD (Nov. 19, 1995) [hereinafter
Jones Remarks].
268. Mondex, What About Privacy?, available online URL http://www.mondex.com/
cmondex/anon.htm.
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will. And if the system of breaking the cards were to be widely pub-
lished, the issuing bank would be helpless.2 '
Exactly how much privacy the Mondex card provides the user is a
subject of considerable dispute. The Chairman of Mondex has stated
that the company has not yet decided how much transaction logging
the card will do when it graduates from field tests to commercial use.
Meanwhile, Simon Davies, a Visiting Professor of Law at Essex Uni-
versity, a well-known privacy advocate and gadfly, has alleged that
Mondex card readers keep records of up to the last 500 cards used in
the reader, despite Mondex's claim that the cards are as anonymous as
cash; Professor Davies has filed a false advertising complaint with the
UK Trading Standards Board.7 Mondex states that the card itself
keeps a record of the last ten transactions;27 1 there have been allega-
tions that the card is designed to download this information to the cen-
tral bank every time the card is placed in an ATM.27 2
Digital purses with currency that does not have to be cleared
through the issuing bank raise a number of intriguing regulatory
problems beyond the scope of this article. Among them are: (1) what
regulations might be appropriate to reduce the harmful consequences
of the "meltdown scenario" in which someone cracks the security of the
electronic smartcards and begins minting her own apparently legiti-
mate digital cash; (2) how to prevent smart cards from becoming a tool
of money laundering; (3) how to monitor issuing banks to ensure that
they do not issue more card-based currency than customers have actu-
ally purchased; (4) transborder regulatory questions including con-
sumer protection, the role of non-bank banks in foreign markets, possi-
ble loss of seignorage, and bank exposure to multiple and differing
concepts of escheat.2 73 More than any other implementation of elec-
tronic cash, digital purses such as Mondex threaten to erode the control
269. See Stefan Brands, Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica (CW7), Off-line Cash Trans-
fer by Smart Cards 2 (1994) (CS-R9455), available online URL http://www.cwi.nl/ftp/brands/
CS-R94tt.ps.Z; Steven Levy, E-Money, WIRED, Dec. 1994, at 174, 177 (quoting David Chaum).
270. Gavin Clarke & Madeleine Acey, Mondex Blows Users Anonymity, NETWORK WK.,
London, Oct. 25, 1995 at 1.
271. Id.
272. There have been suggestions that the system is programmed to copy this information, and
the card's internal error log, every time a card is used to contact the bank. "Rev. Mark Grant,"
Mondex, 18 July 1995 (posting to cypherpunks@toad.com).
273. Cf. European Commission, DGXV, Study on the legal and regulatory aspects of the
issue and use of pre-paid cards (multi-sector electronic purses and wallets), available online URL
http://www.cec.lu/en/comm/dgl5/paystud.html (describing planned study).
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of central bank authorities over the money supply.2 7 ' Central banks ap-
pear to be concerned: "although none of the central banks have pointed
the finger at [Mondex] by name, one governor [of the European Mone-
tary Institute] delivering a recent speech on the subject in his native
language reportedly dropped into English to declare: 'Purse to purse,
No!"99 7 5
When Alice pays Mondex to put money on a smart card, the
transaction increases the money supply until the credit is redeemed.
Unlike other payment schemes such as checking accounts, travellers
checks or even digital coins, the Mondex scheme allows, even encour-
ages, participants to refrain from redeeming stored value at the bank.
The Mondex card's ability to transfer value from one card to another
thus increases the effective money supply.27 6 When Alice puts $10 into
her checking account, the bank has use of the money (and Alice has a
claim on the bank), but Alice does not have the use of the money
277
until she takes it out again. The only time when the bank and Alice
both have the use of that $10 is during any float period between when
Alice writes a check and the bank honors it.27 8 Furthermore, advances
in technology have been reducing this float period compared to the
past; debit cards eliminate it. In contrast, when Alice purchases $10
worth of credit for her Mondex card, the bank has the use of the $10
(and Alice has a claim on the bank), but Alice also has the use of a
274. The effect will be within the power of central banks to control so long as Mondex money
is issued by banks whose reserve requirements can be increased. See supra note 240. If, however,
Mondex money were to be issued by a poorly monitored non-bank financial institution or one not
subject to reserve requirements, the effect on the money supply could become more pronounced.
275. Paul Rodgers, Banks in Cash Card Warning; Fears of Abuse by Forgers and Money
Launderers, THE INDEPENDENT, July 9, 1995, at B1.
276. Interestingly, if the issuing bank treats the transaction as a purchase of digital cash,
rather than a deposit, then there is no need for an abeyance account, or even deposit insurance.
Aside from issues of risk management if there is a run on digital cash or a catastrophic failure of the
card encryption scheme, it would seem the bank might be able to escape the effects of abandoned
property laws that require untouched accounts to escheat to the state after a period of time. A lost
Mondex card is thus pure profit to the bank. See Richard Field, Re: E-Cash: Mondex, e-mail to list
e-cash(nptn.org, 18 Aug. 1995.
Nevertheless, whether the transaction in which a customer exchanges pocket cash for digital
cash counts as a "deposit" to the bank or a "sale" of a product by the bank is of little
macroeconomic relevance if the central bank is able to adjust reserve requirements to require banks
to hold reserves for any digital cash they issue.
On the other hand, the Chairman of Mondex has suggested that the loss of seignorage alone
will cause governments to nationalize his operations within 20 years. Jones Remarks, supra note 267.
277. Unless Alice is a business with a floating charge on her account, in which case she has in
effect borrowed against it.
278. This is a short period. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 236 (1995).
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$10 store of value. If she purchases something from a merchant who
does not return the funds to the bank, but instead either holds the
funds or makes another purchase, the money supply has effectively in-
creased because the same $10 is circulating as money on the card and
as money that the bank can loan out in its customary manner.179 An
unscrupulous bank, or one based in a country that enjoys a very relaxed
regulatory regime,28° might become tempted to "mint" its own un-
backed electronic funds, which it might loan to customers, or use to
meet its own obligations. If electronic messages stored on smart cards
are not considered "money," however, such actions might even comply
with banking laws.
C. Regulation of Digital Cash
The policy-maker's perspective on digital cash generally and anon-
ymous digital cash in particular is complicated by uncertainty about
the capabilities of the technologies, on the market's reaction to them,
and on their effect on privacy and law enforcement. The policy-maker's
task is further complicated by the multiple and sometimes conflicting
objectives that her policy might be designed to serve.
1. The Privacy Calculus
The effect of a digital cash system on privacy depends on which
system is used and, often, the details of how it is implemented. The
systems canvassed above range from privacy-destroying to having a
mixed effect on privacy. The major privacy-enhancing feature offered
by any of these systems as compared to traditional cash is that transac-
tions under most schemes need not be face-to-face, a potentially signifi-
cant privacy advantage given the prevalence of in-store video cameras.
Ordinary cash itself, after all, is less than completely anonymous since
it is usually exchanged in person, bears a unique serial number, carries
fingerprints, and can easily be marked for identification.""
279. Note that this is a wholly separate and potentially larger effect than the relatively trivial
effect that electronic cash which is cleared might have on the velocity of money.
280. Mondex has signed agreements with banks in Hong Kong, Canada and the United
States. None of these jurisdictions is notorious for its relaxed banking regulation, but Hong Kong
will become part of the Peoples Republic of China in 1997.
281. Indeed, the technology now exists to track the movement of unmarked bills through the
banking system simply by recording their serial numbers. E-Mail from John Gilmore to Michael
Froomkin (19 Sept. 1995) (on file with author).
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Some digital cash models compare favorably to plastic debit and
credit cards; others are no better. The debit card model of digital cash
creates a complete accounting record of all transactions. Blinded digital
coins provide more privacy than ordinary credit cards, since credit
cards create a complete transaction record that is accessible to the is-
suer; blinded digital coins provide payor, but not payee, anonymity.
In the absence of an installed base of smart card readers on per-
sonal computers, digital coins in tiny denominations appear most suited
to Internet information commerce. 82 Arguably, the basic digital coin
"does not deserve to be called cash . . . because it lacks the distin-
guishing characteristic" of ordinary money-its anonymity. 88 As each
transaction is cleared with the bank it leaves a record. In contrast,
blinded cash protects the anonymity of the payor, but not the payee. At
this writing, only one financial institution offers blinded digital cash
backed by ordinary currency.28' Even blinded coins or checks only
anonymize payments, not receipts. In fairness to digital cash, however,
it should be noted that paper money is not as anonymous as it may
seem. Large transactions in paper currency often trigger reporting re-
quirements designed to detect money laundering. 85
Truly anonymous digital cash would be possible with an anony-
mous bank account. If the bank account is anonymous, then withdraw-
als and deposits cannot be traced to the owner. Digital cash would ac-
tually enhance transactional privacy if banks that support digital cash
become willing to open anonymous accounts, and to accepts deposits in
digital cash. In this scenario, anonymous bank accounts, combined with
anonymous purchases and payment, would be even more private than
282. See supra note 220.
283. Finney, supra note 243.
284. See supra text accompanying note 252 (discussing Mark Twain Bank).
285. 28 U.S.C. § 6050(i) (1995) requires any person who receives more than $10,000 in cash
in the course of a trade or business to file a Form 8300 declaration stating the cash payor's name
and other identifying information. This requirement applies to all transactions, even payments to
lawyers, and has survived constitutional challenges that it pierces the client's Sixth Amendment right
to consult a lawyer anonymously and the client's Fifth Amendment right to consult counsel without
self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, 935 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1991). But
see United States v. Gerner, 5 F.3d 963 (1st Cir. 1995) (denying summary enforcement of summons
against law firm on grounds that District Court finding that tax proceeding was pretext for antici-
pated investigation of client was not clearly erroneous). Federal law requires a U.S. bank involved in
a cash transaction exceeding $10,000 to file a report with the Secretary of the Treasury. See 31
U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1995), 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a) (1995). Federal law also makes it illegal to break
up a single transaction above the reporting threshold into two or more separate transactions for the
purpose of evading the reporting requirement. 31 U.S.C. § 5324(3) (1995). But see Ratzlaf v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994) (reading strict scienter requirement into statute).
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cash, since both the seller and buyer could mask their identity. 86 Even
if a bank wanted to offer this service, regulatory authorities would be
likely to oppose it.
The electronic purse's effect on privacy is particularly sensitive to
how it is implemented. Electronic purses are the only system described
above that are designed to allow peer-to-peer funds transfers without
requiring the parties to contact a third party. Mondex cards and card
readers could be configured to do little transaction logging, which
would make them possibly more private than cash, or the hardware
could capture and record every transaction. At present, however,
286. In earlier drafts I suggested that, regardless of the regulatory environment, even a bank
willing to issue ahonymous digital cash would be highly unlikely to allow anonymous accounts unless
its clearing system was on-line. On-line clearing would allow the bank to prevent double-spending;
off-line clearing, I suggested, would leave the bank vulnerable to an infinite amount of respending of
the same coin since the anonymous account holder would know that the bank did not know her
identity and would know that coins would only be cleared after a transaction was over.
As this article was in proofs, I received e-mail from Stefan Brands, one of the leading develop-
ers of digital cash protocols, in which he described an unpublished system he has invented that
protects a bank wishing to engage in off-line clearing of anonymous digital cash issued to anonymous
bank accounts. Under this protocol, the bank faces no more risk of multiple spending than if it
issued "blinded" digital cash to an ordinary account with an identified account holder.
Brands's protocol works as follows:
1. Alice contacts the Bank. She identifies herself to the Bank's satisfaction and provides the
Bank with a unique public key that she will use to identify herself in future communications.
2. The Bank issues Alice with a signed blinded credential (for a description of the "blinding"
protocol, see supra § III.B.3) that I will call a "ticket". The ticket has information about Alice's real
identity, but the Bank cannot access that information in a computationally feasible manner unless
the ticket is used to open more than one account or a coin backed by that ticket is double-spent.
3. Alice waits while the Bank issues similarly blinded tickets to other people. When there are
enough other tickets in circulation, e.g. issued but not used, so as to fog her identity, Alice contacts
the Bank anonymously and presents her ticket. The Bank opens an anonymous account, keeping the
ticket on file instead of the normal customer information. (Alice could, of course, give the ticket to
anyone else, and the Bank would be none the wiser, but since the Bank will be able to seek redress
from her if coins issued to the account are double-spent she has a strong incentive not to do this.)
4. Alice purchases coins anonymously using funds in her anonymous account. Each coin issued
to her encodes sufficient information about Alice's ticket that if the coin is double-spent it not only
reveals the ticket, but also allows the Bank to decrypt the ticket and learn Alice's identity. Neverthe-
less, no matter how many coins Alice single-spends, the Bank cannot in a computationally feasible
manner get this information. Furthermore, there is nothing that the first recipient of a coin, or the
bank holding a coin, can do to make it appear a coin was double-spent. See E-mail from Stefan
Brands to Michael Froomkin, 15 May 1996 (on file with author); E-mail from Stefan Brands to
Michael Froomkin, 20 May 1996 (on file with author).
Anonymous digital cash that can be purchased from anonymous accounts and cleared off-line
has many interesting possible applications. These coins could, for example, serve as anonymous digi-
tal postage stamps. The stamps could be used to compensate remailer operators for remailing anony-
mous communications. Without some means of compensation, few people are likely to be willing to
operate remailers if there is any risk of liability for carrying anonymous messages. See supra text
accompanying notes 88-94.
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Mondex is not well-suited to an Internet payments mechanism because
personal computers have no means of accessing Mondex cards without
expensive and rare connective hardware. Furthermore, as currently
designed, the Mondex system is vulnerable to a "man in the middle"
attack when the transacting parties are not face-to-face, making the
system more suited to in-store transactions than to Internet transac-
tions.2817 One can imagine ways to use electronic purses to enhance pri-
vacy, such as adding value from vending machines paid with ordinary
cash; but so long as the card itself is not anonymous, and so long as all
cards keep even limited records, the card provides less privacy than
traditional cash.
2. Regulatory Policy Goals and Practical Constraints
All governments and central banks have an obvious interest in re-
taining control of the money supply. Central banks should be able to
achieve this objective by taking three related steps: (1) Ensuring that
issuers of digital cash are subject to the rules that apply to existing,
regulated, financial service providers. One simple, if restrictive, means
of achieving this would be to limit digital cash issuance to banks.
(2) Adjusting reserve requirements to neutralize the effects of changes
in the stock of pocket cash. 88 (3) Taking whatever steps are possible to
reduce the likelihood of the "meltdown scenario" in which someone
cracks the security of a digital cash scheme. All these steps are equally
applicable whether or not the digital cash is anonymous.
Whether the U.S. or other governments will choose-or should
choose-to regulate anonymous digital cash is more complicated. Citi-
zens are likely to feel, with some reason, that their governments should
help create the conditions that make it possible for them to protect
their privacy. Data protection laws or changes in property rights over
information might contribute to this, but they are uncertain at best.
And once information privacy is lost it is difficult to regain as there is
almost no way to recall data that are in wide circulation.
On the other hand governments have an interest in preserving
their ability to enforce existing laws and regulations, such as tax collec-
tion and laws against fraud and illicit transactions. Furthermore, as the
287. Jones Remarks, supra note 267. In a man in the middle attack, Mallet inserts himself
into the communications channel between Alice and Bob. He relays all of Alice's messages to Bob
and vice versa until Alice sends Bob the Mondex money; Mallet sends Bob random and worthless
data and walks off with the cash.
288. See supra text at notes 240-41.
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enforcer of moral values that have been embodied in legislation or, in
some cases, as tyrant, governments may desire to control the purchase
or movement of information and of funds. Governments are likely to
believe, not without reason, that their enforcement abilities would be
threatened by the widespread deployment of anonymous digital cash,
although traceable digital cash might often make their work easier..
Only fully anonymous digital cash stands much chance of aiding
in financial crimes such as money laundering or tax evasion.2 89 Banks
will continue to have records of the amounts withdrawn by their clients
and will know who is depositing digital cash. Law enforcement will,
however, have less information than they would have when tracing a
wire transfer, since a wire transfer links payor and payee to a single
transaction. In contrast, a DigiCash transfer, for example, does not al-
low the bank or the police to link the two halves of the transaction.
Nevertheless, anyone depositing DigiCash to a bank must disclose their
identity, just as they do when depositing cash. Indeed, most digital
coins make money laundering more difficult than does traditional cash,
since digital coins must be returned to the bank after every expendi-
ture. Similarly, in its current form a Mondex card is unlikely to be of
much value in money laundering. Even if Mondex cards do not keep
transaction records, the value that can be encoded on a card is likely to
be limited to $500 or £500.190 To the extent the government is con-
cerned about these issues, they point towards either outlawing fully
anonymous cash, or otherwise complicating its deployment; one means
to achieve this is to tilt the regulatory playing field towards forms of
digital cash that are not fully anonymous and hope that they achieve
market dominance.
289. Although the implications of anonymous transactions for taxes, product liability, and
copyright, remain to be worked out, it seems to me likely that the effects will be unevenly distrib-
uted. I do not believe that the tax system will be deeply affected, since most production and even
more consumption involves transactions that are easily monitored for tax compliance. Furthermore,
any transaction that encounters the banking system-for example, deposits placed on short-term
interest-will be easily traceable for tax purposes so long as the bank is located in a jurisdiction that
enlists banks as enforcers of its, or its treaty-partners', tax rules. My income, for example, comes
from a salary paid by an institution that has no incentive to make it easy for me to engage in tax
avoidance. My house is plainly visible from the street, and as easily taxed as it can be linked to me.
Most of what I buy is tangible-things like groceries, diapers and shoes-and can easily be taxed
under a VAT system if our current tax system should show signs of collapse. Though some
knowledge workers may be able to demand that payment be routed to accounts held at untaxed off-
shore addresses, thus causing an effect at the margin, these schemes seem likely to remain relatively
small in comparison to traditional, more easily taxable, forms of labor and compensation for the
foreseeable future.
290. Jones Remarks, supra note 267.
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Governments have considerably more power to reduce the liquid-
ity, acceptability, and utility of anonymous digital cash than they do to
cut off the flow of anonymous speech. Unlike anonymous speech, which
does not require any willing parties inside the country other than a
single speaker or listener, anonymous cash requires at least two parties,
the buyer and seller, and often also involves a trusted third party as
well.2 91 If anonymous digital cash is banned by a government, many
corporations active in that jurisdiction will be reluctant to use it be-
cause they are subject to audit and disclosure requirements, and have
assets to lose if subjected to civil or criminal penalties. At a minimum,
a ban would raise the cost of using anonymous digital cash, perhaps to
the point where few people were willing to trade in it. Even a refusal to
enforce contracts or debts based on the exchange of anonymous cur-
rency would have a significant deterrent effect.
Widespread use of Internet-tradable digital cash might interna-
tionalize money. That day seems far away, if it will ever come; to date,
even the Mondex card, the most self-consciously international digital
cash to be field tested, is linked to national currencies (up to five on one
card). In principle there is no reason why, given the international na-
ture of the Internet, its unit of account needs to be pegged to a particu-
lar currency.192 Trading in Internet-provided information, perhaps
starting with micro-charges for access to web pages, is ideally suited to
a new unit of account, used initially for the internet only. If the issu-
ance of the new monetary unit-perhaps it could be called the
"bit"?-could be designed so that the money supply grew at the right
speed, one would eventually expect to see transactions in which bits
were exchanged for traditional currencies.2 93 Amusing as these specula-
tions can be, practice and prudence suggest a different outcome.
Internationalized cash would suffer from a number of serious
problems that would have to be resolved before it would be safe to rely
on it. First, there is the question of who would issue it. If a single digi-
291. See generally Froomkin, supra note 228.
292. For one slightly over-enthusiastic suggestion that digital cash will not only international-
ize money but that private currencies will crowd out national currencies, see Giles Keating, Elec-
tronic Money Is In Race With Emu, FIN. TiMs, Nov. 2, 1995, at 15.
293. Indeed, there are currently markets in CyberBucks, the currency issued by CyberCash
for its test of its software. See Ecash Market, available online URL http://www.c2.org/-mark/
ecash/ecash.html; see also Electronic Cash Marketing Mailing List, available online URL http://
www.ai.mit.edu/people/lethin/ecm.html. On November 24, 1995, one shop offered to pay $5 for 100
cyberbucks and offered to pay 100 cyberbucks for $8. FireCloud Solutions EShop, available online
URL http://www.firecloud.com/eshop/eshop.htm (accessed on Nov. 24, 1995, printout on file with
author).
[Vol. 15:2:395
FLOOD CONTROL ON THE INFORMATION OCEAN
tal currency were to become an international standard, it would require
either a central bank or at least an agreed, enforceable, mechanism for
controlling the minting of currency. This sort of centralization is unlike
the Internet as we know it. More likely, individual issuers around the
world would agree on a common protocol for the issuance of "bits,"
and international banking would be plunged into an electronic repeat of
the pre-Civil War financial system. Before the central bank centraliza-
tion of the mid-19th century, banks commonly issued their own notes,
and the discount applied to these notes varied according to the reputa-
tion of the bank (which affected the liquidity of the note), and usually
the distance the note had travelled from the issuer.'"
Whether internationalized or simply anonymized, Internet digital
cash worries national authorities charged with preventing money laun-
dering.295 Digital cash is obviously more portable and mobile than ordi-
nary paper currency. So long as funds must clear through a bank, and
the payee is not anonymous, the effects of digital cash on money laun-
dering control should be fairly low, since most existing money launder-
ing rules require banks to know who deposits cash. "6 If, however, digi-
tal cash that does not have to be cleared through a bank (e.g., a
Mondex scheme) becomes widespread, the ability of authorities to con-
trol money laundering will depend greatly on the extent to which the
scheme allows authorities to trace the funds. The longer the memory on
a smart card, and the more information it collects about the smart
cards with which it transacts, the more incriminating that card will be
if searched or captured by the authorities. Similarly, if smart cards are
programmed routinely to dump the contents of their memories to the
bank for auditing and verification purposes, 97 then banks will usually
have databases that will meet the claimed needs of law enforcement.
If anonymous, untraceable, digital cash without expenditure limits
were to be deployed, it would greatly increase the range of interper-
294. See generally BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1957); GLYN DAVIES,
A HISTORY OF MONEY 460-61, 465-66, 471-85 (1994). For an extremely interesting discussion of
the market mechanics of private notes, see David G. Ordel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 HARV.
J. L. & Pun. POL'Y 327 (1993); see also Martin S. Eichenbaum & Neil Wallace, A Shred of Evi-
dence on Public Acceptance of Privately Issued Currency, FEDERAL RES. BANK OF MINN. QrRLY.
REv. [unpag] (Winter 1995) (suggesting that Canadian experience with coupons suggests that pri-
vate currency may be more acceptable to public then widely believed by economists and lawyers).
295. See MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 202.
296. As a result, money launderers use false invoicing, overpricing goods to camouflage the
cash flows being laundered. See MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 202, at 9-10.
297. See supra text accompanying note 272 (allegations that Mondex scheme contains this
feature).
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sonal transactions that could be conducted anonymously, even if it did
not become "a heyday for criminals. 29 8  One can imagine on-line
fraud, in which a digital personality provides attestations from hun-
dreds of satisfied customers, each of whom is nothing more than an-
other digital personality created by the author of the fraud. While it is
possible to envision sophisticated reputation systems that would reveal
many such manufactured attestations, these do not currently exist, and
might be cumbersome to use. Other unsavory possibilities include
vastly simplified insider trading in securities transactions, the sale of
corporate and personal secrets, blackmail and "perfect crimes."2 99
Armed with untraceable digital cash, any transaction that Alice can
persuade Bob to undertake for a digital payment can be commanded
anonymously, with even Bob ignorant as to Alice's identity. Alice
might be more willing to hire a contract killer, for example, if she felt
secure that the crime could never be traced back to her; on the other
hand, if Bob doesn't know who Alice is, he will demand payment in
advance. Killer Bob might not be that interested in advertising his true
identity either, which might make Alice unwilling to pay an anonymous
stranger in advance.300
298. Benjamin Wittes, Government Seeks a Way to Keep Tabs on Computer Cash, THE RE-
CORDER, Feb. 2, 1995, at 1 (quoting cryptologist Dorothy Denning's suggestion that anonymous cash
would be a boon to crime); see also Scott Charney, Chief of the Computer Crime Unit, Criminal
Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Computer Crime 9 (Nov. 28, 1994) (unpublished manuscript) (stat-
ing "one particular group-criminals-often seek[s] anonymity as well").
299. "Military-grade cryptography plus anonymous re-mailers plus fully anonymous digital
cash plus bad guys equals perfect crime," Wittes, supra note 298, at 1 (quoting American Banking
Association official).
In a perfect crime, Alice commits an act of extortion (e.g., blackmail or kidnapping). Instead of
demanding small unmarked bills, Alice demands that Bob force a bank to issue blinded digital cash
based on numbers contained in Alice's ransom note, and publish the result. Because the payoff oc-
curs via publication in a broadcast medium such as a newspaper, Alice faces no danger of being
captured while attempting to pick up the ransom. If Alice used the right blinding protocol only she
can unblind and spend the coins. (Or for extra security, Alice can demand that the blinded coins be
encrypted with a public key generated for the occasion.) And because the blinded digital cash is
anonymous and untraceable, Alice is able to spend it without fear of marked bills, recorded serial
numbers, or other forms of detection. See SCHNEIER, supra note 25, at 145; Sebastiaan von Solms &
David Naccache, On Blind Signatures and Perfect Crimes, 11 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 581, 582-83
(1992) (describing the mathematical steps that must be followed in order to effectuate a "perfect
crime").
300. Fortunately for Alice, but unfortunately for her target, crypto-anarchist philosopher Tim
May has thoughtfully described a protocol for a system involving a mutually trusted (and also anon-
ymous) third party who makes a business of selling escrow services and thus needs to maintain a
good reputation, who facilitates such transactions by holding on to the money until the hit is verified.
See Timothy C. May, The Cyphernomicon §§ 2.9, 2.13.9, 8.5, 16.16. (Sept. 10, 1994), available
online URL ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/tc/tcmay/cyphernomicon (May's original version); available
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In light of these possibilities, even if they are largely theoretical, it
would not be surprising if many governments, including the U.S. gov-
ernment, wish to act to discourage or forbid the issuance and use of
completely anonymous digital cash, at least forms that allow it to be
exchanged in denominations higher than those proposed by Mondex.
Although libertarians and advocates of increased privacy are likely to
be disappointed, a decision to ban or discourage fully anonymous digi-
tal cash is likely to be politically acceptable in the U.S., for example,
because it appears to extend the status quo to the digital age. Small
cash transactions are largely anonymous today; neither large cash
transactions nor most electronic transactions have any anonymity.8 0'
A ban on the use of anonymous digital cash for ordinary tangible
commerce appears likely to face few constitutional or practical obsta-
cles as applied to the sale of goods. Even if the ban made anonymous
purchases in tangible goods difficult or impossible, it would probably be
constitutional because there is no generalized right to shop anony-
mously.802 The constitutional difficulties arise when the same rules are
applied to the sale of information, i.e., "speech." As explained below, a
ban on anonymous digital cash could greatly obstruct the anonymity of
speakers and readers. " 8 The practical problems arise from the poten-
tial constitutional difficulties: there is no way to create anonymous digi-
tal cash that could only be used for commerce in information. Any reg-
ulation that aims to control the perceived evils of anonymous cash, e.g.,
money laundering and illicit trade, perforce impinges on anonymous
speech as well.
IV. DATA COLLECTION AND PROFILING: TOWARDS THE ARGUS
STATE?
The degree to which digital payment schemes, or the regulations
constraining digital privacy schemes, alter user privacy gains signifi-
cance in light of the revolution in data acquisition, processing and stor-
age. Both public and private organizations are acquiring unprecedented
abilities to build, sell, and use consumer profile data. Commerce in con-
online URL http://www.apocalypse.org/pub/nelson/bin.cgi/cypernomicon (hypertext version by 3rd
party).
301. Governments also have it in their power, at least for the foreseeable future, to limit the
use of small-denomination anonymous digital cash, or the use of any blinded digital coins.
302. One can imagine exceptions to the generalization in the text, e.g., there may be a right to
buy books anonymously, and there is clearly a right to purchase a membership in an organization or
make contributions to it without having the government require that the transaction be disclosed.
303. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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sumer data is affected by the same technical developments that make
digital commerce on the Internet possible-and by the existence of the
Internet itself. Every transaction on the World Wide Web, for exam-
ple, from catalog sales to information acquisition, can be recorded and
archived by either party to it. As a result, the Internet could become
the mother lode of consumer profile information; parallel developments
in the public sphere make it increasingly feasible to monitor what citi-
zens do and where they go. Combine the two, and there is little privacy
left.
Databases erode the citizen's control over her personal information
in several ways. Computerized records allow a firm to form a consumer
profile based on the a customer's transactions with that company.$'" At
a slightly more complex level, firms sell customer lists to each other,
which may result in junk mail or increased information to the con-
sumer, depending on one's perspective or good fortune. Meanwhile, in
the U.S., social security numbers and driver's license numbers (often
the same) have become de facto national ID numbers. 08 The most im-
portant part of the emerging database phenomenon, however, arises
from the combination of the growth in computer processing power with
the likelihood that routine personal data collection will soon become
nearly ubiquitous. As the cost of data storage plummets, these trends
will make it possible to assemble an individual data profile of extraordi-
nary detail by cross-referencing multiple, extensive, databases. 0 These
profiles have uses in commerce, in law-enforcement; some applications
are benign, some less so.
In the marketplace the concerns arise because markets are imper-
fect, the consumer's ability to control the extent to which she is profiled
are limited, and in an imperfect market profiling threatens to change
the balance of power between consumers and sellers. In the public
sphere, the concerns relate to chilling effects on the right to read, and
the possibility that citizens' movements will be tracked by a combina-
304. This often results in improved service: our local pizza delivery service recently installed
caller ID, and linked it to a computerized data base. When I call up, I am greeted by name, and I no
longer have to spell the easily misunderstood name of our street.
305. For a short history of the use and abuse of social security numbers, see William H.
Minor, Identity Cards Databases in Health Care: the Need for Federal Privacy Protections, COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoDS. 253, 261-68 (1995). Other countries are, or are considering, permitting or re-
quiring citizens to carry electronic national ID cards. See, e.g., George Parker & Paul Taylor, IT
Review Could Lead to Citizens' Transaction Card, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, p. 11 (describing
British government study of multi-purpose "citizens' smart card" proposal).
306. See OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION (1993).
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tion of Intelligent Transportation Systems, security cameras, and trans-
actional data.
Despite the very real grounds for concern, 807 the existence of large,
interlinked, databases is not inevitably bad for the consumer/citizen.
Better, cheaper, information suggests that transactions costs may de-
crease leading to more efficient markets and increased consumer satis-
faction. Some very consumer-friendly technologies, notably intelligent
agents, use the consumer's behavior to anticipate her desires and select
information that may be of particular interest.80 8 And to the extent
that public databases and monitoring will lower crime or traffic conges-
tion, citizens benefit from an increased quality of life.
Under current ideas of property in information, consumers are in
any case in a poor position to complain about the sale of data concern-
ing them.30 9 The alienation of this personal data may have occurred
with the citizen's acquiescence. Every transaction has at least two par-
ties; in most cases the fact of the transaction belongs equally to both
parties.310 As the existence of the direct mail industry testifies, both
sides to a transaction generally are free to sell the fact of the transac-
tion to any interested third party. Of course, there are exceptions. The
parties may by contract provide otherwise, for example by agreeing to
a confidentiality clause. And sometimes the law creates a special duty
of confidentiality binding one of the parties, e.g., a fiduciary duty or a
lawyer's duty to keep a client's confidence.311 It seems safe to assume,
however, that cases where confidentiality is the legal default are rela-
tively rare. It also seems fair to suggest - although it could be de-
bated-that at least in many consumer transactions the marginal value
to the consumer of protecting a given datum will be lower then either
the cost of negotiating a confidentiality clause (if that option even ex-
307. See generally GANDY, supra note 306; Gandy, supra note 210.
308. For an early prototype of such an intelligent agent, see Anderson Consulting, Bargain
Finder Agent Prototype, available online URL http://bf.cstar.ac.com/bf/. Interestingly, several of
the CD vendors being sampled by the agents adopted a strategy of "locking out" the agents to
prevent their prices from being displayed in the prototype. Whether the non-cooperating stores' mo-
tive was to avoid excessive load on their Internet servers or to keep competitors from seeing their
prices, or something else entirely, is unclear.
309. For an extreme example, see Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
310. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 446 (1995) (noting traditional view, now retreating in Europe,
that "data ... were perfectly normal goods and thus had to be treated in exactly the same way as
all other products and services").
311. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY, Canon 4 (1995); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 1.6 (1995).
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ists), or the cost of forgoing the transaction, or even the average value
of protecting the datum when considered in conjunction with value of
protecting all the other data concerning the consumer. Absent some
change in the law to make consumers the default owners of the fact of
their economic activity, the law gives them little recourse if they lack
the market power or the resources to demand confidentiality clauses in
the agora. Nor is it obvious that such a change in the law would be
seen to comply with the First Amendment and with the U.S. tradition
that "the government should not intervene in the marketplace of ideas
in the absence of compelling needs, ' 12 although I suggest below that
someday the need may become compelling.
A. A Primer on Profiling
It is now possible to construct a consumer profile based on widely
divergent types of data, to correlate and re-correlate information as
never before. A chilling example of this data linkage is the sale by
Farrell's Ice Cream Parlor of the names of those claiming free sundaes
on their birthdays. The list was purchased by a marketing firm, which
in turn sold them to the Selective Service System. Some of the ice-
cream eaters soon found draft registration warnings in their mail. 13
More complex matchings use consumer demographics (based on ex-
tended zip codes that allow houses to be targeted in small groups) and
known buying patterns to target telephone and especially direct mail
sales.3 1' Similar techniques are used routinely in political campaigns, in
which demographic and other data is used to decide which (if any) of
the candidate's stands on issues will be sent to the voter.31 '
312. Reidenberg, supra note 7, at 501.
313. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE 10 (1994).
314. Gandy, supra note 210, at 15-17, 20, 27-28.
315. I know this from personal experience, since I helped implement, albeit not design, such a
campaign, using demographics, party registration, presumed national origin based on (Polish-sound-
ing) last name, and party affiliation, in mail and telephone campaign aimed at voters in a 1984 (!)
Congressional election. Responses to mail queries as to the household's views, and responses to simi-
lar telephone calls and visits by campaign workers, were used to decide which of over a dozen letters
(each discussing a different issue) to send to the voter. If the survey found that the voter had no
commonality of views with the candidate, but the demographics were favorable, the voter received a
bland letter describing the candidate's personal biography and recent good works. The same survey
data were used to prime the candidate when he made neighborhood tours. A campaign worker would
tell the candidate which of the views expressed by or imputed to the household agreed with his
positions, and he would emphasize those views when he spoke to the voters. The data were also used
to generate lists of probably supportive voters, who were then contacted on the day of the election to
remind them to vote. We offered to provide transportation to the polls if required. We won by less
than one percent of the vote.
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The ice cream example is trivial compared to what is ahead, given
the likely omnipresence of data collection. Data collection will grow in
at least five areas: medical history, government records, personal move-
ments, transactions, and reading and viewing habits. Between them
these five areas cover most of modern life.
1. Medical History
"The development of population-wide health databases," some of
which contain patient identifiable data, "is not a distant concept, but a
reality."3 16 Between the likely authorized and unauthorized users of
any medical records, patient privacy is likely to be low, resulting in the
dissemination of information about physical and mental health, genetic
history, and treatment choices. 8 7 This information would be of value
for scholarly purposes (e.g., epidemiological studies), regulatory pur-
poses (e.g., assessing quality of care, cost control), and commercial pur-
poses (e.g., malpractice actions and employment and insurance
decisions) .818
The market has begun to broker information in medical histories.
Direct marketers offer lists of hypertensives, angina sufferers, diabetics,
arthritics, and heavy antacid users.3 19 The direct marketers obtain most
of this information from the sufferers themselves, by asking them to
complete surveys in exchange for free products, or coupons. Commer-
cial health data-base providers collect information from health care
providers and insurers then sell the information, without the patient's
knowledge, to insurance companies and managed care providers.3 2 0
Equifax, the consumer credit information agency, has purchased sev-
eral small healthcare firms and formed an alliance with AT&T to com-
puterize millions of paper-based medical records.32 1 Private medical in-
316. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 464 (1995);
see also Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 710-
12 (1987) (discussing "the transparent patient"). Enactment of any comprehensive national health-
care program would accelerate the trend. See generally id.; Minor, supra note 305.
317. See Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 295, 300-06 (1995).
318. See Gostin, supra note 316, at 487-89.
319. Robert Gellman, Washington Perspectives On Genetics and Privacy, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 71, 72 (1994).
320. See Gostin, supra note 316, at 488; Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and
the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1395 (1987).
321. Outsiders in Health Care. A Cure for All Ills?, THE EcONoMST, Nov. 4, 1995, at 67.
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formation is also available on the black market;22 as genetic testing
and other methods of predictive health care improve, this information
is likely to increase in value. 23
2. Government Records
Drivers licenses in the United States typically show the owner's
name, address, height, weight, age, date of birth. Often they also have
the owner's social security number, and some medical information; at a
minimum a driver's license notes whether the driver requires glasses.
Some state licenses also note whether the driver is diabetic or has epi-
lepsy. Most states also require a photograph. Increasingly often, all this
data, including the photograph, is digitized and stored electronically on
a magnetic strip and in a central record office. 2 4 The driver's license
has been described as a "gold mine of personal information," one that
most states routinely sell to anybody who desires it.
825
In addition to driver's licenses, some states maintain computerized,
publicly accessible databases containing criminal or arrest records, and
property tax information. 26 Other government databases, not ordina-
rily public, contain transfer payment information such as welfare, food
322. Lois Rogers & David Leppard, For Sale.- Your Secret Medical Records for £ 150, THE
SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 26, 1995, at I (describing offer for sale of medical records of "politi-
cians, celebrities and millions of other National Health Service patients").
323. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Health Insurance, Employment Discrimination, and the Ge-
netics Revolution, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME
PROJECT 264 (Daniel J. KevIes & Leroy Hood eds., 1992).
324. Gellman, supra note 319, at 71.
325. Id.; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation Personal Information and Public Sec-
tor Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 612 (1995) [hereinafter Privacy and
Participation] (stating that "majority of states have traditionally released motor vehicle registration
and driver license information"). In 1994, New York State made $8 million from the sale or rental
of public records, primarily those furnished by drivers to the Department of Motor Vehicles. Big
Bucks in DMV Data Sales, PRIVACY J., Sept. 1995, at 5. The data can be used for a variety of
marketing with a little creativity,
Now, take a look at this information all over again and see how valuable it is. Suppose I have
a catalog of big and tall clothing, who do I want to send it to? How am I going to find my
market? Well, they're not going to send it to me. But I can go through the driver's license
information and pick out people of a certain height and weight, and they're the ones I'm
going to send my catalog to.
Suppose I am selling glasses or contact lenses. I can get a list of every potential customer
in the state simply from the state government. Suppose I'm selling insurance policies aimed at
people who just turned sixty-five. Well, if I want a list of people who turned sixty-five on
April 15th, 1994, I can get that information from the state.
Gellman, supra note 319, at 71.
326. See Privacy and Participation, supra note 325, at 608. If you own a house, chances are
the purchase price, addresses, and other information can be found on LEXIS, library ASSETS.
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stamps, social security, and pensions data."' National databases in-
clude both transfer payment data and other records such as service
records and passport applications.
3. Personal Movements
Many countries, including the United States, are exploring the
possibility of "intelligent transportation systems" (ITS). 81 Under ITS,
the position of every vehicle on the road would be monitored to manage
traffic flow, 29 prevent speeding and perhaps implement road pricing
and even centralized traffic control. A full-blown ITS system might
provide law enforcement with continuous real-time surveillance of all
vehicles.83 0 Less complex systems might create detailed travel records
that could be accessed after the fact.83 1 Most cellular telephones al-
ready report their location every few minutes whenever they are in use
or ready to receive calls.332 Increasingly, both public and private secur-
ity forces are using microphones and video cameras to record what goes
on in city streets, shopping centers, and residential complexes.333
4. Transactions
Credit card purchases leave a vast trail of transaction records. 33' If
digital money makes even small Internet transactions cost-effective, the
327. As states move to distributing benefits electronically, see, e.g., Texas Replaces Food
Stamps With Food Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1995, at B5 (describing plan to distribute food
stamps via electronic funds transfer at grocery check out), they will inevitably create new databases.
328. See generally Symposium: Privacy and ITS, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. LJ. 1 (1995).
329. Traffic flow can be managed by adjusting the times of traffic lights, or communicating to
drivers the need to consider alternate routes. If the ITS includes a system by which the driver selects
the destination but the ITS chooses the route, the system can route around bottlenecks without
driver intervention.
330. See Margaret M. Russell, Privacy and IVHS: A Diversity of Viewpoints, 11 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 145, 163 (1995). The Government of Singapore requested
bids on a road-pricing system that would communicate with cars and charge their smart cards as
they passed various points on the road. Chaum, supra note 235, at 101.
331. Russell, supra note 330, at 164-65.
332. The famous "low speed chase" of OJ Simpson began when he was located by tracing the
movement of his cellular telephone. Simpson, Under Suicide Watch, is Jailed After a Bizarre
Chase, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, at 1.
333. See Timothy Egan, Police Surveillance of Streets Turns to Video Cameras and Listening
Devices, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1996, at A12.
334. American Express accumulated more than 500 billion bytes of data on how its customers
used 35 million charge cards between 1991 and 1994. Laurie Hays, Using Computers to Divine Who
Might Buy a Gas Grill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1994, at BI. By 1993, the United States had more
than 328 million general purpose (e.g., VISA, MasterCard, American Express, Discover, and Diners
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number and range of transactions that leave a collectible and searcha-
ble record can be expected to increase unless the payment mechanism
is anonymized.
This mass of transactional information can be subjected to sophis-
ticated pattern analysis, dubbed "data mining," by which corporations
try to learn more about existing and potential customers. 85 Data min-
ing allows companies to identify client preferences, purchase histories,
credit histories, "life stage," and thus the potential value of keeping the
client as a happy customer. This information can be used for cross-
selling, identifying new customers and targeting existing customers for
upgrades or new products.336
5. Reading and Viewing Habits
The absence of monitors is an important part of the right to
read.3 3 7 The degree to which the right to read in private is prized can
be seen by the protest generated by the FBI's "Library Awareness Pro-
gram." In this program FBI agents pressured librarians in certain tech-
nical libraries to report on the reading habits of patrons.3 38 Tomorrow,
rather than the FBI attempting to profile the reading habits of a small
Club) credit cards in circulation. The cards were used for $223.92 billion worth of charges in the
first six months of 1993. Matthews, supra note 215, at 233. Worldwide credit and debit card use
continues to increase, although the number of card in use and the willingness of merchants to accept
them varies greatly in different countries. See Paying With Plastic, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 1995,
at 115.
335. "Data mining is the process of discovering meaningful new correlations, patterns and
trends by sifting through large amounts of data stored in repositories, using pattern recognition tech-
nologies as well as statistical and mathematical techniques." Commercial Parallel Processing Con-
ference, THE COMPUTER CONFERENCE ANALYSIS NEWSLETTER, Oct. 11, 1995 available online
LEXIS library Nexis, file Curnws (reporting on presentation of Erick Brethenoux, Gartner Group);
see also Kevin Fogarty, Data Mining Can Help to Extract Jewels of Data, NETWORK WORLD, June
6, 1994, at 40 (describing the practice of 'data mining' by which corporations accumulate and ma-
nipulate enormous data bases). Cf GTE, Knowledge Discovery Mine, available online URL http://
info.gte.com/gtel/sponsored/kdd/Welcome.html (collecting links to various sources of information
on data mining).
336. Commercial Parallel Processing Conference, supra note 335 (reporting on presentation
of Douglas Newell, Tessera Enterprise Systems).
337. On the constitutional protection of the right to read anonymously see infra text accompa-
nying note 397.
338. See HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE FBI's LIBRARY AWARE-
NESS PROGRAM (1991); Ulrika E. Ault, Note, The FBI's Library Awareness Program: Is Big
Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1532, 1532-39 (1990) (describing FBI
library monitoring program); AMERICAN LIBRARIES, July/Aug. 1988, p. 562-63. When the program
became public in 1987, and encountered heavy criticism, the FBI responded by running "index
checks" on 266 critics to see if they were part of a Soviet campaign to discredit the library monitor-
ing program. Gordon Conable, The FBI And You; Did The FBI Investigate You As Part Of Its
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number of people with suspected foreign connections, businesses will be
profiling everyone who uses the World Wide Web.
Even today, it is relatively simple to monitor web page accesses
whether or not the person reading a page initiates a commercial trans-
action. Most Web browsing software is designed to allow routine moni-
toring. Netscape, for example, tells the owner of every web page the IP
address of every visitor to the page"3 9 and the URL of the page most
recently visited by that person. If the user has filled out her e-mail
address or name on the "options" page of her program- something
Netscape requires before the user can employ Netscape to send an e-
mail message-then that information is transmitted too. Web servers
routinely log this information. Some companies now send e-mailed ad-
vertisements to those who access their pages.340 It will not be long
before they correlate names and locations with telephone numbers and
begin follow-up sales calls and letters. The next step, perhaps, would be
for someone to begin to either purchase or correlate these logs to build
consumer profiles. One can imagine insurance companies wanting to
know if applicants have been receiving information on diseases;"' em-
ployers wanting to know about the interests of potential employees; per-
haps some governments will want to find the identities of those they
consider likely to be subversives.
Traceable payments may expand from the world of tangible goods
to the purchase of information. If Internet tools such as the World
Wide Web become a major national and international communications
medium with an embedded micro-charging mechanism, every newspa-
per article accessed, every online catalog perused, every political debate
sampled, will leave an information residue. These data can be collected
to form a highly detailed profile of the consumer-citizen. The existence
of such detailed dossiers on spending and intellectual preferences would
be unprecedented. Non-anonymous digital coins that clear through a
central bank would accelerate this process. Instead of needing a mid-
dleman to collect and correlate transactions patterns, the bank would
find itself in possession of all the data: amount of purchase, buyer,
seller, and (if the transaction is on line) date and time of transaction.
Library Awareness Program? Here's How To Find Out, 3 AM. LIBR. 245 (Mar. 1990), available
online LEXIS library Nexis, file Arcnws.
339. The importance of this may decrease as services aimed at the home user increasingly
move to dynamic IP numbers, in which IP numbers are temporarily assigned to users while logged in
and then returned to a pool of available numbers.
340. I have received such advertisements.
341. See Greely, supra note 323.
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Banks, however, present relatively easy targets for privacy regulations,
because they are less numerous than the buyers and sellers themselves,
and because banks are already a highly regulated industry.
B. Interlinked Databases
"[T]he ability to assemble information selectively, or to correlate
existing information, can be functionally equivalent to the ability to
create new information." 4 ' Networks such as the Internet make it un-
necessary to attempt to create and store an enormous database in one
place. Instead, the information can be maintained by the organization
that collects it, and merely accessed on demand by those who so
desire.34
Private databases are growing quickly. Between them, Equifax,
TRW and Trans Union maintain consumer credit data on almost every
American who has borrowed money or used a credit card in the last ten
years. The trend will intensify. The Internet will bring "telebanking"
and home shopping to the personal computer.3 "4 As "databanks become
more prevalent and sophisticated, long-distance, invisible assaults on
privacy will occur more frequently." 4 5 The data stored in "data ware-
houses" available for data mining will only increase, 46 as will the so-
phistication of programs designed to mine the data.34 7 For example,
restaurants commonly use computers to handle patron orders; insur-
342. COLIN BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EU-
ROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 18 (1992); see also LYON, supra note 313, at 84.
343. See DAVID J. CURRY, THE NEW MARKETING RESEARCH SYSTEMS 7-12 (1993).
344. See Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-
Related Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 6842, 6842 (1994) [hereinafter Inquiry on Privacy Is-
sues] ("As the [National Information Infrastructure] develops, Americans will be able to access
numerous commercial, scientific, and business data bases . . . [and] engage in retail, banking and
other commercial transactions . . . all from the comfort of their homes."); see also Microsoft and
Visa to Provide Secure Transaction Technology for Electronic Commerce, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 8,
1994, available in WESTLAW, PRNews-C database (announcing plans to provide secure electronic
bankcard transactions across global public networks using RSA encryption).
345. Inquiry on Privacy Issues, supra note 344; cf. JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE:
How COMPUTERIZATION HAS MADE EVERYONE'S PRIVATE LIFE AN OPEN SECRET 28 (1992);
DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 20, 23-25 (1983).
346. "90% of large companies are building, or planning to build, a data warehouse." Com-
mercial Parallel Processing Conference, supra note 328 (reporting on presentation of Scott F.
Miller, VP High Performance Computing); cf Cheryl D. Krivda, Data-Mining Dynamite, BYTE,
Oct. 1995, at 97 (describing creation of data warehouses).
347. See, e.g., Pilot Software Launches Major New Data Mining Initiative, Bus. WIRE, Nov.
8, 1995, available online LEXIS library News file curnws (describing ambitious plan to design tech-
niques to "discover and explore relevant hidden and predicative information housed in massive data
warehouses").
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ance companies might like to know whether potential customers eat
fatty foods, and how much they tend to drink before driving.348 Often,
consumers will benefit from the development of improved screening
techniques. For example, many people will prefer "perfect junk mail,"
in which one receives only advertisements likely to result in a purchase,
to the current plethora of catalogs that inundate some homes.
Public databases are increasingly interlinked also. The U.S. gov-
ernment has connected the databases of the Customs Service, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), the IRS, the Federal Reserve, and the
State Department. In addition, the Counter Narcotics Center, based at
CIA headquarters, brings together the FBI, the DEA, the NSA, the
Defense Department, the State Department, and the Coast Guard.3 49
The Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN), has compiled a large and sweeping database to further the
government's anti-money-laundering activities. 850 Data do not need to
be in a single office to be combined into dossiers or to be organized and
searched. The Office of Technology Assessment has warned that the
"extensive use of computer matching can lead to a virtual national data
bank, even if computer records are not centralized in one location" 51
The distinction between "public" and "private" data in any case
may be ephemeral although the public and private sectors may con-
tinue to use the data in significantly different ways. As the ice cream
example shows, data in private hands can be purchased and used by the
government. Similarly, data in public hands often tends to "leak" into
private hands,5 2 or be sold to raise revenue. Although the sources of
the data may begin to merge, the ways in which public and private
organizations may use the data raise different concerns.
8
The existence of large, and linked, databases is potentially alarm-
ing in the United States because the U.S. has relatively few data pro-
348. See G. Bruce Knecht, Is Big Brother Watching Your Dinner and Other Worries of Pri-
vacy Watchers, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1995, at BI (quoting warning by Rep. Jim Moran of Virginia).
349. Robert Garcla, "Garbage In, Gospel Out": Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability,
and the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1065 (1991).
350. For an alarming account of FinCEN, see Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveil-
lance in an Information Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 383, 429 (1994).
351. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK:
ELECTRONIC DELIVERY OF FEDERAL SERVICES 144 (OTA-TCT-578 1993).
352. LYON, supra note 313, at 12; Simitis, supra note 316, at 707.
353. On public disclosure, see the magisterial discussion in Kreimer, supra note 84. For an
interesting and skeptical account of the issues in private disclosure, see Lillian R. Bevier, Informa-
tion About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy
Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 455 (1995).
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tection statutes along the lines of the European and Canadian mod-
els.8" U.S. data protection laws place some limits on the use of
government databases.3 55 They also give consumers the right to correct
erroneous entries that may be kept in their files by private credit
bureaus.3"
Although the U.S. has enacted fewer data protection laws than
many other OECD countries this is not necessarily a permanent condi-
tion. 57 There seems to be a widespread belief in the United States that
some computerized intrusions on privacy are unconscionable. In 1991,
Lotus attempted to market CD-ROM disks that contained the names,
address, marital status and estimated income of 80 million household-
ers. Lotus received so many complaints that it felt forced to withdraw
the product.35 8 The political process has demonstrated that it is capable
of reacting swiftly when galvanized by what it perceives to be an outra-
geous attack on privacy. The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988359
was enacted shortly after a newspaper printed the video rental records
of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork,5 "° although video watching
habits resurfaced as an issue in the confirmation hearings of Clarence
Thomas.
Unfortunately, whether data protection laws are effective in pro-
viding long-term protection of the privacy of personal information re-
mains uncertain.361 Data protection laws are likely to work best when
the data collectors are few, or operate in industries that are already
highly regulated, such as banks. Bigger databases are easier to regulate
that many small databases: "the more concentrated the profile data,
354. See Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1324 (1992) (stating that from
an international perspective, the American legislative response to computer processing of personal
data is incomplete); for a careful description and critique of European and Canadian data protection
laws, see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989).
355. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1995).
356. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1995).
357. See generally PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY (1995); BENNETT, supra note
342.
358. LYON, supra note 313, at 15.
359. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988)).
360. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Personal But Not Confidential: A New Debate Over Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1988, at 56.
361. See FLAHERTY, supra note 354, at 406-07 (concluding extensive comparative study with
warning that while it is possible to have effective data protection commissions, it is also possible they
will be viewed as "a rather quaint, failed effort").
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the greater the privacy that is possible by regulation."8 62 As data col-
lection and communication techniques grow, however, it is at least pos-
sible, and perhaps likely, that the large centralized database will be-
come as much of a dinosaur as the mainframe, to be replaced by
networks of small, interlinked databases continually updated in real
time. Data protection regulation would be particularly difficult in such
a world. Worse, the international nature of data flows limits the ability
of any single nation to enforce its data protections laws. 63 As a result,
the European Commission now allows transborder data flows only if
the recipient country allows "an adequate level of data protection.""
Given the mobility of information, even a highly organized interna-
tional effort to control data flows could be undermined by a "data ha-
ven"-the information equivalent to a tax haven-a single nation that
offered to warehouse data offshore.
3 65
C. Implications of Profiling for Anonymity Regulation
In the absence of effective data protection laws, anonymous com-
munication and transactions are the only techniques that are likely to
allow one to control the dissemination of personal information and thus
even partly realize the idea of home as a secure fortress. Digital ano-
nymity may be a rational response to a world in which the quantity of
identifying data on each of us grows daily, and the data become ever
easier for government and private parties to access.
When the state is involved in the data collection, it is reasonable to
ask if the Constitution imposes constraints on how the data may be
used. When the state is not directly involved in the data collection, one
can ask if regulation is appropriate and whether the state has the
power to regulate the collection, storage, and use of the data. More to
362. Conversation with Peter Swire, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia, Jan.
4, 1996.
363. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and the Restrictions on Interna-
tional Data Flows, 80 IowA L. REv. 471, 472 (1995) (noting that even Europe-wide controls on data
flows are insufficient to protect privacy in an era of internationalized communications) [hereinafter
European Data Protection Law]; Privacy and Participation, supra note 325, at 553 (same).
364. Common Position (EC) No/95 With a View to Adopting Directive 94/ /EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995, O.J. (C 93, Apr. 13, 1995), reprinted
in Appendix, 80 IowA L. REv. 697 (1995). For a discussion of what constitutes an adequate level,
see European Data Protection Law, supra note 363, at 480-88.
365. For a discussion of European efforts to prevent personal data from leaving Europe with-
out guarantees that it will not be improperly distributed, see European Data Protection Law, supra
note 363.
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the point, one must ask whether the state may constitutionally forbid
the use of a technique -anonymous digital cash-if the effect of that
ban is to remove one of the major techniques available to those who
wish to use the Internet as a communicative tool, even when money is
required to use the medium, without subjecting themselves to profiling.
1. Privacy-Enhancing Market Solutions Unlikely
It might seem that at least part of the privacy problem could be
solved by creating a property right over information about oneself.8 66 In
this scenario merchants would have to pay for the right to send junk
mail. " ' This cost-shifting regime would make particular sense on the
Internet today, as many people pay telephone or per-e-mail access
charges when they download their e-mail, charges that they have no
way to pass on to junk e-mailers. The problem with a property-rights
approach is that it could easily be defeated by the realities of modern
transactional life. Some U.S. residents might prefer not to give out
their social security number. In practice, however, refusing to give out
this information will complicate many basic transactions. The tele-
phone company may require an enormous deposit before installing a
telephone line-and a much longer delay before installation. Credit
card companies will not extend credit. The bank will not lend money to
buy a house. For all but the most determined, the attempt to withhold
a social security number is likely to be a futile battle, one in which the
merchant's economies of scale mean huge costs for the individual who
has a taste for privacy that is unsatisfied by the default of zero.368 A
similar process would likely occur in the market for transactional infor-
mation. Merchants would include a transfer of the right as part of the
standard for contract they offered to customers. So long as the courts
refuse to rewrite or ignore contracts of adhesion, and as long as in each
individual transaction the cost of not providing the information is dis-
proportionate to the loss (which is a function of the cumulation of the
transactions, not any single transaction), a property rights approach ap-
pears unlikely to have much real influence on database creation.
366. See, e.g., Simitis, supra note 316, at 734 (discussing West German Federal Constitu-
tional Court's protection of "informational self-determination").
367. Cf. Associated Press, "Junk Mail" Suit Seen as Threat to Direct Marketers, Mar. 11,
1996, available online LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (describing efforts by Ram Aurahami to
sue U.S. News & World Report for selling his name to direct marketers without his permission).
368. See, e.g., LYON, supra note 313, at 49 (describing lengthy delays introduced into
purchase of washing machine by his refusal to supply personal data).
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If the property rights approach is impractical, anonymity may be
the only technique of resistance to profiling (short of civil disobedience
or outright surrender) available to the average citizen.3a 9
2. Beached Whalen
870
The growth of profiling technologies means that any attempt to
regulate anonymous communication will have implications that extend
beyond speech. Even a regulation that exempts pure speech and targets
only anonymous transactions could have profound consequences. If pro-
filing is on the increase, and if consumers who have a taste for privacy
are unable to secure changes in the standard forms that govern most
transactions but make no provision for this preference, then transac-
tional anonymity may become the primary means by which consumers
can maintain control over information about themselves. In this view of
the world, any attempt to restrict anonymity could affect not just
speech rights and the right to read, but other wide-ranging privacy in-
terests as well.
The speech-related privacy interests protected by anonymous com-
munications have a constitutional dimension, even if the precise con-
tours of these rights are unclear. 71 In contrast, the privacy interests
threatened by profiling of non-speech commercial transactions cur-
rently have little if any constitutional protection. In part this is because
many of the profilers are private actors, and the U.S. Constitution does
not apply to their actions; 72 however, even when the profiles are main-
tained, required, or used by the government, there appear to be few
applicable constitutional constraints.
The constitutional right to privacy, such as it is, is frequently de-
scribed as having three components: (1) a right to be left alone; (2) a
right to autonomous choice regarding intimate matters; and (3) a right
to autonomous choice regarding other personal matters.37 8
Supreme Court decisions relating to privacy issues have tended to
be Fourth Amendment cases concerned with a governmental claim in
369. Others have reached similar conclusions in other contexts. For example, "[a]nonymity is
the only sure defense" for those exercising upopular constitutional rights that might expose them to
violence, Kreimer, supra note 84, at 40.
370. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
371. See supra Part 11.
372. The privacy provisions of the state constitution of California have been held to apply to
private actors. See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
373. See TRIBE, supra note 132, § 15-1; Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1340.
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the context of a criminal investigation of a right to access to a person
or to data (papers, telephone calls). "Privacy" in a legal sense is also
invoked in special classes of cases that concern the individual's freedom
to make important life choices, particularly regarding sexual and repro-
ductive freedom (contraception, abortion). Although both of these lines
of cases offer language with suggestive implications for a broader right
of privacy, the Supreme Court's major modern discussion of an infor-
mational privacy right remains Whalen v. Roe.
87 '
In Whalen, the Court accepted that the right to privacy includes a
generalized "right to be let alone, '3 7 5 which includes "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. ' 876 Despite finding a
theoretical right to avoid disclosure of intimate personal matters, how-
ever, in Whalen the Court allowed New York state to keep a computer-
ized list of prescription records for dangerous drugs and to require phy-
sicians to disclose the names of patients to whom they prescribed those
drugs.3 77 The decision balanced the social interest in informational pri-
vacy against the state's "vital interest in controlling the distribution of
dangerous drugs. 3878 Finding New York's program to be narrowly tai-
lored, and replete with security provisions designed to reduce the dan-
ger of unauthorized disclosure, the Supreme Court held that the consti-
tutional balance tilted in favor of the statute .3 7'Despite upholding the
mandatory compilation and disclosure of prescription data, the Court
left the door open to future restrictions in light of technical change,
noting that it was "not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized
374. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). For a scholarly analysis of the right to privacy outside the Fourth
Amendment context, see Kreimer, supra note 84.
375. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (finding a constitutional right to 'receive information
and ideas, regardless of their social worth').
376. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977) (acknowledging the existence of the right,
but finding that it could be overcome by a narrowly-tailored program designed to serve the state's
"vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous [prescription] drugs"); see Gary R.
Clouse, Note, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 536,
547-57 (1982) (collecting and dissecting inconsistent circuit court cases dealing with the right to
withhold private information). The right to be left alone, however, is insufficiently compelling to
prevent a large number of physical intrusions to bodily integrity when the police seek forensic evi-
dence relating to a criminal investigation. See ThIBE, supra note 132, at 1331 nn.4-11 (collecting
cases).
377. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593, 603-04.
378. Id. at 598.
379. See id. at 601-04.
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data banks or other massive government files." 0 In so doing, the
Court set the stage for claims that the Constitution embodies a right to
informational privacy,881 although the Court has yet to expand on this
idea in any significant way.
382
3. Anonymous Communication in the Argus State
It is likely that in the future one will have to pay for access to
reading materials on many web pages. It is also possible that the web
or its successors will become a major, perhaps the major, source of in-
formation for many citizens. As noted above, a ban on the use of anon-
ymous digital cash for ordinary tangible commerce faces few constitu-
tional or practical obstacles as applied to the sale of goods.883 As
applied to the sale of reading matter, or information more generally,
the ban potentially is problematic. If every visit to a fee-based web
page leaves a data trail behind it, the reading habits of some persons
are certain to be chilled.s "
380. Id. at 605.
381. See, e.g., Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational
Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 155 (1991) (concluding that because most theories of personhood
assume personal information is a crucial part of a person's identity, there must be a recognized
"right to informational privacy based on personhood" and that information is property protected by
the Fifth Amendment); Clouse, supra note 376, at 541-47 (tracing the development of the right to
informational privacy, and noting the Supreme Court's use of a balancing test to determine whether
an individual's constitutional rights have been infringed by a government-mandated disclosure of
information).
382. In Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977), in which the Court
rejected Nixon's claim that allowing government archivists to review and classify his presidential
papers and effects violated his "fundamental rights ... of privacy," the Court quoted from Whalen
and applied Whalen's balancing test. Nixon's privacy interest was found insufficiently strong to out-
weigh the public interest in preserving his papers. Id. at 465. The issue has also been canvassed in
several lower court cases. Long, supra note 25, at 1192 n.81 (collecting cases).
Perhaps of greater significance are the decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975), and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), in which the Court struck down state
law privacy claims arising from the accurate publication of arguably private facts that had become
matters of public record. The Court did suggest that there "there is a zone of privacy surrounding
every individual," 420 U.S. at 487, but it did not say what it was.
The closest thing to an expansion of Whalen is the unanimous decision in United States Dept. of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989). There the Supreme
Court held that there was a heightened privacy interest in an FBI compilation of otherwise public
information sufficient to overcome a FOIA application. Even if the data contained in a "rap sheet"
were all available in public records located in scattered courthouses, the compilation itself, the "com-
puterized summary located in a single clearinghouse" was not. 489 U.S. at 764.
383. See supra text at notes 302-03.
384. See, e.g., Fabulous Assoc. v. Pa. Public Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d at 780, 786 (3d Cir.
1990) (noting testimony before FCC that telephone sex lines suffer enormous loss in calling volume
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Depending on precisely what types of digital cash were banned, a
prohibition on anonymous digital cash could make it effectively impos-
sible to speak and/or read web pages anonymously whenever any
"marked" funds changed hands. Because the loss of anonymity occurs
when digital money that identifies its owner changes hands, the ano-
nymity of the author and reader would not be preserved by using either
an anonymous web browser or a web page that could not be traced
back to its author.
Broadly, two types of prohibitions on anonymous digital cash can
be imagined: a ban only on cash that allows both parties to remain
anonymous, or a ban that also reaches cash that preserves the anonym-
ity of the payor only. Neither of these hypothetical regulatory schemes
affects the anonymity or traceability of Internet speech and readership
in which no money changes hands.
First, one can imagine a ban on purely anonymous digital cash,
e.g., Mondex-style smart cards with no funds tracing. 85 This narrow
prohibition would not affect DigiCash-style blinded digital coins.3 86 In
this model, the privacy of readers would be unaffected since blinded
coins leave the payor anonymous. Furthermore, the author of the web
page would give up only a very limited degree of anonymity when she
turned the coins in to the bank because nothing about the coin redemp-
tion transaction necessarily tells the bank where the cash came from or
how the author came to acquire it.387
On the other hand, a ban on anonymous digital cash that extended
to payer-anonymous schemes could have First Amendment implications
for its effect on both authors and readers. A ban on payer-anonymous
schemes means that the reader must disclose her identity at least to the
issuing bank, and probably to the author as well. It also means that the
issuing bank is able to link the author to the reader if not inevitably to
the precise reading matter being exchanged.8 88 Furthermore, in some
schemes the reader may be able to learn the identity of the author.
if customers are required to identify themselves); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978).
385. See supra § III.B.5.
386. See supra § III.B.3.
387. In an off-line clearing system, an attempt to spend a coin for a second time should dis-
close the identity of the double-spender. See supra § III.B.3. This attempt at fraud waives any claim
to privacy.
388. See supra § III.B.
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This last effect, the loss of anonymity of the author, is the effect
most clearly at odds with current First Amendment law. 8 9 Further-
more, the author also loses if readers are deterred from purchasing the
material because they cannot do so anonymously. It is well-established
that authors and publishers do not lose their First Amendment rights
by charging for their work.""0 The Supreme Court has recognized that
a regulatory scheme that denies authors the incentive of compensation
"imposes a significant burden on expressive activity"8 91 and that
"[s]ome of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered
for a profit."8 92 "[E]ven under marketplace theories, the loss of speak-
ers is not without significance. An idea confined to the margins of pub-
lic discourse is not likely to have as powerful an impact." 98
The most serious inhibiting effect might fall on the reader,8 9' yet
the reader's personal interest (as opposed to the author's interest in
having readers) is harder to characterize as within the protection of the
First Amendment because it is not obvious that it recognizes a right to
read anonymously. Even if there is a First Amendment right to read
anonymously, that right will not necessarily outweigh a content-neutral
restriction justified by a compelling government interest, especially if
there appears to be no alternative regulation that could accomplish the
goal. On the other hand, a content-neutral rule that closes down an
entire channel of communication may run afoul of the First
Amendment. 95
389. Indeed to the extent that the speech was political speech, it would be directly covered by
the First Amendment precedents discussed supra § II.B.I.
390. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105
(1991); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-31 (1987); Minneapolis Star
"& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comn'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
391. United States v. National Employees Treasury Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 (1995); see
also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115
(1991) (stating that the imposition of financial burdens may have a direct effect on incentives to
speak); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) (observing that the threat of burdensome taxes "can operate as effectively as a censor to
check critical comment").
392. Fox, 492 U.S. at 482; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
393. Kreimer, supra note 84, at 49.
394. For example, people who were identified as recipients of unpopular information could be
subject to various forms of social control, e.g., private blacklisting. See Kreimer, supra note 84, at
42-50.
395. The place of least-restrictive-means analysis as opposed to mere narrow tailoring in the
analysis of content-neutral regulations of speech is a topic far beyond the scope of this article. Ordi-
narily used in evaluating the constitutionality of time-place-manner restrictions, least-restrictive-
means analysis has achieved at least a toehold in content-neutral analysis also. See City of Ladue v.
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The First Amendment protects the rights of readers up to a point.
We have seen that in the U.S. the right to speak anonymously derives
from the First Amendment's protection of speech and association."'
The Supreme Court also has repeatedly stated that the First Amend-
ment protects the right to read (sometimes called the right to receive
information) ,89 most recently striking down a ban on honoraria to mid-
and low-level government employees in part because of the "significant
burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees
would otherwise have written and said."8 8 That said, the contours of
the right to read remain far less well defined than the extent of the
right to speak.
The First Amendment right to read is bound up with a variety of
understandings of the place of the First Amendment in a system of
ordered liberty. It can be said to derive from the right to speak; it can
also be viewed as an independent right without which speech would be
meaningless. The right to receive information can be seen as an inte-
gral part of the individual's right to self-definition and self-actualiza-
Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2044 n. 11, 2045-47 (1994) (assuming that challenged regulation is content-
neutral and then conducting alternative-channels-of-communication analysis); see also Geoffrey
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 46, 57-58 (1987); cf Madsen v. Women's
Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994) (using time-place-manner analysis to determine whether injunc-
tion should be issued that imposed content-neutral burden on speech); City of Los Angeles v. Tax-
payers For Vincent, 459 U.S. 1199 (1983) (not requiring least restrictive means); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (same).
396. See supra § II.B.I.
397. See United States v. National Employees Treasury Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014-15
(1995) (declaring statute violates First Amendment in part because it "imposes a significant burden
on the public's right to read"); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1981) ("[T]he right to
receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of
speech, press and political freedom."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (1974)
(holding that First Amendment right of recipient of prisoner's letter is violated by prison censorship
policy, although disclaiming reliance on a "right to read"); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395
U.S., 367, 390 (1969) (noting "right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
("[ilt is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (holding that "the right to receive, the
right to read" are protected by the First Amendment); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
143 (1943) (First Amendment 'necessarily protects the right to receive' information"); see also
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[t]he Constitution
protects more than just a man's freedom to say or write or publish what he wants. It secures as well
the liberty of each man to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will listen."); Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
398. United States v. National Employees Treasury Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014-15 (1995).
[Vol. 15:2:395
FLOOD CONTROL ON THE INFORMATION OCEAN
tion.s99 Free choice among types of information can be an important
part of individual autonomy. Practiced in groups, the exchange and ac-
cess of information becomes entwined with the right of association, be
it a book club, a church reading group, or a political action campaign.
Alternately, the right to receive information could be understood as an
essential part of the republican vision in which an informed citizenry
takes part in a continuing national political and moral debate; if citi-
zens do not have access to information the debate is impoverished to
the point of pointlessness.4 " In any of these senses, the right to read
undisturbed is indeed a right that "is fundamental to our free
society."4 01
In light of the First Amendment's protection of anonymous speech,
and of the importance of the right to read, one could argue that the
First Amendment protects a right to read anonymously.' 02 There is,
however, no directly relevant decision of the Supreme Court to support
this assertion. The closest thing is Lamont v. Postmaster General,03 in
which the Court struck down a statute requiring post offices to refuse
399. "The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the
human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the devel-
opment of ideas and a sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire
for recognition and affront the individual's worth and dignity." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
400. In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Supreme Court
upheld an FCC refusal to require broadcasters to sell time to anti-war organizations on the grounds
that there was no constitutional right to access to broadcast media. Rejecting the vision of listener
rights to receive specific information, the Court instead held that broadcasters had a right to deter-
mine what ideas are broadcast.
In Red Lion, the Court had previously ruled that listeners had a right to balanced information.
In CBS v. DNC, however, Chief Justice Burger suggested that listeners could not be relied upon to
speak articulately for themselves; broadcasters, although nominally proxies for the public interest,
were thus essentially free to act on their own judgment of what best served the public's interest.
CBS v. DNC is often read to stand for the proposition that neither Red Lion nor the Constitu-
tion require "fairness" in broadcasting, or even as a rejection of the republican vision of a constitu-
tionally protected national conversation. It is important to note, however, that Chief Justice Burger's
opinion rests in part on the prudential grounds that were listeners rather than broadcasters to be
entrusted with editorial discretion, there would be a danger of chaos. To the extent that this decision
relies on a judgment that the public is not competent to speak for itself, it deserves to be rejected; to
the extent that this judgment relies on the intermediation of broadcasters, the direct speaker-to-
reader communication of the Internet is distinguishable.
401. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that First Amendment protects
possession of obscene materials in the home).
402. The storm of protest that greeted the FBI's Library Awareness program suggests that
public expectations and intuitions are offended by government monitoring of private reading matter.
See supra note 338. The Library Awareness program was, however, more directly intrusive than a
government policy that merely makes it more difficult for readers to hide their identities.
403. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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to deliver foreign-mailed communist propaganda unless the addressee
specifically requested the material.04 The Court accepted that this re-
quirement would very likely deter addressees from requesting mail that
might be categorized as communist propaganda,'40 5 and held that the
statute therefore was "at war with the 'uninhibited, robust and wide-
open' debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amend-
ment.' '0  Justice Brennan's concurrence underlined the idea that the
right to speak means little unless the right of the reader is protected
also.'0 7
Courts of Appeal have recognized the right to read in terms that
suggest anonymous reading may be protected by the First Amendment.
"When the effect of banning a form of speech is to prevent receipt of
the message by the intended audience, it cannot seriously be argued
that the ban is innocuous because it applies only to the mode of
speech."'"" Indeed, the Third Circuit held that "[a]n identification re-
quirement exerts an inhibitory effect" which "raises First Amendment
issues comparable to those raised by direct state imposed burdens or
restrictions.' 4 9 Thus, after concluding that strict scrutiny was the ap-
propriate standard, the Third Circuit struck down a state statute im-
posing an identification requirement for the use of phone sex services
because there was a less restrictive alternative. 10
The counter-argument to all this would be that the right to read
and receive information is a derivative right, as is the right to speak
anonymously. The "right" to read anonymously could be described as
doubly derivative from the First Amendment; if so, perhaps it need not
be derived at all. One also might argue that negative and positive rights
should not be confused. Even if there may be a right to be free of
government-created registration rules, such as Lamont, it does not fol-
404. Id. at 302.
405. See id. at 307.
406. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
407. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing
if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them").
408. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 1995) (enjoining
"English only" amendment to state constitution), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
409. Fabulous Assoc. v. Pa. Public Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65).
410. Fabulous, 896 F.2d at 787-88. The Third Circuit distinguished F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC order granting complaint against radio station for broadcast-
ing "patently offensive" language), on the grounds that the telephone was far less pervasive than
broadcast media and required the active choice of the listener to receive it. Fabulous, 896 F.2d at
783. It is debatable whether that distinction applies to the Internet.
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low that the government is foreclosed from taking actions that happen
to make it more difficult for people to read anonymously.4"
There are indeed differences between the facts of Lamont, in
which the government affirmatively imposed a viewpoint-based burden
on the right to read, and a hypothetical ban on anonymous digital cash.
Assuming nevertheless, if only for the sake of the argument, that there
is a First Amendment right to read anonymously, any law that had the
effect of burdening that right would be subject to strict scrutiny if it
was content-based, but to considerably lesser scrutiny if the effect on
speech was only an incidental effect of a regulatory scheme aimed at
non-speech conduct.412
A ban on anonymous digital cash would affect all transactions
equally, not just speech for pay. As such, the ban would be a content-
neutral burden on the right to speak anonymously and/or read fee-
based digital materials anonymously. The ban would therefore be sub-
ject only to intermediate scrutiny on the theory that speech was inci-
dentally burdened by a more general, legitimate, regulatory scheme.'18
411. As Trotter Hardy pointed out in a discussion of this issue on the cyberia-I discussion list,
recognition of a right to read anonymously might pose difficulties for the regulation of reading mate-
rial that must be denied to particular classes of readers, e.g., material that cannot be furnished to
minors. There is, however, a partial technical solution to this problem if a trusted third party can be
found to issue anonymous age credentials. The third party would examine the person's proof of
majority, then issue a certificate to that effect, signed with the certifying authority's public key. See
Froomkin, supra note 228. The certificate need contain only the public key of the person whose age
is being attested, not the person's name, making the credentials both unforgeable and anonymous.
Alas, the system is not foolproof. If Alice, age 17, can persuade Bob, age 21, to give her the private
key associated with the public key in Bob's certificate, Alice can impersonate Bob and no one on the
Internet will be the wiser. It is possible to imagine versions of a digital signature infrastructure in
which possession of another person's digital signature created such a risk for the original owner that
signature sharing became rare, but this is not inevitable.
412. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); see also United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
413. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459-62 (1994) (applying
intermediate scrutiny after deciding that must-carry provision that distinguished between speakers
solely by the technical means used to carry speech is not a content-based restriction); Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (allowing reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech, provided such restrictions are not content-based); City Council of
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (describing an antisign ordinance as con-
tent-neutral); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981)
(holding a time, place, and manner regulation on all solicitations at a state fair to be content-neu-
tral); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367; see also David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech,
42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1988) (discussing the development of the less-exacting incidental regula-
tion doctrine for examining free speech concerns); Stone, supra note 395, at 46 (exploring the nature
of content-neutral review); Ned Greenberg, Note, Mendelsohn v. Meese: A First Amendment Chal-
lenge to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 369 (1990) (distinguishing between
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The general rule would be examined to see whether it burdened "sub-
stantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests."'" The legitimate interests put forward in favor of
the ban are likely to be compelling, including the need to control
money laundering, and to trace illicit transactions, particularly illegal
narcotics but perhaps other crimes also.'15 Against such weighty inter-
ests, the only claims that would have any reasonable hope of prevailing
in traditional intermediate scrutiny balancing would be that the same
objectives could be realized with a lesser burden on speech, or that the
cost to free speech was too enormous to be tolerated.
There are at least two schemes less restrictive than an outright ban
on all forms of anonymous digital cash that might meet the felt needs
of law enforcement. The first scheme is simply to ban only fully anony-
mous digital cash, and to allow payer-anonymous digital cash to circu-
regulations that incidentally restrict speech, which are subject to a lower level of scrutiny, and those
that directly curtail speech, which are subject to a higher level of scrutiny).
414. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989)); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989); Schad v.
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Note that not "sub-
stantially more" is a less exacting standard than "there be no conceivable alternative." See Fox v.
SUNY, 492 U.S. 469, 478; Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171
(1993) (discussing standards of review).
This intermediate scrutiny explains why public libraries can keep records of who checks out
their books even if the First Amendment does protect a right to read anonymously. The library's
record-keeping is a content-neutral rule that burdens no more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests in getting the books back from bibliophillic and larcenous patrons.
Whether libraries can keep the information about the reading habits of their patrons once the books
have been returned is a different question. It is difficult to see what interest the government has in
this information; book usage statistics, for example, do not require that the identity of the patron be
maintained. It may be that the First Amendment, like the American Library Association's cannons
of ethics, requires that the library at least refuse to release this information, and perhaps requires
that it be routinely erased.
One court rejected these arguments, albeit in a decidedly cursory fashion. See Brown v. John-
son, 328 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1983) (rejecting challenge to police subpoena for library circulation
records based on chilling effect on First Amendment rights of library patrons); see also Carolyn M.
Hinz, Note, Brown v. Johnson: The Unexamined Issue of Privacy in Public Library Circulation
Records in Iowa, 69 IOWA L. REV. 535 (1984) (criticizing Brown decision for ignoring relevant U.S.
Supreme Court precedents, failing to apply strict scrutiny, importance of privacy rights at stake, and
failing to consider objective and subjective reasonableness of public expectations of privacy). For a
suggestion that library circulation records are valuable social history that should be preserved, see
SH1IRLEY A. WIEGAND, LIBRARY RECORDs: A RETENTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY GUIDE 1-5 (1994).
Indeed, state laws prohibiting the destruction of public records frequently apply to library circulation
records. Id. at 11. Wiegand also reports a number of cases in which libraries have surrendered
circulation information pursuant to court orders, id. at 139-4, and one case where the library itself
voluntarily published potentially embarrassing patron circulation information in course of a cam-
paign to shame patrons into returning overdue books. Id. at 141.
415. See supra note 299 (discussing "perfect crimes").
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late. While knowledge of the recipients of large amounts of cash is of
value to identifying possible money launderers, this is not a perfect so-
lution from the point of view of maintaining the status quo. Under cur-
rent rules the recipient of a large amount of cash must report the trans-
action and identify the payer.416 With payer-anonymous digital cash
this is no longer possible. Thus, although a world of merely payer-anon-
ymous digital cash may be acceptable to many privacy advocates, it is
unlikely to satisfy law enforcement especially if they were able to per-
suade legislators of the need for the broader ban. In any event, since
this scheme does not fully realize the objectives of a ban on all forms of
anonymous digital cash, it is not evidence that the general ban failed to
be narrowly tailored for First Amendment intermediate scrutiny
purposes.417
The second scheme relies on a technical solution. Rather than en-
code the identity of the owner into the cash in a form that the recipient
and/or the digital cash issuer can read, the owner's identity could be
encoded in a fashion that only the government, or other trusted third
parties, could read.418 The government's right to access the information
in this 'Clipperized cash' could be hedged with procedural safeguards,
or it could be triggered automatically whenever a Clipperized digital
cash transaction exceeded current reporting limits. This scheme would
meet any of the needs of law enforcement that could reasonably be
asserted for an outright ban on anonymous cash-and it would protect
the privacy of users against profiling by private parties-but it would
do so at a cost that privacy advocates are likely to find very hard to
accept. Whether this scheme would protect against government profil-
ing of the reading and spending patterns of citizens would depend on
the safeguards regulating the government's access to the identifying
data.
Because intermediate scrutiny often seems to involve a balancing
test,'19 whether a ban on anonymous digital cash "'unduly constrict[s]
the opportunities for free expression' is likely to be a critical issue.4 20
416. See supra note 288.
417. A fortiori it is also not evidence that the broad ban failed to find the least restrictive
means, if that is the test.
418. See supra text accompanying note 300.
419. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994) (applying the balancing test);
Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (same); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535
(1980) (same); TRIBE, supra note 132, § 12-23, at 979 (stating that the Supreme Court's balancing
test examines "the degree to which any given inhibition ... falls unevenly upon various groups").
420. City of Ladue, 114 S. Ct. at 2045 n.13 (1994) (quoting Stone, supra note 395, at 58; see
also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985) (noting that part of the test is whether an
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These decisions are frankly contextual: "Each method of communicat-
ing ideas is 'a law unto itself' and that law must reflect the 'differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method.1 42 1
In dissent Justice Holmes described the mails as "almost as much
a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues"4 22 Anonymous
reading may yet come to be viewed as almost as much a part of free
speech as the right to use our eyes. As Justice Thomas noted in his
concurrence in McIntyre v. Ohio Electrons Comm'n, "It is only an in-
novation of modern times that has permitted the regulation of anony-
mous speech. 42 " Reading has not been a traditional subject of regula-
tion; metering or monitoring reader's habits simply clangs,4 24 and if
fee-based Internet speech comes to displace television or newspapers as
a prime information medium, we may yet find the possibility of this
monitoring, even if only by private parties, to be sufficiently intolerable
to justify placing restraints on the government's power to deny readers
the tools to remain anonymous.
All this is of course speculation. In the short term, and maybe
longer, the Internet remains a medium in which speech is free in every
sense of the word. The robustness of the speech may be the best evi-
dence that the Internet as a medium will survive well even if anony-
"incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest" (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))).
421. Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (First Amendment guarantees must be "applied in light of the
special characteristics of the ... environment"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (same);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression,
of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may
present its own problems.").
422. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); cf Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971) (quoting Holmes's description
with approval).
423. 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1529 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
424. In this context, it is also interesting to return to Justice Scalia's dissent in McIntyre:
Principles of liberty fundamental enough to have been embodied within constitutional guar-
antees are not readily erased from the Nation's consciousness. A governmental practice that
has become general throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the valida-
tion of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of constitutionality.
Where the meaning of a constitutional text (such as "the freedom of speech") is unclear, the
widespread and long-accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of
what fundamental beliefs it was intended to enshrine.
Id. at 1532-34.
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mous speech can only be free. Indeed, from the point of view of some
regulatory authorities, it may survive all too well.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Lily Tomlin used to do a routine as an elementary school teacher
in which she threatened children that they had better do as she said, or
she would make an entry on their "permanent record that will follow
you for the rest of your life." If it seemed far-fetched back then-and
it didn't always-it seems all too plausible now.
The public worries about threats to its privacy.115 Yet, most popu-
lar conceptions of databases and the effects they are likely to have on
social and economic life are simplistic, often focused on the danger of
inaccurate records, while the more important implications of database
compilation and aggregation remain poorly understood.
The coming growth in transactional and communicative records
pose a little-understood danger to personal privacy, in the sense of con-
trolling information about oneself. As records proliferate, fresh starts
are harder to come by,426 and privacy, even personal identity, are be-
425. A 1995 Harris poll found that 80% of those surveyed agreed that "consumers have lost
all control over how personal information about them is circulated and used by companies." Knecht,
supra note 348, at B1, B7.
426. The lack of accountability in anonymous communication enables a certain type of fresh
start that may otherwise be hard to come by. See Graham, supra note 300, at 1395, 1411 (noting
that allowing persons to conceal information about their past allows them to avoid unfavorable as-
sumptions otherwise made by others). Indeed, people can reinvent their online persona over and over
again.
When and whether people should be allowed fresh starts-or multiple fresh starts-is an inter-
esting legal and philosophical question. For those who came to these shores of their own free will
(unlike those who were already here or came in chains), the decision to come to America was itself a
choice to start anew. Similarly, during the frontier period, the decision to head out West was for
many a new beginning. Short of joining the witness protection program, fresh starts of that type are
today more rare, and appear to be institutionalized only in an economic context, via discharge of
debt in bankruptcy, see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 225-52
(1986) (surveying economic and ethical arguments for discharge). But see F.H. Buckley, The Amer-
ican Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 67 (1994) (arguing that American fresh start
rule is too generous to defaulting debtor and does not well serve efficiency goals).
Several moral philosophers, including Kant, Bentham, and Hegel, opposed official pardons.
Kant, for example, suggested that pardons have no place in a democratic society, since for the com-
munity to fail to punish would be a breach of moral duty. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 28-49 (1989). Nevertheless, despite criticisms that they
undermine the deterrent effect of the law, pardons and more general amnesties have been persistent
features of the U.S. legal landscape. See, e.g., Leo Martinex, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and
Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAx. REV. 535 (1991) (arguing against tax amnesty as ineffective and
likely to reduce tax compliance). Conversely, forgiveness and charity are considered virtues by sev-
eral major religions.
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coming less personal, more commodified. There is a drift towards in-
creased surveillance of various forms whether de facto or de jure. Ano-
nymity is the great potential corrective to all these trends, and is
relatively easy to achieve in electronic communication over the Internet
through a combination of encryption and chained computers running
remailer programs. Transactional anonymity is much more difficult to
arrange in an electronic payments medium. Protocols for digital coins
exist that protect the identity of the payor, but not the payee. Greater
transactional anonymity is possible with digital wallets that store value,
and allow it to be transferred from user to user, without having to clear
the funds through a third party. The degree of anonymity provided de-
pends critically on how the wallets are implemented. It is simple to
create wallets that keep full records over every transaction, and send
them to the bank, or others, whenever they get a chance.
Globalized communications have already transformed the politics
of several countries. Electronic mail is credited with contributing to the
failure of the 1991 coup attempt in Moscow. 2 7 Fax communication
and the presence of CNN limited the Chinese government's ability to
suppress the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.428 The U.S. govern-
ment's awareness of the presence of TV cameras has greatly shaped the
public relations tactics of every foreign military operation since
Vietnam.29
In at least the medium term, the existence of anonymous remailers
and jurisdictions willing to host them means that communicative ano-
nymity is an inevitable consequence of allowing citizens access to the
Internet. The same is not true of digital cash. Although nothing is yet
standardized, many of the digital coins being tested provide no transac-
tional anonymity to the user; others provide anonymity to payers but
not payees. In contrast, smart-card based digital stores of value can be
engineered to afford almost any amount of privacy that the system de-
signers choose.
The degree of anonymity afforded to communications and transac-
tions is a critical question because of the continuing growth of personal
data profiles. Consumers may have to resort to strong forms of ano-
nymity if they wish to restrict the spread of information about their
427. LYON, supra note 313, at 87.
428. See Steven V. Roberts et al., New Diplomacy by Fax Americana, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., June 19, 1989, at 32.
429. See, e.g., Matthew J. Jacobs, Assessing the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the
Persian Gulf War, 44 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1992).
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tastes and activities. This is especially true in countries such as the
U.S. that have limited data protection laws, but it applies with dimin-
ished force even to nations with more regulation because no system of
regulation can control all of the ways in which personal data can be
stored, disseminated, searched, and used.
Whether or not there is a constitutional right to read anony-
mously, a ban on anonymous digital cash risks imposing unwelcome
and perhaps poorly understood consequences on consumers. If the
World Wide Web or its successors become fee-based systems in which
readers are charged for access, a ban on digital cash will turn reading
habits as well as transactions into tradeable data. This could have a
chilling effect on readers and, depending in part on the details of the
ban, on authors also.
The Internet is often seen as an anarchic medium. In some ways,
as the discussion of anonymous communication demonstrates, it is. The
international nature of the Internet makes some kinds of regulation fu-
tile. But not all. As the discussion of digital cash shows, ideas of ano-
nymity and the anarchic communicative regime that it allows can be
difficult to transfer to the world of commerce. The consequence of
traceable transactions, not to mention traceable communication, is that
the Internet or related networks may become the foundation of the op-
posite of anarchy: life in a transparent data ocean, a life in which data
recording everyone's movements, tastes, purchases, medical history,
reading habits, and contacts with officialdom are commodified and
available to some, and perhaps even to all. Perhaps the information
ocean is not, after all, the right metaphor. Perhaps we are headed for
the information fishbowl.
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